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Summary of Thesis 
k 
Global climate change has important implications for the way in which benefits and 
burdens will be distributed amongst present and future generations. As a result, it 
raises important questions of intergenerational distributive ethics, which is the issue 
of how benefits and burdens should be distributed across generations. It is shown that 
two serious problems arise for those who wish to approach these questions by 
utilising familiar ethical principles. The first (the Non-Reciprocity Problem) arises 
from the apparent lack of reciprocity evident in dealings between members of 
different generations. The second (the Non-Identity Problem) arises from the fact that 
the very social policies which climatologists and scientists claim will reduce the risks 
of climate change will also predictably, if indirectly, determine which individuals will 
live in the future. The troubling questions which these problems raise for theorising 
about intergenerational ethics are discussed at length, and it is argued that they do not, 
ultimately, pose an insurmountable barrier for such theorising, and in particular for 
the idea that present persons have wide ranging obligations to members of future 
generations. It is argued, however, that these two problems do severely limit the 
extent to which theories which are reciprocity-based and/or identity-dependent can be 
extended to cover issues of intergenerational distribution. Reciprocity-based theories 
assume that obligations of distributive ethics are owed only to those who can benefit 
others; whereas identity-dependent theories assume that acts, or social policies, 
cannot violate the requirements of distributive ethics if they do not harm, or 
disadvantage, particular individuals. Some positive grounds for our obligations to 
future generations are also outlined. In particular, the idea that members of existing 
generations ought not act so as to undermine the integrity of various future 
communities, such as nations or cultures, is defended. 
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Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 
1. Introduction 
Questions of intergenerational distributive ethics, that is, of how benefits and burdens 
should be distributed across generations, appear to be raised by a number of 
contemporary environmental, cultural, and economic issues. Prominent examples 
include depletion of non-renewable natural resources, destruction of the ozone layer, 
and levels of public debt. However, perhaps the best discussed contemporary public 
issue which raises these questions is that of global climate change. 
1 
Substantial evidence exists that continuing release of greenhouse gasses (GHGs) into 
the atmosphere will have grave consequences for the long-term health of the earth's 
environment and its human inhabitants. In its most recent assessment of the climate 
change issue, for example, the authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) concluded that `the balance of evidence suggests discernible human 
influence on climate change. '2 The IPCC also found that the long-term impact of 
climate change, in virtue of the disturbances it will cause for the functioning of 
II refer to the definition of climate change given in the text of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). According to Article I of the 
UNFCCC, climate change refers to changes in climate which are `attributed directly or 
indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which 
is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods' (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, London, HMSO Books, Cm 2833, 
1995, p. 4). 
2 J. T. Houghton, L. G. Meira-Filho, B. A. Callander, N. Harris, A. Kattenberg, and K. 
Maskell, eds., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996 (hereafter IPCC, 1996a), p. 5. 
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physical systems, will have a predominantly, if not uniformly, adverse impact on the 
health of future human populations. 
It is within this context that concern regarding the way in which climate change will 
have far reaching implications for the distribution of social and economic benefits 
across generations has gathered momentum in recent years. This concern has been 
given official sanction by both the policy documents of individual countries and of 
the United Nations. Article 3.1 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), 4 for example, states that those countries party to it 
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in 
accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities. 
3 See A. J. McMichael et at, `Human Population Health', in R. T. Watson, M. C. Zinyowera 
and R. H. Moss, eds., Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate 
Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (hereafter IPCC, 1996b), pp. 564ff. 
4 The UNFCCC was adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992, and was designed to serve as the 
framework for further co-ordination and negotiation towards legally binding protocols on 
GHG emissions to be agreed in Kyoto in December 1997. According to the latest, Kyoto, 
protocol to the UNFCCC, developing countries must reduce their collective emissions of the 
six most important GHGs by 5.2 per cent by 2012, as compared with present levels. The text 
of the Kyoto Protocol can be found on the world-wide web 
(http: //www. cop3. org/home. html). 
5 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 5. Article 2 of the same 
convention sets out an objective of stabilising atmospheric GHG concentrations at levels 
which `would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' and 
within a time-frame `sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to 
ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner' (p. 5). 
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On the other hand, perhaps the most striking finding of the IPCC's Second 
Assessment Report on the economic and social dimension of climate change, is that 
climate change issues raise `particular questions of equity among generations. '6 
This last claim, while not unchallenged, appears to command very wide agreement 
amongst policy-makers, ethicists, and scientists alike. In fact, the findings of the 
IPCC's Second Assessment Report as a whole command cross party support in the 
UK, and in many other industrialised and developing countries. At the New York 
`Rio Plus Five' Earth Summit held in June 1997, for example, Tony Blair drew upon 
these findings in order to urge all industrialised nations to set ambitious targets for the 
stabilisation, and eventual reduction, of GHG emissions. In his speech to the summit, 
Blair observed that 
This Earth is the only planet in the solar system with an 
environment that can sustain life. Our solemn duty as leaders of the 
world is to treasure that precious heritage, and to hand on to our 
children and grandchildren an environment that will enable them to 
enjoy the same full life that we took for granted. 
The previous Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment, John Gummer, 
also showed himself to be a firm supporter of the IPCC's research findings. Gummer 
endorsed the findings of two important reports on the impact of climate change in the 
6 K. J. Arrow et al, `Intertemporal Equity, Discounting and Economic Efficiency', in J. P 
Bruce, H. Lee and E. F. Haites, eds., Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions 
of Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996 (hereafter IPCC, 1996c), 
p. 130. It is worth noting that IPCC use the notions of `fairness', `equity', and `justice' 
interchangeably (IPCC, 1996c, p. 85). 
7 See "Save the Planet' Plea to World Leaders by Blair', The Times, Tuesday 24 June 1997, 
p. 1. 
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1990's, which predicted various long-term shifts in weather patterns, health problems, 
and economic activity in the UK as a result of climate change. In the foreword to a 
1997 report on the UK's response to the UNFCCC mentioned above, Gummer 
observed that 
Climate change threatens our world and our children's future... If 
we act effectively we can confine the impact of climate change 
within a containable measure. If we do not, the effect could make 
the lives of our grandchildren immeasurably more difficult and 
perhaps threaten the future of the planet itself. 8 
While it might be argued that the content of such speeches, and much of the public 
concern about climate change in general terms, is motivated predominantly by 
common-sense convictions rather than by a fully developed theory of environmental 
or intergenerational ethics, there is at least one line of argument which might be 
appealed to in order to provide an underlying ethical justification for such concerns. 
This line of argument focuses solely on the benefits that maintaining the integrity of 
the climate system will have for future members of the human race, and as such it is 
put forward in the spirit of humanism. The argument has three steps, and it goes 
something like the following: 
8 See The Department of the Environment, Climate Change: The UK Programme, London, 
HMSO Books, February 1997, Cm 3558, p. 3. 
9 Which I take, following Joseph Raz, to be the view that `the explanation and justification 
of the goodness or badness of anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or 
possible, to human life and its quality' (Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1986, p. 194). 
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(1) the changes in the climate system which are being brought about 
by human-originating atmospheric GHG emissions pose a clear 
threat to the well-being of members of future generations. 
(2) human practices which threaten the well-being of members of 
future generations raise important questions of intergenerational 
distribution. 
(3) by virtue of being a clear example of a human-originating 
practice which threatens the well-being of members of future 
generations, climate change raises questions of intergenerational 
distribution. 10 
In this thesis, I will be investigating this important line of argument, which seems to 
underpin much common-sense thinking about the ethical ramifications of global 
climate change, as well as the ethical stance of the IPCC. 
11 In particular, I will be 
investigating the veracity of premises 1 and 2, as well as seeking to show how the 
various debates which arise in relation to these premises might be clarified. Consider 
the former. Some will think that this premise should be abandoned because the 
phenomenon of climate change is a `scare story' with no basis in scientific fact, and 
as such it cannot pose a threat to anyone's well-being, future persons included. 
12 
10 I do not wish to rule out the possibility, of course, that there exist other (humanist or non- 
humanist) arguments which would give a similar unity to these diverse expressions of 
intergenerational ethical responsibility. Those which spring to mind turn on the ethical value 
of non-human animals, components of the natural world, the biosphere itself, or on a more 
theistic model. 
11 See, for example, K. J. Arrow et al, `Intertemporal Equity, Discounting and Economic 
Efficiency', pp. 125M 
12 This view is rarely expressed in print in this country. However, energy industry 
organisations such as the World Energy Council have expressed such opinions in the past. In 
a press release shortly before the publication of the IPCC's Second Assessment Report, the 
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Others have argued that climate change, while it certainly exists, will not have the 
range and depth of adverse effects on future generations that the IPCC suggest. They 
have also claimed that the net long-term impacts of climate change on human-kind 
will either be negligible or mildly beneficial (as a result of reducing cold-related 
deaths and increasing opportunities for outdoor leisure, touristic pursuits and so 
forth). 13 I think that these responses are unsound, however, and I review the 
overwhelming evidence for this view in a review of the science and impacts of 
climate change in section 4 of this chapter. 
Consider, next, the objections which might be directed towards premise 2, which will 
be the primary concern of the thesis. Whereas few deny that global environmental 
problems such as climate change pose a threat to the well-being of future generations, 
it might nevertheless be claimed that such threats are simply not the concern of 
distributive ethics. The requirements of distributive ethics, one might think, bind only 
contemporaries belonging to the same society, or only contemporaries whatever 
society they belong to. 
On the other hand, it might be conceded that the impacts of climate change are of 
relevance for distributive ethics, but only insofar as they threaten the well-being of 
those who will belong to the nearest of future generations. Such claims may appear to 
organisation described the IPCC's research as `deficient and of little value to policymakers. ' 
See 'Climate Report 'Is Deficient", The Financial Times, 25 April 1996, p. 7. 
13 One of the better known proponents of this sceptical position, Patrick Michaels, has 
described the scientific basis of the IPCC's recent Second Assessment Report as 'deeply 
unscientific' (see Fred Pearce, `Greenhouse Wars', New Scientist, 139,1997, p. 38). Other 
sources of the sceptical view can be found in various contributions to the energy industry 
sponsored World Climate Report (edited by Michaels), for example, `Global Warming: 
Slouching Towards Moderation', The World Climate Report, University of Virginia, 2,23, 
1997 (http: //www. nhes. com/FT/features. html). It is also a view which has been embraced by 
Wilfrid Beckerman. See Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens, 
London, Duckworth, 1995, pp. 88ff. 
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be unsound. However, it is an unsettling fact that, while the IPCC take it largely for 
granted that climate change raises ethical questions of unparalleled importance, there 
have been few systematic attempts to test the robustness of premise 2 either (a) across 
different theories of distributive ethics or (b) in the light of some perplexing problems 
associated with extending the scope of these theories to cover issues of 
intergenerational distribution. '4 
Regarding issue (a), I attempt to address this gap in the literature in Chapter 2 of the 
thesis, where I argue that climate change does indeed raise peculiarly important 
questions for a representative sample of theories of the ethics of distribution. 
Regarding issue (b), a little more preliminary comment is required. It appears to be 
the conviction of many that human activities which compound the climate change 
problem are unjust, or unethical, in virtue of harming generations yet unborn. Onora 
O'Neill, for example, writes that `by burning fossil fuels prodigally we accelerate the 
green-house effect and may dramatically harm successors, who can do nothing to 
us. ' 15 However, as I hope to demonstrate in later chapters, there are certain difficulties 
in explaining exactly how our successors can be harmed by acts or policies which are 
necessary conditions of their coming into existence. 16 Nevertheless, a key finding of 
the thesis is that the problem which this observation raises for the intergenerational 
extension of the concept of harm is soluble. 
14 Two exceptions in this regard are the following: John Broome, Counting the Cost of 
Global Warming, Cambridge, The White Horse Press, 1992; and Thomas Hurka, `Ethical 
Principles', in Harold Coward and Thomas Hurka, eds., Ethics and Climate Change: the 
Greenhouse Effect, Calgary, Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993, pp. 23-38. 
15 Onora O'Neill, Towards Justice and Virtue, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996, p. 115. 
16 See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon, 1984, pp. 351 ff. 
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On the other hand, even supposing that future persons can be harmed by actions or 
policies undertaken before they exist, some suggest that the lack of mutual benefit, or 
reciprocity, which characterises dealings between members of different generations 
undermines the claims of future persons to resources currently at the disposal of 
existing persons. '? This is because there exists a close connection between the scope 
of norms of distributive ethics and the notion of reciprocity. In this respect, it is 
claimed, problems with the notion of intergenerational ethics mirror fairly closely 
some of those facing the notion of international ethics. 
19 Nevertheless, a key finding 
of the thesis is that even theories of distribution which appeal to notions of reciprocity 
give rise to norms of intergenerational ethical responsibility. 
It is worth noting that, because I spend most of my time clarifying, and attacking, 
various objections which might be raised to premises 1 and 2, the bulk of the defence 
I provide of the existence of requirements of intergenerational distributive ethics, and 
their application to climate change issues, is a peculiarly indirect one. I set out with 
the deliberate intention to show that none of the objections to the argument outlined 
roughly above are sound, rather than to provide a new theory of intergenerational 
distribution as such. 
However, during the course of the discussion it will also be necessary to introduce 
and examine some positive principles of intergenerational ethics, and one of my main 
findings is that the partial success or application of these principles suggests that 
17 For discussion see Brian Barry, `Justice as Reciprocity', Democracy, Power and Justice, 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1989, pp. 483ff- and chapters 3 and 4 below. 
18 For a discussion of the connection between problems of intergenerational and 
international justice, see Brian Barry, A Treatise of Social Justice: Theories of Justice, 
London, Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989, pp. 183ff. 
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intergenerational ethics does not admit of a tidy theoretical solution. That is, it seems 
unlikely that a single distributive ideal could ever provide the basis for a complete 
explanation of all of the responsibilities we have to future generations which concern 
the benefits and burdens our actions foist upon them. In short, while I hope to provide 
in parts a direct and indirect defence of the view that climate change does raise 
questions of distributive significance, I also find irresistible the view that there are 
multiple, at times conflicting, sources of intergenerational obligation. 
In order to construct a manageable context for my investigation of the IPCC's ethical 
stance, and of the line of argument described briefly above, I will be helping myself 
to three methodological assumptions, two of which are taken from the writings of 
John Rawls. While these assumptions are not beyond criticism, they appear to 
combine to offer the most obvious, and I think clearest, methodological basis in 
which to study questions of intergenerational distributive ethics. The first concerns 
the merits of viewing intergenerational distributive issues in terms of what might be 
called the assumption of extensionality, the second concerns the merits of adopting 
the method of reflective equilibrium, and the third concerns the merits of appealing to 
a restricted range of hypothetical, rather than imaginary, examples. 
In what remains of this introductory chapter, I briefly outline these assumptions and 
the role they play in the thesis. I then provide a chapter by chapter outline of the 
thesis. Finally, I provide a review of recent research in climate change, focusing on 
the way in which such change will influence the distribution of many benefits and 
burdens across both nations and generations. 
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2. Three Methodological Assumptions 
According to what I call the assumption of extensionality, the most appropriate way in 
which to approach questions of intergenerational distribution is to investigate the 
extent to which theories of distributive ethics which serve us well when looking at 
dealings between contemporaries can be extended to cover dealings between non- 
contemporaries. One writer who holds that issues of distributive ethics between both 
generations and nations are best approached as `problems of extension' is John 
Rawls. In Political Liberalism, Rawls writes that the problem of distributive ethics 
concerns the basic structure as a closed background system... If we 
are successful in the case of a [single] society, we can try to extend 
and to adjust our initial theory as further inquiry requires. 19 
Elsewhere, Rawls adds that 
the problem of the law of peoples is only one of several problems of 
extension for these ideas of justice. There is the additional problem 
of extending these ideas to future generations, under which falls the 
problem of just savings. 20 
Obviously there are many theories of intragenerational distribution which one might 
attempt to extend in this way - theories of distributive equality, priority, and 
sufficiency to mention but three. As I hope to show in the chapters that follow, there 
are several problems which face those who wish to extend such theories. However, 
19 Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York, Columbia University Press, p. 272. It is worth 
mentioning that Rawls generally speaks of problems of `distributive justice' rather than 
problems of `distributive ethics', but I assume here that the two ideas are interchangeable. 
20 Rawls, `The Law of Peoples', in Susan Hurley and Stephen Shute, eds., On Human 
Rights, New York, Basic Books, 1993, p. 44. 
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none of these, I will argue, seems to present an insurmountable challenge for those 
who wish to adopt the Rawlsian strategy of extension in this context. 
According to my second methodological assumption, a cogent theory of 
intergenerational distributive ethics must cohere with at least some of our most 
deeply held convictions about intergenerational ethical responsibility. This is not to 
say, however, that the methodological strategy of the thesis will be to engage in what 
has been referred to disparagingly as `piece-meal appeal to intuition'21 - that the 
theories considered will be tested solely according to the extent to which they reflect 
peoples' ethical intuitions. However, it does mean that I seek to take intuitions 
seriously in the thesis. There are a number of ways in which peoples' intuitions about 
distributive ethics might be taken seriously in a project of this nature, but perhaps the 
most obvious, and I think useful, is captured by the notion of `reflective equilibrium. ' 
The notion of reflective equilibrium was introduced to normative ethics by Rawls. 22 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls addresses the issue of how we might best characterise 
the relation between our common-sense beliefs and our ethical or political theories. 
Do the former stand in need of the latter for their justification? Or is the acceptability 
of these beliefs constrained by considerations of theory? Or is the justifiability of 
ethics constrained in some way by our considered common-sense beliefs? Rawls 
suggests that, rather than privileging either side of the equation, we should endeavour 
to find a balance, or equilibrium, between pre-theoretical and theoretical ethical 
beliefs. The basic procedure for doing this is as follows. First, we start with our most 
21 See James Griffin, Value Judgement, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 3 ff. 22 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge (Massachusetts), Harvard University Press, 
1971, pp. 20ff and pp. 48ff. 
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considered pre-theoretical beliefs about an ethical issue (for example, 
intergenerational ethical responsibility) purged of basic inconsistencies. Second, we 
attempt to construct a theory that will explain and give unity to these beliefs. Third, 
we ask whether this theory implies that we ought to change or modify some of our 
pre-theoretical beliefs. Fourth, and depending on our answer to this question, we have 
basically two options: (a) to return to theory and tinker with it until it delivers the 
rights results or (b) to give up some elements of the common-sense position. 
Whether we choose (a) or (b), Rawls thinks, depends on the circumstances of the 
case. If the theory is particularly attractive and any modifications to it appear 
arbitrary, then we may decide to reject common sense (an approach which we might 
refer to as `biting the bullet'). This is an attractive move if we can give a good 
explanation of why the common-sense view is obviously unsound which is 
independent of the theory we give. If, however, the common-sense view is very 
firmly held, then we might wish to modify the theory. Basically, the overall aim is to 
reach a point which we are, on balance, satisfied; where we have reached a `reflective 
equilibrium' between common-sense beliefs about particular practices and our best 
candidate ethical theory23 
The method of reflective equilibrium appears to be particularly well suited to issues 
of intergenerational and climate change ethics as (1) discussions of climate change 
issues, as well as issues of environmental responsibility in general, are well rooted in 
both the media and in public life more generally, and (2) the issue of intergenerational 
23 Griffin describes the procedure here as being one of `going back and forth between 
intuitions about fairly specific situations on the one side and the fairly general principles that 
we use to try to make sense of our moral practice on the other, adjusting both, until 
eventually we bring them all into coherence' (Value Judgement, p. 9). 
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responsibility is not one which fails to generate intuitions on the part of the general 
populace. On the contrary, most people have quite deeply held convictions about the 
ethics of despoiling the environment, or of running up huge national debts, or of 
failing to bequeath some cultural and artistic heritage for the sake of future 
generations. As demonstrated above, a cursory trawl through the broadsheets reveals 
that both the findings of the IPCC, as well as more abstract commitments to the idea 
of intergenerational ethical responsibility made by politicians such as Tony Blair, 
have generated a great deal of media coverage. This does not imply that peoples' 
convictions about climate change ethics should be viewed uncritically, for the nature 
of reflective equilibrium as an approach to applied ethical issues is that of balancing a 
sensitivity to both peoples' intuitions with the fact that these intuitions often need to 
be revised in the light of fresh ethical, or indeed empirical, findings. However, it does 
suggest that an approach to intergenerational ethics which takes such intuitions 
seriously will have a rich vein of intuitions to draw upon. 
According to my third methodological assumption, while a coherent approach to 
issues of intergenerational ethics requires extensive appeal to hypothetical examples 
(which, for example, attempt to tease out our convictions about the merits of climate 
change policies which will have differential impacts on the quality of life of future 
human populations), it should as far as possible avoid any appeal to imaginary 
examples. As Dale Jamieson has argued recently, the difference between these two 
sets of examples is somewhat difficult to draw, but it is important as the intuitions 
teased out by philosophical appeals to imaginary examples appear to be somewhat 
more problematic than those teased out by appeals to hypothetical examples - 
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imaginary examples, according to Jamieson, are those which `involve logical 
possibilities that could occur only in a world very different from ours. '24 
Consider the series of imaginary science fiction examples which involve people being 
`tele-transported' from one planet to another, and which are discussed by Derek Parfit 
in his book Reasons and Persons. 25 Parfit thinks that, by appealing to peoples' 
intuitions about such examples, we can make progress in our characterisation of 
personal identity and its importance. One problem with Parfit's methodological 
strategy is that even if people entertain clear and deeply held convictions about 
whether being tele-transported would involve the termination of their identity, it 
might be doubted that such convictions can be used to explain, and give unity to, the 
beliefs they hold about personal identity in less schematic, and more mundane, 
contexts. The idea is that the imaginary case and the actual case here are not 
relevantly similar to the point that any important insight can be drawn from our 
teasing out of peoples' convictions in the light of the former. 
When we turn to hypothetical examples, however, these problems seem at the very 
least less problematic. Jamieson describes hypothetical examples as being those 
which `involve instances of situations or events that have occurred, or could occur 
without requiring us to rewrite physics or change our basic conception of how the 
world works. w26 Such examples seem much less prone to the objection that the set of 
circumstances that they describe are so dissimilar to those of the real world that our 
convictions cannot be transposed between these cases. Fortunately for the purposes of 
24 Dale Jamieson, `Method and Moral Theory', in Peter Singer, ed., A Companion to Ethics, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1996, p. 484. 
25 Parf it, Reasons and Persons, pp. 200ff. 
26 Jamieson, `Method and Moral Theory', p. 484. 
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 15 
the thesis, the range and depth of empirical evidence concerning climate change and 
the way in which it will impact upon the quality of life experienced by future human 
populations paves the way for a consideration of hypothetical examples without 
deviating from plausible, and scientifically grounded, assumptions about the world. 
3. Outline of Thesis 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, comprising the remainder of this 
chapter and chapter two, attempts to set out the strongest possible case for the view, 
endorsed by the IPCC, that climate change raises peculiarly important questions of 
intergenerational distribution. In section 4 of this chapter, I review recent empirical 
research into the science of climate change, as well as the evidence amassed for the 
view that climate change will impact significantly on the way in which benefits and 
burdens are distributed across existing and future generations, albeit in a way which 
cannot be predicted with great accuracy. The idea here is that the assumption that 
climate change will impact upon the distribution of benefits and burdens across 
generations (premise I of the argument considered above) requires investigation, 
particularly as some enthusiasts of economic growth deny that failure to do something 
about increasing levels of GHG emissions will endanger the quality of life 
bequeathed to our remote descendants. 27 
In chapter two, I go on to argue that the predominantly adverse effects of climate 
change on the quality of life of future persons are cause for concern for a 
representative sample of theories of distributive ethics. That is, the long-term effects 
27 See Wilfrid Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens, pp. 90ff. 
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of climate change pose questions of intergenerational distributive ethics which are 
robust across many theories of distribution, on the assumption, that is, that we seek to 
extend these theories in the manner in which Rawls suggests. The bulk of my 
comments here will be targeted towards theories of distributive equality, priority, and 
sufficiency - although I will also discuss in less detail communitarian and libertarian 
theories. 
The second part of the thesis contains an extended discussion of two especially 
problematic issues for those who seek to extend familiar distributive theories across 
generations, namely, the issues of Non-Reciprocity and Non-Identity. A number of 
writers have appealed to these two issues in order to defend the thought that no, or at 
least no plausible, distributive theories can be extended beyond the immediate future - 
in effect a denial of premise 2 of the above argument - so a detailed analysis of them 
seems crucial for any thorough evaluation of the IPCC's ethical claims. 
I deal with the issue of Non-Reciprocity in chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I outline 
the claim that the lack of direct reciprocity, or mutually beneficial interaction, evident 
in dealings between non-contemporaries undermines the intergenerational extension 
of distributive ethics -a claim which gives rise to what I call the Non-Reciprocity 
Problem. In later sections of Chapter 3, and in the whole of Chapter 4, I go on to 
discuss several considerations which challenge the force of this problem. In Chapter 
3, for example, I argue that even if we accept the controversial claim that there exists 
a tight connection between the notion of reciprocity and the scope of distributive 
ethics, dealings between persons belonging to different generations are subject to an 
indirect form of reciprocity which is sufficient to solve the Non-Reciprocity Problem. 
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Also in Chapter 3, I consider some considerations which tend to undermine the view 
that there is a tight connection between reciprocity and the scope of distributive 
ethics. In Chapter 4, I attempt to defend the notion of posthumous harms from certain 
objections, and go on to suggest that this notion seems to support the view that there 
may be some degree of direct reciprocity evident in dealings between persons 
belonging to different generations after all. 
The issue of Non-Identity is dealt with in chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, I outline the 
argument that the dependence of future individuals' identities on the behaviour of 
their ancestors renders implausible the idea that existing persons can behave wrongly 
by damaging the environment which future persons will one day inherit from them 
(for example, by adopting public policies which enhance the greenhouse effect). In 
this chapter I also outline one response to what has been called the Non-Identity 
Problem, a response which is grounded in the notions of specific interests and rights. 
However, I argue that the appeal to such interests and rights is not a robust solution to 
the Non-Identity Problem. 
In chapter 6, I take a more detailed look at another response to the Non-Identity 
Problem, which focuses on the way in which environmentally damaging policies, 
even if they result in no existing or future individuals being harmed, could be 
expected to harm certain future collectivities. It is suggested that a limited range of 
obligations of intergenerational distributive ethics could be grounded in the claims 
which these collectivities have to goods required to enable them to survive and 
flourish in the future. However, it also suggests that the most coherent basis for 
intergenerational distributive ethics lies in the endorsement of a quite controversial 
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 18 
meta-ethical claim, namely, that acts or policies (for example, climate change 
policies) can violate the requirements of distributive ethics even if they harm no 
particular existing or future persons. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I present a brief summary and restatement of the argument, and 
outline some implications which I think it has for both the way in which we should 
regard recent attempts to create legally binding protocols designed to achieve 
reductions in global GHG emissions. 
4. A Review of Recent Research on Climate Change 
In the following, I review some of the most recent research on climate change, and 
the impacts which it is expected to have on the quality of life enjoyed by future 
human populations. I have in mind two aims in providing the review. First, to 
demonstrate that climate change informed discussions of intergenerational ethics do 
not merely raise questions which are philosophically fascinating, they also concern 
urgent practical challenges which will almost certainly confront humanity during the 
decades and centuries to come. Second, to provide valuable background information 
with respect to the hypothetical examples which I will refer to in later chapters of the 
thesis devoted to the problems of Non-Reciprocity and Non-Identity. 
4.1 The Science of Climate Change 
4.1.1 The Natural Greenhouse Effect 
Energy is radiated from the sun mainly in the visible, short-wave, part of the 
spectrum. Much of this energy reaches the Earth, apart from a small amount which is 
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reflected back into space, with the result that the surface of the Earth is warmed. The 
energy which reaches the earth's surface is redistributed throughout the atmosphere 
(notably by the processes of atmospheric and oceanic circulation) and ultimately 
much of it is radiated back into space at longer wavelengths. In equilibrium, the 
amount of energy which the earth's surface receives from the sun is balanced by the 
amount of energy radiated back into space, although this outgoing energy is radiated 
at a much lower temperature. Any disturbance in the amount of radiation received 
form the sun and/or the amount of energy which is retained in the earth's atmosphere 
will bring about a change in the total energy available in the earth's atmosphere, such 
changes being known as radiative forcings. 28 
One factor which has altered the balance of incoming and outgoing radiation in the 
past, and which has caused a positive radiative forcing, is the accumulation of 
naturally occurring GHGs in the atmosphere. When present in the atmosphere at 
sufficient concentrations, GHGs, such as carbon dioxide (C02) or water vapour, 
reduce the efficiency by which the Earth cools to space by absorbing outgoing 
radiation at certain wavelengths. The radiation trapped by the absorptive properties of 
CO2 and water vapour warms the lower part of the earth's atmosphere, the 
troposphere, and as a result the warmed air radiates energy in all directions, keeping 
the Earth warmer than otherwise would be the case (at present, about 15°C averaged 
out). The remainder of the tropospheric radiation subsequently leaks out into higher 
and higher levels of the atmosphere, ultimately escaping into space. 
28 See IPCC, 1996a, pp. 13-14; and pp. 108-118. 
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In simple terms, the process just explained is the natural greenhouse effect. In the 
absence of this effect, the Earth would be expected to have a similar surface 
temperature to the moon (i. e. an inhospitable -18°C). 
4.1.2 The Enhanced Greenhouse Effect 
Human activities which increase the concentrations of water vapour and C02, as well 
as other GHGs, also have the effect of reducing the efficiency with which the Earth 
cools to space. Since the beginning of the industrial revolution, concentrations of 
human-originating GHGs in the atmosphere have been increasing at various rates, 
predominantly as a result of various industrial and agricultural practices. 
9 The 
current and pre-industrial levels of a sample of these gases are included in Table 1 (on 
the next page). 
As Table 1 shows, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased from 280 
ppmv in pre-industrial times to 358 ppmv in 1994, and the IPCC claim that there is 
`no doubt that this increase is largely due to human activities, in particular fossil fuel 
combustion. 30 While atmospheric CO2 concentrations are believed to be responsible 
for the bulk of the human originating, or anthropogenic, radiative forcing witnessed 
over the course of the twentieth century, the IPCC points out that the importance of 
other GHGs ought not be underestimated - particularly since these gases are much 
29 See J. Alcamo et al, 'An evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emissions Scenarios', in J. T. 
Houghton, L. G. Meira Filho, J. Bruce, H. Lee, B. A. Callander, E. Haites, N. Harris and K. 
Maskell, eds., Climate Change 1994: Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an 
Evaluation of the IPCC IS92 Emissions Scenarios, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
(hereafter IPCC, 1994); see also IPCC, 1996a, p. 78. 
30 IPCC, 1996, pp. l4ff. 
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more efficient at inducing climatic change than CO2, and their combined climatic 
impact relative to CO2 is increasing sharply. 31 
TABLE 1: Current and Pre-Industrial Concentrations of Greenhouse Gases32 
Greenhouse Gas Pre-Industrial 1994 Atmospheric 
Atmospheric Atmospheric Lifetime 
Concentration Concentration (in years) 
Carbon Dioxide 280ppmv 358ppmv 50-200 
Methane (CH4) 700ppbv 1720ppbv 12-120 
Molecular Nitrogen (N2) 275ppbv 312ppbv 50 
Trichlorofluromethane (CFC- n/a 268pptv 12 
11) 
Chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC- n/a 110ppty 12 
22) 
Perfluoromethane (CF4) n/a 72pptv 50,000 
A key finding of the IPCC's 1996 Second Assessment Report is that the build up of 
human-originating GHGs in the atmosphere has already caused a small, but 
noticeable, warming of the earth's atmosphere. The IPCC observe that the warming 
witnessed in this century `is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin [and] the balance 
of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human influence on global climate. '33 
31 IPPCa, 1996, pp. 15-23. 
32 Source: IPCCa, 1996, p. 15. 
33 IPCC, 1996, p. 6. 
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 22 
This finding, more than any other, has attracted the widespread attention of the media, 
public, and interest groups which represent the extremes of the climate change issue. 
This is an especially important finding as some writers have suggested that unequal 
distributions of benefits and burdens which arise naturally - that is, not as a 
consequence of human action - may not raise questions of distributive ethics. 
34 As 
Temkin has argued recently, those who subscribe to this view `may not only be 
unconcerned about "natural" inequalities within societies - say, between the blind and 
the sighted - they may be unconcerned about the "natural" inequalities 
between rich 
and poor countries, or between present generations and past and future ones. '35 
It is also worth noting, however, that the IPCC's findings in this regard, as well as the 
climate models which are used to support them, are one of the main targets of the 
climate change sceptics. The problem, argue the sceptics, is that they do not appear to 
explain why temperature increases at the ground level in the past twenty years or so 
have not been accompanied by a similar warming of the atmosphere36 For the student 
of climate change ethics, however, much of this dispute is of limited relevance. 
Very few sceptics, for example, deny the existence of climate change altogether, or 
that climate change will impact to some extent on the distribution of benefits and 
burdens across generations. Rather, they emphasize that the warming will be less 
marked than suggested by the IPCC (with a doubling of CO2 in the atmosphere 
raising average temperatures by between 1 and 1.5°C -a figure towards the bottom 
34 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974, Ch. 7. 
35 Larry Temkin, `Justice and Equality: Some Questions About Scope', in Ellen Frankel 
Paul, Fred Miller, and Jeffrey Paul, eds., The Just Society, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p. 76. 
36 Indeed, some researchers have claimed that the lower atmosphere, the troposphere, has 
actually cooled in recent years. See Fred Pearce, `Greenhouse Wars', p. 43. 
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end of the IPCC's predictions) and that climate change will bring about many more 
beneficial effects on future human populations than are currently admitted by the 
IPCC (such as decreasing winter mortality and morbidity). Thus while Patrick 
Michaels (a leading sceptic) has remarked in an interview with New Scientist that 
`you can't make a case for a global apocalypse out of a 1.5°C warming', even the 
changes in climate predicted by the sceptics are consistent with the claim that climate 
change raises important questions of intergenerational distribution, for a 1.5°C 
warming will certainly impact on the health, welfare, and quality of life of future 
human populations. 7 
4.1.3 Three Important Findings 
Beyond their endorsement of the enhanced greenhouse effect, the IPCC have made a 
number of important claims which are relevant to the problem of intergenerational 
climate change ethics. The most important of these are (a) that climate is expected to 
change in the future regardless of the actions of existing and future governments; (b) 
that uncertainties associated with predicting climate change do not imply that nothing 
should be done to reduce the threat of future climate change; and (c) that there are 
measures of mitigation and adaptation available by which the future costs of change 
could be reduced. 38 1 briefly expand upon each of these claims below. 
(a) In order to establish the magnitude of future climate changes, it is necessary to 
predict future atmospheric concentrations of both natural and anthropogenic GHGs. 
This requires careful determination, particularly as levels of anthropogenic GHG 
37 Pearce, 'Greenhouse Wars', p. 43. 
38 IPCC, 1996a, pp. 3-7. 
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emissions are susceptible to factors such as economic growth that are within human 
control. As part of its research into climate change, the IPCC has developed six 
`emissions scenarios' in order for it to predict future levels of GHG emissions, and 
with them likely figures for global warming in the decades up to the year 2100.39 
These scenarios covered all the major GHGs, and each one incorporates different 
assumptions about rates of increase in world population, economic growth, and 
success of existing attempts to limit GHG emissions by certain international 
agreements. The assumptions adopted by three of the six scenarios developed by the 
IPCC are particularly interesting. The three serve as the scenarios which proffer the 
largest, smallest, and mid-range predictions for radiative forcing, global warming, and 
sea-level rises over the next century. The IPCC's projections for these three scenarios 
are contained in Table 2 (on the next page). 0 From the ethical point of view, the 
IPCC's projections of future global warming and sea-level rises on all scenarios 
provides the core scientific basis for the proposition that increasing GHG 
concentrations will influence the distribution of benefits across many generations. 
(b) The IPCC admits that there are numerous limits on their ability to predict the 
nature and limits of future climate change. They mention three particular areas where 
future research is essential if the biggest uncertainties are to be removed or reduced. 
39 IPCC, 1994, pp. 251ff; IPCC 1996a, pp. 39ff. 40 While atmospheric GHG concentrations are evenly distributed throughout the globe, 
localised differences in the nature of climate processes mean that the effects of both global 
warming and sea-level rises will vary from region to region. According to the latest 
Department of the Environment report into the effects of climate change, and on the 
assumption that no `major global policies of reducing greenhouse gas emissions are 
enacted', temperatures over the United Kingdom are expected to rise at a rate of 0.20C per 
decade, there will be an increase the frequency of very warm seasons, and annual rainfall 
will increase by around 10% by the year 2050 (M. L. Parry et al, Review of the Potential 
effects of Climate Change in the United Kingdom, London, HMSO Books, 1996, p4. 
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First, the projection of future emissions of GHGs and other relevant 
anthropogenically produced agents (e. g. aerosols). Second, the representation of 
climate processes in climate change models (e. g. so called `feedback' processes). 
Third, the collection of climate change data (e. g. solar output). 
TABLE 2: IPCC Projections for Future Climate Change41 
Climate Projected CO2 Emissions Projected Global Air Projected Global 
Scenario 1991-2100 (Giggatonnes Surface Temperature Sea-Level Rise 
of Carbon (GtC)) Increase 1991-2100 1991-2100 
IS92c 770 GtC 1°C 15cm 
IS92a 1500 GtC 2°C 50cm 
IS92e 2190 GtC 3.5°C 95cm 
The IPCC notes that `future unexpected, large and rapid climate system changes (as 
have occurred in the past) are, by their nature, difficult to project', a consideration 
which it observes gives rise to the possibility of 'surprises. 42 However, the IPCC at 
no stage argues that these uncertainties provide a justification for delaying actions 
designed to reduce the risks of climate change. On the contrary, it suggests that the 
present generation ought to insure themselves against the risk of bringing about 
detrimental future effects as a result of climate change. According to what they call 
41 Source: IPCC, 1994, pp. 261-2; IPCC, 1996a, pp. 5-6. 
42 IPCC, 1996a, p. 7. 
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 26 
the precautionary principle, `actions giving rise to possible but quantifiably unknown 
and potentially very large risks [ought to be] avoided or corrected. '43 
The IPCC's defence of the precautionary principle is of particular ethical importance 
because it runs counter to a claim which is made from time to time in the literature on 
intergenerational ethics, namely that our lack of knowledge about the long-term 
effects of our actions on future generations, for example as relating to the effects of 
emissions of GHGs, in some way diminishes our responsibilities to them. 44 
(c) There would, perhaps, be little point in considering climate change as raising 
important ethical questions, either as relating to the extension of ethical principles 
across time or space, if little could be done to offset or reverse the bad effects it 
threatens for future quality of life. Fortunately, it would appear from the IPCC's 
research that there are several options available for governments, in particular, which 
would reduce, or reduce the threat of, these bad effects. 
There are, broadly speaking, two separate categories of measures which the IPCC 
suggest might be undertaken here: measures of avoidance and measures of 
adaptation. Measures of avoidance, moreover, can be divided into two finer 
categories: measures which will increase the number or efficiency of sinks and 
measures which will reduce the number or efficiency of sources of GHGs. GHG 
sources are processes or activities (such as fossil fuel combustion) which introduce 
GHGs, or precursors of GHGs, into the atmosphere. GHG sinks, on the other hand, 
43 IPCC, 1996c, p. 185. For a critical discussion of this principle, see Beckerman, Small is 
Stupid, pp. 88-103. 
44 For a critical discussion of this claim, see Val and Richard Routley, `Nuclear Energy and 
Obligations to the Future', Inquiry, 21,1978, pp. 149ff. 
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are processes, activities or mechanisms (such as plant life or the oceans) which 
absorb certain GHGs so that they play no further role in warming the atmosphere 45 
The IPCC claims that reductions in atmospheric GHG concentrations could in fact be 
achieved by both reducing the climatological impact of sources, and increasing the 
impact of sinks. For example, measures could be adopted to increase energy 
efficiency in both the industrial and domestic sectors; transport practices might be 
altered; and more efficient land management practices could be adopted. Moreover, 
many of these measures, according to the IPCC, would have benefits which would 
equal or exceed their costs, quite apart from the way in which they would be expected 
to mitigate the threat of climate change. "' 
4.2 Climate Change and Human Population Health 
The health of human populations - both presently existing and those yet unborn - 
depends upon the maintained integrity of a variety of physical systems (such as 
weather patterns) as well as that of ecosystems (such as agricultural ecosystems). 
Shifts in the conditions which determine the integrity of these systems brought about 
by climate change, therefore, pose a potential threat to the health of human 
populations. While there is a considerable amount of uncertainty associated with 
predicting the future human health implications of climate change - particularly in the 
longer-term - the IPCC's Second Assessment Report defends three key findings 
relating to the likely health impacts of climate change. First, it argues that the 
45 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, p. 5. 
46 The IPCC describes these as `no regrets' measures, or measures 'which are worth doing 
anyway. ' See IPCC, 1996c, p. 5, p. 15n. 
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cumulative impacts of climate change on human health will be, on balance, extensive 
and adverse. 7 Second, it argues that climate change will often impact upon human 
health through indirect and non-immediate pathways. 
8 Third, it is argued that the 
indirect impacts of climate change will predominate over the direct impacts on the 
assumption that climatic changes continue in the longer-term. 
9 
The IPCC refers to a number of consequences regarding the likely effect of climate 
change on human health. Perhaps the most notable of these were those regarding 
which the IPCC predicted would occur with a high degree of confidence. According 
to the IPCC's definition, such findings were those denoted by a `wide agreement, 
based on multiple findings through multiple lines of investigation. 'S0 Three human 
health related impacts of climate change which the IPCC predicted with the highest 
degree of confidence were (a) increases in deaths as a result of increases in frequency 
in extreme weather events, (b) increases in mortality and illness following increases 
in the frequency or severity of heat stress, and (c) increases in potential transmission 
area of various biological disease agents. 
I discuss each of these potential health impacts in brief below. " 
47 See A. J. McMichael et al, 'Human Population Health', in IPCCb, pp. 561-84. 
48 According to the IPCC, direct impacts are those which `result from changes in climate 
characteristics or short-term weather extremes that impinge directly on human biology', such 
as those connected with thermal stress and extreme weather events. By contrast, indirect 
impacts will be those that `do not entail a direct causal connection between a climatic factor 
(such as heat, humidity, or extreme weather event) and human biology', such as those 
connected with air pollution (see IPCC, 1996b, pp. 568ff). 
49 IpCC, 1996b, p. 563. 
50 IPCC, 1996b, p. x. 
51 While I do not discuss the possible beneficial impacts of climate change on human health, 
it does seem likely that there will be some of these - one example being decreases in cold- 
related deaths in winter months in the countries of Northern Europe. I assume that providing 
evidence for the likely negative impacts of unchecked climate change is sufficient in itself to 
demonstrate that important questions of intergenerational distribution are posed by climate 
change and climate change polices. 
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4.2.1 Extreme Weather Events 
Extreme weather events have been defined recently as `infrequent meteorological 
events that have a significant impact upon a society or ecosystem at a particular 
location. '52 Such events can occur suddenly (as in the case of floods or cyclones) or 
more gradually (as in the case of droughts). Climate change is expected to lead to a 
rise in the frequency of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, forest fires, 
wind storms, and tropical cyclones, in virtue of its impact upon the variability of 
weather conditions as well as mean climate. The IPCC claims that if the number of 
extreme weather events increases, `deaths, injuries, stress-related disorders and the 
many adverse health effects associated with the social disruption, enforced migration 
and settlement that these events entail, would also increase. ' 
53 While it seems clear 
that certain populations will be particularly vulnerable to these phenomena (such as 
impoverished island-based societies and developing nations more generally), 
industrialised countries will also be at risk. Parry et al suggest, for example, that 
climate change will prompt an increase in the frequency and intensity of storms, high 
winds, and river flooding and would be expected to have a variety of, largely 
negative, effects on human health in the United Kingdoms` 
Consider the example of floods. Floods are caused by one or a combination of three 
events, and all of these are influenced by climate variables. 55 First, when there is a 
sudden increase in rainfall in a vulnerable location. Second, when there has been a 
52 A. J. McMichael, A. Haines, R. Slooff and S. Kovats, eds., Climate Change and Human 
Health, Geneva, World Health Organisation, 1996, p. 123. 
53 Climate Change and Human Health, p. 123; see also IPCC, 1996b, pp. 570-I. 54 See Parry et al, Review of the Potential effects of Climate Change in the United Kingdom, 
pp. 192-3. 
55 See McMichael et al, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 129-32; and pp. 145ff. 
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sustained bout of rainfall culminating in soil saturation. Third, when there are rises in 
sea-levels in coastal areas for reasons unconnected to rainfall events (for example, as 
a result of oceanic thermal expansion). The IPCC suggest that climate change will act 
so as to increase the frequency of all three of these events. It will, for example, affect 
the distribution and intensity of rainfall, bringing about an increase in the frequency 
of days where heavy rainfall occurs. As noted above, it is also expected to bring about 
significant rises in global sea-levels solely as a result of oceanic thermal expansion. 
An increase in the number, and intensity, of flood events would be expected to raise 
many of the same problems which large-scale flooding has in the past, though 
possibly on a greater scale. Countries with a history of flood damage would be 
particularly at risk. Bangladesh, for example, has already experienced one recent 
flood, in 1991, which killed an estimated 140,000 people. McMichael et al point out 
that most of the deaths and injuries caused by floods occur within a short space of 
time after the flood starts - the main cause of death during a flood being drowning. 
56 
However, floods take their toll on other aspects of human health. First, due to the 
problems associated with maintaining sanitation facilities in the aftermath of 
flooding, the incidence of infectious- diseases often increases. Second, the nutritional 
status of flood victims (particularly the young and the elderly) is vulnerable in the 
aftermath of flooding. Third, by virtue of damaging containment facilities of toxic 
substances, flooding can lead to environmental pollution and subsequent human 
health problems, for example related to the contamination of food supplies with 
pesticides. Fourth, a number of studies have suggested that some of the most 
56 McMichael et al, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 130ff. 
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significant (and long-term) human health impacts of flooding relate to post-traumatic 
stress, and other psychological disorders. 57 
Because of their localised, but massive, effects on human communities and the 
wherewithal they need to flourish, floods in the past have led to the complete 
destruction of some communities' ways of life. Unfortunately, very little research has 
been conducted on the cultural cost of floods which have resulted in the complete 
destruction of a community or set of communities - either with respect to island, or 
other low-lying, communities. However, I think we can assume that these costs would 
be very high indeed; how high would presumably depend on the view one takes of the 
value of communities. 8 
4.2.2 Heat Stress 
As noted above, one of the key features of climate change over the next century will 
be increases in global air surface temperature. Increases in air temperature will be 
accompanied by an increase in the frequency of very hot days, as well as moderately 
warmer seasons, years, and decades. Extremes of heat are a well known cause of 
physiological stress and death. They are known, for example, to cause damage to 
internal organs and exacerbate cardiorespiratory and cardiovascular diseases in 
humans, as well as causing accident rates to rise. 59 
57 See McMichael et al, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 139-41. 
58 For more on this issue, see chapter 6 below. 
59 The incidence of heat-related deaths and illnesses is also known to be affected by socio- 
economic factors, such as class background and ethnicity. Thus, climate change is expected 
to bear hardest, in terms of its heat stress producing impacts, on ethnic minorities, and those 
who already suffer from deprivation, such as the poorly housed or nourished, and this 
accounts for one of the reasons why the relationship between the issues of social exclusion 
and climate change is generating considerable interest from policy-makers and academics. 
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It is in this context that McMichael et al observe that one `near certain outcome of 
climate change is an increase in heat related illnesses and deaths, particularly in 
response to episodes of stressful weather, such as heat waves. '60 A partial offsetting 
factor in terms of the overall balance of heat-related deaths and illnesses which 
extremes of heat will bring to future populations lies in the consideration that mean 
temperature rises in winter should lead to a decline in cold-related illness and deaths 
during the winter months, although recent research suggests that increases in summer 
heat-related deaths will outweigh the decrease in winter cold-related deaths 61 
4.2.3 Biological Disease Agents 
Biological organisms and processes linked to the spread of infectious disease are 
sensitive to changes in climate variables such as temperature, rainfall and humidity. 
62 
Climate change, therefore, could be expected to cause widespread, if uncertain, shifts 
in the pattern of both infectious disease agents, and the carriers of these diseases. 
Climate change could also be expected to affect the geographical distribution of 
diseases whose transmission is not vector-based, but food or water-borne. 
63 This is 
because temperature, in particular, is an important influencing factor in the lifetime 
and reproductive behaviour of infectious agents in general terms. In their analysis of 
the problem of climate change induced changes in the pattern of both vector-, and non 
vector-, borne diseases, McMichael et al conclude that the `available evidence and 
60 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 50. 
61 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 53-4. 
62 McMichael et al, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 71 ff. 
63 IPCC, 1996b, pp. 576-7; McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 96-104. 
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climate change evidence models indicate that climate change will alter the pattern of 
the world's infectious diseases. '64 
One particularly grave cause for concern is the impact which climate change will have 
on malarial transmission. Infections of malaria are caused by several distinct species 
of parasite, each of which possesses different reproductive and physiological 
properties, and therefore vulnerabilities. There are also several different species of 
mosquito which act as carriers, or vectors, for the disease - some of which appear to 
flourish and reproduce only where air temperature reaches a certain level (often where 
it is 16°C or more). Above these levels, small increases in temperature accelerate 
parasitic development inside the mosquito 65 
Recent research suggests that approximately one in twenty of the world's population 
is currently infected by malaria, with 300 million new cases arising annually. The 
disease accounts for more than 2 million deaths annually, most of which are located 
in the developing world. 6 However, a global warming of just a couple of degrees 
would be expected to result in an increased survival rate in various species of 
mosquito in temperate areas. As a result, McMichael et al conclude that it is `highly 
likely' that the geographical distribution of malaria infection will be altered by 
climate change, and that the change would result in both a rise in annual malaria 
related deaths, and the widening of the potential malarial transmission zone. 67 While 
it is not expected that malaria will return to the UK in the near future, Parry et al 
conclude that wetter, as well as warmer, weather conditions will bring about a change 
64 McMichael et al, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 105. 65 IPCC, 1996b, pp. 571-2. 
66 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 78. 
67 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 75 and pp. 78ff. 
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in the distribution of non-malarial vectors (such as ticks or mites). Consequently, they 
also predict increases in the incidences of the diseases they carry. 68 
4.3 Economic, Social, and Cultural Impacts of Climate Change 
The IPCC's research on the social and economic impacts of climate change are 
principally co-ordinated and conducted by its Working Group III, the function of 
which is to `assess cross-cutting economic and other issues related to climate change' 
and to conduct `technical assessments of the socio-economics of impacts, adaptation, 
and mitigation of climate change over both the short and the long term and at the 
regional and global levels. '69 Despite the many sources of uncertainty surrounding 
the assessment of the likely economic, social, and cultural impacts of climate 
change, 70 the IPCC suggest that it is likely that the world will experience at least some 
net loss in global economic output as a result of climate change, while the burden of 
this loss will be non-uniformly distributed across the countries, and populations, of 
the world. The IPCC predicts that the global impact of a doubling in CO2 
concentrations, for example, will be a net decline in global Gross Domestic product 
(GDP) of between 1.5 and 2%. 71 The corresponding figures for the developed and the 
68 Parry et at, Review of the Potential effects of Climate Change in the United Kingdom, 
pp. 193-4. 
69 IPCC, 1996c, p. ix, 5. 
70 The IPCC warns, for example, that the `level of sophistication of climate change analysis 
is comparatively low' and that economic damage estimates are as a result `generally 
tentative and based on several simplifying and often controversial assumptions' (see IPCC, 
1996c, p. ix). 
71 The term GDP is normally used with an individual country in mind, and refers to the total 
value of goods and services produced domestically by a nation during a given year. 
Consequently, global GDP consists of the total value of goods and services produced in the 
world by all nations during a given year. 
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developing worlds respectively of between 1 and 1.5%, and between 2 and 9%; and 
even more pronounced decreases are expected if climate change were to continue into 
the remote future - i. e. beyond a doubling of CO2 concentrations. 
72 
The IPCC suggest that countries which possess a `diversified industrial economy and 
an educated and flexible labour force' will suffer least from the economic affects of 
climate change, whereas countries which possess specialised, and natural resource- 
based, economies and `a poorly developed and land-tied labour force' will be 
expected to fare much worse. 73 Developing countries, for example, are be expected to 
be hit much harder than developed countries. However, the IPCC do not rule out the 
possibility that certain populations will actually be net beneficiaries of climate 
change, and recent research suggests that the UK might be one country which benefits 
in some respects from the medium-term effects of climate change. 
74 
I discuss below the IPCC's research on the socio-economic impacts of climate change 
for a sample of the most vulnerable populations. 
4.3.1 The Developing World - The Case of India 
India would be expected to receive a significant increase in rainfall both inside and 
outside the monsoon season (i. e. June to September) given a doubling of CO2 in the 
atmosphere and the radiative forcing which this would entail. The IPCC expect the 
intensity of monsoons to increase, with the result that agricultural yields for a number 
72 See IPCC, 1996c, p. 218. 
73 IPCC, 1996c, p. 11. 
74 In their report, for example, Parry et al conclude that there will be beneficial effects for 
certain part of the forestry, agricultural, and tourist industries (Review of the Potential effects 
of Climate Change in the United Kingdom, pp. 67ff). 
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of crops, such as rice and wheat, will be reduced. The country would also suffer a 
degree of land loss due to sea-level rises, with the estimated loss in GDP terms of 1% 
solely on the basis of these rises. 75 
4.3.2 Coastal Zones - The Case of Bangladesh 
Much of the land surface and population of Bangladesh is located coastally. Given a 
45cm sea-level rise on the Bay of Bengal coastline, McMichael et al predict that up to 
11% of the total land area of the country would be lost, while a one meter rise would 
submerge 20% of the total land surface area. A different study suggests that, in the 
absence of serious attempts to mitigate the effects of climate change, a rise in sea- 
level of one meter by 2050 `could result in a cumulative loss (in present value terms) 
equivalent to 1-2% of Bangladesh's current GDP', although the same study does 
present this finding as a `worst-case scenario. '76 It is also emphasised that population 
displacement could also be massive. 
77 
4.3.3 Small Island Societies 
There are two considerations which place small islands most at risk from climate 
change induced sea-level rises. First, the fact that their small size prevents more than 
75 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 211. 
76 See J. M. Broadhaus `Possible impacts of, and adjustments to, sea-level rise: the cases of 
Bangladesh and Egypt', in R. A. Warwick et al, Climate and Sea Level Change, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 263. 
77 McMichael et at, Climate Change and Human Health, p. 211. According to recent 
research, it is not possible to quantify the risk that climate change poses for low lying areas 
in the UK. However, Parry et at suggest that communities located along the Norfolk and 
Suffolk coast and around the Wash seem `particularly vulnerable' to storm, flooding, and 
consequently soil erosion damage (see Review of the Potential effects of Climate Change in 
the United Kingdom, p. xx, pp. 211 ff). 
Chapter 1: Intergenerational Ethics and Climate Change 37 
a limited inland retreat and, second, the fact that the economies of these islands tend 
to be highly dependent on resources located coastally. The IPCC observes that, `in 
global terms the population of small islands is relatively small, but a number of 
distinct societies and cultures are threatened with drastic changes in lifestyle and 
possibly forced abandonment from ancestral homelands if sea-level rises 
significantly. ""' They go on to suggest that even the less-vulnerable small-islands 
would be expected to suffer from the loss of tourism and recreation trade. " In 
declining order of severity, it appears that the Small Island States of the South Pacific 
face complete disappearance, severe population displacement, or, at best, moderate 
costs of adjustment. 80 
Attempting to put a socio-economic value on a community's entire annihilation, or 
the cost in terms of human misery of a community's experience of severe population 
displacement, is an appallingly difficult - if not impossible - task. A slightly easier 
task, perhaps, is to estimate the economic cost of the sort of coastal protection 
schemes which might forestall such developments, calculated in terms of the present 
GDP's of the coastal islands to which they would be applied. The IPCC give a 
number of such estimates, one of the most disconcerting of which concerns the case 
of the Marshall Islands. Here, measures to protect just the central, Majuro, atoll alone 
could cost between 1.5 and 3 times the country's present GDP. 81 
78 IPCC, 1996b, p. 310. 
79 IPCC, 1996b, p. 3 10. 
80 See L. Bijisma et al, 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', in IPCC, 1996b, pp296-98; and 
E. Charles et al, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, London, 
Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997, pp. 67ff. 
81 IPCC, 1996b, p. 213. 
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5. Summary 
In this introductory chapter, I hope to have constructed a suitable framework in which 
to examine the issue of intergenerational distributive ethics, and have defended the 
view that global climate change, in virtue of threatening to bring about a range of 
changes in the natural, economic, and cultural environment, will greatly influence the 
distribution of benefits and burdens across generations. I also hope to have shown that 
the distributive consequences which are most ethically relevant to discussions of 
climate change ethics are those which involve countries, or populations, which are 
badly off already becoming even worse off in the future. In the next chapter I want to 
explore in greater depth the reasons why such changes matter from the ethical point of 
view. 
Chapter 2: Climate Change and Distributive Ethics 
1. Introduction 
It was argued in the previous chapter that climate change threatens to bring about a 
number of changes in the natural, economic, and cultural environments which future 
generations will inherit from us, and that these changes will be sufficiently extensive 
to influence the overall distribution of benefits and burdens across generations. In this 
chapter, I want to discuss the relevance of these changes for some pre-eminent 
theories of distributive ethics, where I take distributive ethics to be concerned with 
the question of how scarce resources, and the benefits they confer, should be allocated 
in any given population consisting of members who have competing claims and 
needs. There is obviously a vast number of such theories in existence. So, in order to 
make the task of the chapter more tractable, I restrict my comments to two sets of 
such theories. The first set of theories I consider differ fundamentally in terms of the 
aim they mark out for our distributive concerns, and include theories of equality, 
priority, and sufficiency. The second set of theories differ fundamentally in terms of 
the conception of advantage which out distributive concerns should be developed in 
terms of, and include theories of resourcism, welfarism, and basic-capabilities. 
It is worth noting that I do not set out, here, to resolve the issue of which of each set 
of theories is the most plausible embodiment of our distributive concerns (although I 
do observe that certain welfare egalitarian views seem quite implausible). Indeed, as 
Daniels has argued recently, it appears that a rounded view of such concerns would 
appeal to different aims, as well as different conceptions of advantage, in different 
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contexts. I For example, while we might appeal to the notion of giving priority to the 
worst off in contexts of distributions of resources within families, we might appeal to 
the notion of giving as many people enough resources to enable them to pursue the 
life-plans they affirm in the context of distribution within society as a whole. On the 
other hand, we might seek to equalise interpersonal welfare within the context of a 
single generation, while seeking to equalise resources between generations. What I do 
set out to show, however, is that there exists a broad convergence amongst the 
accounts of the aims of distributive ethics, and also amongst the various accounts of 
the conception of advantage with which these aims are pursued, that the findings of 
the IPCC outlined in the previous chapter are of genuine concern. 
2. Intergenerational Equality 
There are various understandings of equality in existence, but the understanding 
which is most intimately related to the concerns of distributive ethics is that of 
equality of condition. According to the notion of equality of condition, it would be 
better if resources were distributed so that everyone enjoyed the same level, or 
opportunity to enjoy the same level, of social and economic benefit. As such, equality 
of condition can be contrasted with the notion of equality of democratic citizenship, 
according to which it would better from the ethical point of view if certain rights and 
freedoms of democratic citizenship were distributed on the basis of equality so that 
1 See Norman Daniels, Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and 
Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 208. 
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people can pursue their life plans without unnecessary interference from the 
government, social institutions, or other individuals. 
The notion of equality of condition has greatly exercised egalitarians and their critics 
in recent years. Part of the reason for this is that it is a notion which, as Arneson puts 
it, `cries out for clarification. '3 For example, it is of crucial importance to distinguish 
between views which require that inequalities between persons be removed only 
insofar as these inequalities are undeserved (that is, they arise from actions or beliefs 
for which people are responsible) and views which require that inequalities should be 
removed even if they are deserved (that is, they result from actions or beliefs for 
which people are not responsible). We might call the former equality of opportunity, 
and the latter equality of outcome. 
In any case, it is equality of condition, rather than equality of democratic citizenship, 
which seems to be the understanding of equality most relevant to an egalitarian 
evaluation of the IPCC's recent research findings, for while climate change may not 
impact significantly on the long-term ability of states to guarantee their members the 
equal rights and freedoms of democratic citizenship (although it may well do this), it 
will almost certainly have a significant impact on the way in which social and 
economic benefits are distributed within states - as well as between different 
generations. 
One way in which we can seek to clarify the notion of equality of condition is by 
asking what metric (or currency) egalitarians should seek to equalise across persons. 
2 On the distinction between `equality of condition' and `equality of democratic citizenship', 
see Richard Arneson, `Equality', in Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds., A Companion to 
Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, Blackwell, 1993, p. 489. 
3 Arneson, `Equality', p. 490. 
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Thus, in his influential contribution to the literature on egalitarianism, Amartya Sen 
poses the question `Equality of What? '4 In what follows, I outline some key answers 
to Sen's question, comment upon the way in which the different theories of equality 
of condition generated by each separate answer to it might be extended across 
generations, and seek to establish the extent to which each theory views the IPCC's 
findings about the impacts of climate change as being matters of genuine ethical 
concern. 
2.1 Equality of Welfare 
Welfarism, as Sumner has put it recently, is the view that `welfare is the only value 
which an ethical theory need take seriously, ultimately and for its own sake. '5 
Consequently, welfare egalitarianism (or equality of welfare) is the theory that 
resources should be distributed such that each person who falls within the scope of 
the theory experiences the same level of welfare. 
For all the space that equality of welfare has taken up in recent work on theories of 
equality of condition (and their alternatives), equality of welfare has few 
contemporary exponents. However, one writer who has fairly recently embraced an 
equality of welfare view is Ted Honderich. Honderich suggests that resources should 
be distributed such that `we approach as close as we can, which may not be all that 
4 Amartya Sen, `Equality of What? ', in his Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 353. 
5 Wayne Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, 
p. 3. Sen proposes a slightly different definition according to which, `welfarism is the view 
that the goodness of a state of affairs can be judged entirely by the goodness of the utility in 
that state' ('Equality of What? ', pp. 358-9). 
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close, equality in satisfaction and distress', 6 a distributive principle which has also 
been endorsed recently by left-wing egalitarian critics of current Labour party policy.? 
The notion of welfare which Honderich is appealing to here requires some 
clarification. Dworkin, for example, claims that there are two main sets of welfare 
egalitarian theories which are grounded in two accounts of welfare itself, namely, 
success-based theories and conscious-state theories. Success-based theories of 
welfare hold that a person's welfare is some function of their success in having their 
preferences satisfied, and as a result equality of welfare as success will require 
`distribution and transfer of resources until no further transfer can decrease the extent 
to which people differ in their success. '8 Conscious-state theories of welfare, by 
contrast, are those which hold that a person's welfare consists in the presence of 
certain advantageous conscious-states such as pleasure or contentment, and as a result 
equality of welfare as conscious-states will require that `distribution should attempt to 
leave people as equal as possible in some aspect or quality of their conscious life. '9 
Although Honderich's might be better thought of as a theory of equality of conscious- 
states, let us concentrate here on theories of equality of welfare as success 
(henceforward, equality of welfare). 
6 Ted Honderich, Three Essays on Political Violence, Oxford, Blackwell, 1976, p. 4. In 
fairness to Honderich, it should be noted that in later work he appears to endorse a theory of 
giving priority to the worst off, rather than equality of condition as such, and this later theory 
is not explicitly formulated in terms of welfare. According to what he nevertheless calls the 
principle of equality, the principal end of political morality is to `give a priority to policies 
whose end is to make well-off those who are badly-off (Honderich, Violence for Equality, 
London, Routledge, 1989, p. 47). 
7 See Roy Hattersley, 'Why I'm No Longer Loyal to Labour' (The Guardian, July 25 1997) 
and Gordon Brown's response `Why Labour is Still Loyal to the Poor' (The Guardian, 
August 2 1997). 
8 Dworkin, 'What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
10,3,1981, pp. 191-2. 
9 Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', pp. 191-2. 
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On first inspection, equality of welfare would seem an ethical theory well suited to 
cover dealings between non-contemporaries. This is because acts or policies which 
will impact upon the integrity and health of the natural, economic, and cultural 
environments would also be expected to impact upon the preference-satisfaction of 
future human beings. Moreover, the idea that theories which only take the welfare of 
human beings seriously should as far as possible be neutral to considerations of both 
time and space seems well suited to welfarist thinking. In an early contribution to the 
literature on welfarism and intergenerational ethics, for example, Frank Ramsey 
argues that, when theorising about what we owe to future generations, we should not 
`discount later enjoyments in comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is 
ethically indefensible and arises from the weakness of the imagination', and a similar 
view has also been defended by Henry Sidgwick. 10 
One problem with extending equality of welfare across generations, however, is the 
fact that environmental policies will affect not just the range of resources which 
future persons will possess, but also the range of the preferences they possess. 
Suppose that the IPCC's predictions regarding the consequences of climate change 
for both the climate system, and for future human health, prove to be accurate. 
Adaptations in the preference base of future persons which mitigate the possible 
negative impact of climate change on the welfare of future persons could be brought 
10 See Frank Ramsey, `A Mathematical Theory of Saving', Economic Journal, 38,1928, 
p. 543; and IPCC, 1996c, pp. 136ff. Sidgwick writes that, 
the time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness 
from a universal point of view... the interests of posterity must concern a 
Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries, except in so far as the 
effect of his actions on posterity - and even the existence of human beings 
to be affected - must necessarily be more uncertain (see Sidgwick, 
Methods of Ethics, London, Macmillan, p. 381). 
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about in at least two ways. First, members of earlier generations might attempt quite 
consciously to manipulate the genetic make-up of their offspring in order that they be 
better able to flourish in an environment affected by climate change. Second, 
members of later generations might simply adapt their preferences in the absence of 
such conscious attempts of their ancestors, for example by learning not to desire so 
intensely access to clean air, or by learning to desire warmer temperatures more 
intensely. 
If we could assume that the preferences which future persons will possess will be 
shaped in such a way that their ability to have their preferences satisfied is not 
compromised by the effects of climate change, it would seem that on the welfare 
egalitarian view no future individuals would be disadvantaged in terms of the levels 
of welfare they achieve relative to those achieved by members of previous 
generations. Consequently, even if equality of welfare could be extended to cover 
dealings between different generations in principle, the IPCC's research findings on 
the impacts of climate change would not necessarily be of import for this distributive 
theory in practice. 
Fortunately, such a disquieting conclusion is not forced upon us, for equality of 
welfare, both applied to questions of distribution within and between generations, 
does not appear to be an attractive embodiment of equality of condition. I have space 
to mention only three of the main objections to equality of welfare: the offensive 
tastes, expensive tastes and cheap tastes objections. 
According to the offensive tastes objection, equality of welfare is an implausible 
distributive theory in virtue of the way in which it requires us to distribute extra 
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resources to persons who experience less welfare than others due to entertaining 
offensive tastes which remain unfulfilled. Offensive tastes are those which require 
some person or section of the population to suffer discomfort or be discriminated 
against in order that they be fulfilled. Many think that these preferences should not be 
a factor in the distribution of resources. However, as Rawls points out, it is not clear 
how any welfarist account could be restricted so that only inoffensive preferences 
would be taken into account without abandoning the welfarist metric altogether. 
Social welfare, according to Rawls, 
depends directly and solely upon the levels of satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction of individuals. Thus if men take a certain pleasure in 
discriminating against one another, in subjecting others to a lesser 
liberty as a means of enhancing their self-respect, then the 
satisfaction of these desires must be weighted in our deliberations 
according to their intensity, or whatever, along with other desires. " 
According to the expensive tastes objection, distributing resources in order to equalise 
welfare across persons without taking into consideration the different tastes people 
entertain, and the way these tastes were acquired, implies counter-intuitively that 
people who experience less welfare than others due to the fact that the tastes they 
possess are simply difficult to satisfy should be allocated additional resources. 
Consider the case of Louis, who quite deliberately cultivates a preference for 
"plovers' eggs and pre-phylloxera claret' which require a great deal of resources (e. g. 
income) to satisfy. 12 It seems inappropriate for an egalitarian view to attempt to 
11 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 30-1. 
12 Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part I: Equality of Welfare', p. 230. 
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compensate people such as Louis who have acquired such tastes through elitist 
aspirations or through mere lack of self-discipline, but welfarist views seem unable to 
capture this thought. As both Rawls and Dworkin seek to point out, welfare 
egalitarianism requires, counter-intuitively, that extra resources be given to those who 
possess expensive tastes, even if the persons who entertain them (a) acquired them 
voluntarily, (b) do not regret that they acquired them and (c) regard these tastes as 
being as being central to their identity. 13 
Equality of welfare does not merely reward those who possess expensive tastes, it 
also appears to penalise those who possess less expensive, or cheap, tastes. According 
to the cheap tastes objection, equality of welfare is implausible because it cannot 
make sense of the intuitive view that people should be compensated for their severe 
resource deficiencies even if these deficiencies do not prevent their owners from 
enjoying an average, or higher than average, level of welfare. Consider the case of the 
Dickensian character Tiny Tim. 14 Tim's legs are paralysed through no fault of his 
own, so if he is to gain any degree of personal mobility he requires a wheelchair. 
Unfortunately, however, he has not the resources at present to afford a wheelchair. 
More fortunately, Tim is a very cheerful fellow - so much so that, despite his 
disadvantage, he can convert the wherewithal at his disposal into a high level of well- 
being. 
13 See Rawls, `Social Unity and Primary Goods', in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, 
Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 16; Dworkin, 'What 
is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', pp. 229ff. 
14 A case discussed by Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', pp. 241-2; 
and G. A. Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', Ethics, 99, July 1989, pp. 917ff. 
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The question arises: should Tim, in spite of his cheerfulness, receive a state subsidy in 
order to purchase a wheelchair? Equality of welfare seems badly suited to explain our 
intuition that Tim should indeed receive his subsidy. This is because welfare 
egalitarians will view Tim's situation as being of distributive significance only to the 
extent that his disability entails that he experiences less welfare than others. However, 
Tim's cheerful disposition rules out the possibility that his disability will have this 
consequence. Therefore, equality of welfare will deny that Tim deserves any kind of 
compensation for his disability, despite the fact that Tim's disability arose through no 
fault of his own. But as Cohen argues, Tim's capacity for happiness in the face of 
adversity would not normally lead egalitarians to `strike him off the list of free 
wheelchair receivers' for they believe that physically handicapped people, such as 
Tim, should be `adequately resourced, whether or not they also need them to be, or to 
be capable of being, happy. ' 15 
2.2 Equality of Resources 
One well known alternative to equality of welfare is equality of resources. There are 
two main variants of this view: equality of impersonal resources and equality of 
15 Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', p. 918. The problems which the 
expensive and cheap tastes objections pose for welfare egalitarianism have prompted some 
writers to amend, but not abandon, the welfare egalitarian view. These writers claim that 
while we should abandon the idea of equalising interpersonal welfare as such, we ought to 
seek to equalise interpersonal opportunities for welfare. The idea here is that, in most 
circumstances, people should be held responsible for the preferences which they possess, and 
also for the amount of effort they put into their attempts to satisfy these preferences. Those 
who entertain expensive tastes, for example, should not be compensated for any welfare 
deficit they experience as a result of possessing preferences which are very difficult to 
satisfy. I return to this view in section 2.4. 
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impersonal and personal resources. 16 In the following, I argue that both of these 
theories can be extended intergenerationally without incoherence, and both will view 
the IPCC's findings on climate change as being highly relevant from the point of 
view of distributive ethics. 
2.2.1 Intergenerational Equality of Impersonal Resources 
Perhaps the best known theory of equality of impersonal resources is defended by 
John Rawls. 17 Rawls suggests that the problems which afflict welfarist theories of 
distributive ethics, such as utilitarianism, can be avoided if we seek to distribute what 
he calls primary goods so that, unless the worst off in society gain from their unequal 
distribution, these goods are dispersed evenly throughout the population. 
19 Primary 
goods are in effect generalised resources which everyone requires regardless of what 
they want out of life, and according to Rawls they fall under five main categories: (a) 
`the basic liberties as given by a list', (b) `freedom of movement and choice of 
occupation against a background of diverse opportunities', (c) `powers and 
16 Impersonal resources consist in things such as income and wealth which are not 
constitutive parts of a person, whereas personal resources consist in things such as a person's 
physical and mental powers, talents and handicaps which are constitutive parts of a person. 
See Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 10,4,1981, pp. 300ff. 
17 It is worth noting that Rawls' view, like Honderich's, might be interpreted as one of 
giving priority to the worst off, rather than of equality as such. I discuss the distinction 
between theories of distributive equality and priority in section 3 below. 
18 According to Rawls' theory of the ethics of distribution, 
`Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: they must 
be (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society; 
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
equality of opportunity' ('Social Unity and Primary Goods', p. 162). 
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prerogatives of offices and positions of responsibility', (d) `income and wealth', and 
(e) `the social bases of self-respect. "9 
Let us concentrate on (d) - income and wealth. The Rawlsian view does not appear to 
be prone to at least two of the three problems discussed above precisely because it 
eschews the aim of achieving interpersonal equality of welfare. Thus, it is consistent 
with the idea that income and wealth should not be given to people in order that they 
can satisfy their expensive tastes, as well as the idea that it should not be an aim of an 
egalitarian theory that peoples' offensive tastes be satisfied (I return to the issue of 
cheap tastes below). 
Extending theories of impersonal resource egalitarianism, such as Rawls', across 
generations would appear to require that each generation hand down to the next a no 
less abundant share of resources than that which it inherited from previous 
generations. Consider the view defended by Brian Barry. 20 Here, the consumption of 
non-renewable natural resources over time `should be compensated for in the sense 
that later generations should be left no worse off (in terms of productive capacity) 
than they would have been without the depletion. '21 
The fundamental issue for a theory of intergenerational equality, Barry thinks, is the 
appropriate consumption of non-renewable natural resources across time. When 
reserves of non-renewable resources (such as oil or natural gas) are depleted, the costs 
of extracting and then using these resources to generate electricity to heat homes, 
19 Rawls, `Social Unity and Primary Goods', p. 162. 
20 I discuss Rawls' view of intergenerational distribution in more detail in chapter 3. 21 Brian Barry, `The Ethics of Resource Depletion', in Barry, Democracy, Power and 
Justice, Oxford, Clarendon, 1989, p. 519. See also Talbot Page, `Intergenerational Justice as 
Opportunity', in Douglas Maclean and Peter Brown, eds., Energy and the Future, Totowa, 
New Jersey, Rowman and Littlefield, 1983, p. 58 
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power cars, and run machinery are increased for future generations. There are also 
costs imposed upon these generations in virtue of the side-effects of depleting these 
resources, such as global climate change, air pollution and destruction of the ozone 
layer. As a consequence of these costs, it is crucial to establish how much existing 
generations may deplete stocks of non-renewable resources without violating the 
requirements of intergenerational equality. 
It would be unfair, Barry thinks, to require existing generations to leave all non- 
renewable resources untouched for the sake of future generations (that is to consume 
nothing), neither would it be possible for each generation to replicate in every detail 
the non-renewable resources it exhausts. However, it would appear to be a sound 
principle to aim for that existing generations ought not act so as to worsen the 
position of future generations by depleting non-renewable resources with no 
compensatory action or recompense. 
The idea of making recompense, however, typically leaves it open for a given 
compensation for a depleted resource, X, to be compensated by the provision of a 
given commensurable resource, Y- so long as this compensation enables the recipient 
to be no worse off than they would have been had the original resource, X, not been 
used up. Perhaps the most obvious example of such compensation in the 
intergenerational context would be the way in which improvements in technology 
(energy efficiency, for example) appear to compensate for losses of natural non- 
renewable resources (energy resources such as coal, for example). 
So long as we regard the climate system as a sort of `open access resource' in its own 
right, then, it appears that Barry's view will generate extensive obligations on the part 
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of existing generations not to act in such a way as to (1) damage the climate system 
by continued profligate emissions of GHGs into the atmosphere, (2) deplete non- 
renewable natural resources which are sources of GHGs, or (3) bring about the 
destruction of certain natural resources (such as coastal land) through climate change 
unless these actions are offset by an appropriate amount of compensation. 
2.2.2 Intergenerational Equality of Impersonal and Personal Resources 
One problem with equality of resources as just explained has prompted some to 
amend, but not abandon, the resourcist view. The problem is that some people, 
despite having the same bundle of impersonal resources as others, might still not 
enjoy equal life-chances in any real sense as a result of them experiencing some 
natural disadvantage. Consider someone who is born hard of hearing. Bringing it 
about that this person has the same amount of money as everybody else might still not 
remedy the relative lack of life-chances that he experiences as a result of his disability 
(that is, it might not enable him to purchase a hearing aid, for example, a device 
which would considerably improve his life-chances). Or consider the case of Tiny 
Tim. According to theories of equality of impersonal resources, Tim should get the 
same resource share as everyone else, despite his sunny disposition. However, if an 
equal share of his society's impersonal resources is simply not big enough for him to 
afford a wheel-chair, then this is simply not a development which this distributive 
theory will regard as problematic. 
The amendment which some have proposed in order to overcome this problem is to 
include within the concept of resources, personal resources, such as talents or 
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disabilities which are inalienable features of a person. So in our example of the person 
who is hard of hearing, or of the case of Tiny Tim, the disabilities concerned would 
be viewed as (so to speak) a negative resource which is (other things equal) deserving 
of compensation from the resource egalitarian point of view. Dworkin, for example, 
argues that, to be an attractive alternative to equality of welfare, resourcism must not 
only seek to eradicate undeserved inequalities which arise from people's differential 
holdings of impersonal resources such as income and wealth, but also those which 
result from people's undeserved differential holdings of personal endowments, such 
as talents and handicaps. 22 Of course, natural endowments are not easily transferred 
from person to person - at least in practice - so it is unclear how a society might put 
an egalitarianism of both personal and impersonal resources into effect. As a result, 
the problem which exercises Dworkin is how to define a distribution of transferable, 
external, resources which would best approximate to the requirement that we remove 
interpersonal inequalities in holdings of personal and impersonal resources. 
I take the liberty of not discussing in detail the intricate argument which Dworkin 
puts forward to defend his theory of equality of impersonal and personal resources, 
except to note that a crucial component'of it is to be found in the notion of envy 
elimination. Simply put, Dworkin thinks that equality of personal and impersonal 
resources requires that allocations of resources be effected such that, immediately 
after the allocation, no person affected would prefer someone else's allocation of 
resources to their own. This test of egalitarian distribution has become known as the 
envy-test, and distributions of resources which meet this test are called envy free 
22 See Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources', pp. 284ff. 
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distributions. 23 The envy-test, thought not without its problems, offers on attractive 
view of distributive equality. Moreover, it seems to capture the wish that equality be 
sensitive to peoples' differential endowments of personal, as well as impersonal, 
resources. 
The envy-test is also a notion which has interesting implications for climate change 
ethics. Suppose once more that climate change does have the, predominantly adverse, 
effects on the health and well-being of future human populations that the IPCC 
predict. Recall that, to the extent that members of these populations will inherit 
(through no fault of their own) a damaged context within which to pursue their life 
plans, Barry's theory of intergenerational equality of impersonal resources would 
appear to view these people as deserving of compensation. This is because such 
people - or at least many of these people - will have access to a less than abundant 
bundle of impersonal resources than were available to earlier generations. 
Climate change, however, may also have effects which undermine intergenerational 
equality of personal resources as well. It is true that some impacts of climate change, 
such as sea-level rises, will impact largely upon peoples' access to impersonal 
resources, such as fertile agricultural land. However, other impacts relating to rising 
temperatures may well have effects on the personal resources of future individuals. 
Examples might be the way in which extremes of temperature and air pollution affect 
not simply the impersonal resources available to humans (e. g. clean air), but also rates 
of physical and mental disease amongst both adults and young children. 24 
23 Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part Two: Equality of Resources', pp. 284ff. 24 See A. J. McMichael et al, `Heat, Cold and Air Pollution', in McMichael et al, eds., 
Climate Change and Human Health, Geneva, World Health Organisation, 1996, pp. 43ff. 
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I have not the space here to discuss the highly pertinent question of whether Barry's 
theory of intergenerational equality might be broadened to require the conservation of 
personal, as well as impersonal, resources across generations. However, even without 
such a discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that climate change issues do raise 
questions of great significance for theories of resource egalitarianism on either of its 
main variants. 
2.3 Equality of Basic Capabilities 
According to basic capability egalitarianism, we should seek to equalise what people 
are able to do with resources, their basic capabilities and functionings, and not 
peoples' impersonal and personal resource shares as such. Amartya Sen, who is the 
most prominent proponent of this theory of equality of condition, lists several basic 
capabilities including `the ability to meet one's nutritional requirements, the 
wherewithal to be clothed and sheltered, [and] the power to participate in the social 
life of the community. '25 According to Sen, basic capabilities and functionings are not 
so much features of goods themselves but of `peoples' relations with these goods. '26 
He writes that, `what people get out of goods depends on a variety of factors, and 
judging personal advantage just by the size of personal ownership of goods and 
services can be very misleading. '27 
Consider the paradigm example of a basic capability: that of being well-nourished. 
The distributive importance of food stuffs for welfarists lies in terms of the way in 
25 Amartya Sen, `Equality of What? ', p. 367. 26 Sen, `Rights and Capabilities' in Sen, Resources, Values and Development, Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell, 1984, pp. 315-6. 
27 Sen, Choice, Welfare and Measurement, pp. 29-30. 
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which their consumption creates welfare (satisfies preferences), and for resourcists it 
is simply the possession of the food itself. But, as Sen notes, having access to a 
regular supply of food gives people much more than just a regular supply of welfare, 
and what it does for them cannot be explained solely in terms of resource possession. 
Rather, such access engenders `the capability of functioning in a particular way, e. g. 
without nutritional deficiencies of particular types. 28 Basic capability egalitarianism, 
Sen argues, would certainly require differential distributions of resources: a person 
with a lower metabolic rate may well require less food in order to become, and 
continue to be, well nourished than a person with a higher metabolic rate. However, it 
is not by creating an equal distribution of resources as such that we achieve equality 
of condition, but rather by creating an equal distribution of basic capabilities and 
functionings. 
Sen's theory of basic capability equality appears well suited to the context of 
intergenerational distribution. It would seem to require that the present generation 
should not act so as to undermine the possibility that members of future generations 
will be able to exercise certain basic capabilities. To the extent to which human 
originating environmental problems, such as climate change, do undermine this 
possibility, it would seem that they violate the requirements of basic capability 
equality. Our concerns here will certainly be different from either the resourcist or the 
welfarist. It will not be the aim of distributive ethics to secure a resource base for 
future generations which is no less abundant than that enjoyed by previous 
generations, but rather to preserve a resource base which enables future persons to 
28 Sen, `Rights and capabilities', p. 316 
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meet their nutritional, clothing, and health capabilities in a way which is no less the 
case than with existing persons. 
Consider the way in which climate change is expected to impact upon the food 
production, food security and food quality both within and between future 
generations. Reliable sources of good quality food are crucial for the normal growth 
and health of existing and future human populations, and recent research on climate 
change suggests that a number of changes in climate variables are expected to alter 
both the total amount of food available to future populations, and the nutritional 
quality of this food . 
29 Sea-level rises, for example, are expected to bring about a 
massive loss of land (through the process of inundation), soil infertility and loss of 
fresh water for irrigation projects. As a consequence, food production and nutrition in 
many coastal regions is expected to be damaged. However, food production is also 
expected to be threatened in the future in semi-arid areas as a result of global 
30 
warming as well 
In fact, when all the changes in climate variables are taken into consideration, the 
IPCC suggest that many more people belonging to future generations are at risk from 
hunger and malnutrition as a result of climate change. A central finding in this regard 
is that `an extra 40-300m people will be at risk of hunger in the year 2060 because of 
the impact of climate change on top of a predicted 640m people at risk of hunger by 
that date in the absence of climate change. i31 Taking nutritional status as a 
29 See A. J. McMichael et at, 'Climate, Food Production and Nutrition', in A. J. McMichael 
et at, eds., Climate Change and Human Health, pp. 107ff. 
30 IPCC, 1996b, pp. 576-7. 
31 IPCC, 1996b, p. 577. According to McMichael et at, 'it is generally considered that 
sustained, increasing climate change would eventually cause a downturn in world crop 
production' ('Climate, Food Production and Nutrition', p. 121). 
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paradigmatic example of a basic capability, then, the IPCC's research suggests 
strongly that climate change will impact upon the distribution of basic capabilities 
across generations, and that it will be the case that some future persons will have a 
less than equal share of at least one basic capability (e. g. nutrition) than that enjoyed 
by existing persons. 
Climate change will also, it seems, impact upon the distribution of basic capabilities 
within the generations to come. This is because changes in climate variables will 
impact more adversely upon peoples' access to basic capabilities in some regions than 
others. This is at least partly down to the fact that some regions, and populations, are 
more able to adapt to changes in climatic conditions than others. Thus the IPCC argue 
that `poorer countries, already struggling with large and growing populations and 
marginal climatic conditions' would be particularly vulnerable to the food shortages 
brought about by climate change. 2I conclude that the IPCC's findings are of genuine 
concern for capability egalitarians. 
2.4 Equality of Opportunity 
Non-welfarist egalitarians, such as Dworkin and Sen, hold that equality of welfare is 
an inadequate articulation of distributive equality. Take Dworkin, for example. 
Dworkin's main charge against equality of welfare is that it cannot permit inequalities 
in interpersonal welfare when such inequalities are deserved. For example, equality of 
welfare cannot make sense of the view that those who possess voluntarily acquired 
expensive tastes, such as the taste for fine wine, should not be allocated extra 
32 IPCC, 1996b, p. 577. 
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resources even if this means that these people continue to enjoy less welfare than 
others. If a person enjoys less welfare than others as a result of his failure to convert 
the resources at his disposal into satisfied preferences, Dworkin thinks, this is not 
something that should concern egalitarians. What should concern egalitarians, 
according to Dworkin, is rather the aim to equalise peoples' possession of impersonal 
and personal resources, subject to the proviso that inequalities in resource possession 
which arisen from actions or beliefs that people can be responsible for are ethically 
unproblematic. 
Suppose that we share the broad thrust of Dworkin's objections to equality of welfare, 
namely, we hold that distributive equality consists in eliminating inequalities in 
peoples' conditions which arise involuntarily. It is still not necessarily the case that 
we must endorse Dworkin's view that eliminating such inequalities requires the 
equalisation of people's holdings of impersonal and personal resources. For we might 
disagree with Dworkin as to those features of a person's condition which they are 
responsible for and those features which they are not. It has been argued recently, for 
example, that Dworkin draws the boundary of what a person is, and is not, 
responsible for in the wrong place when he argues that people are responsible for the 
preferences they entertain and affirm, but not the resource endowments that they 
possess. 
Cohen, for example, has claimed that the correct boundary between what people are 
responsible for and what they are not is determined by the distinction between what 
happens to them as a consequence of bad luck on the one hand, and what happens to 
them as a result of actions which they could have chosen not to perform on the 
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other. 33 Arneson, in contrast, proposes a slightly different account of where this 
boundary should be drawn. The contributions of Arneson and Cohen to the issue of 
distributive equality represent two additional answers to Sen's question which I have 
yet to explore, namely, equality of opportunityfor welfare and equality of access to 
advantage. In the following I outline each, and go on to comment on their 
intergenerational extension. 
2.4.1 Arneson and Equality of Opportunity for Welfare 
Arneson presents the core idea of his theory of equality of opportunity for welfare in 
the following passage: 
Think of two persons entering their majority and facing various life 
choices, each action one might choose being associated with its 
possible outcomes. In the simplest case, imagine that we know the 
probability of each outcome conditional on the agent's choice of an 
action that might lead to it. Given that one or another choice is 
made and one or another outcome realised, the agent would then 
face another array of choices, then another, and so on. We construct 
a decision tree that gives an individual's possible complete life- 
histories. We then add up the preference satisfaction expectation for 
each possible life history. In doing this we take into account the 
33 Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', pp. 921 ff. Cohen writes that `the right cut 
is between responsibility and bad luck, not between preferences and resources' (p. 921). 
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preferences that people have regarding being confronted with the 
particular range of options given at each decision point 34 
According to Arneson, equality of opportunity for welfare consists in each person 
facing life-plan, or decision, trees which are identical in the sense that the expected 
levels of welfare achieved by these trees are the same (or effectively the same). This 
view departs from straight-forward equality of welfare, then, by regarding those 
inequalities between peoples' final level of welfare which are within their control as 
being `nonproblematic from the standpoint of distributive equality. '35 
On first inspection, Arneson's view seems readily extendible to issues of 
intergenerational distribution. At the start of his essay, Arneson remarks that an 
important context for discussions of distributive equality is the fact that `many 
persons are troubled by the gap between the living standards of rich people and poor 
people in modem societies or by the gap between the average standard of living in 
rich societies and that prevalent in poor societies. 36 However, many people are 
equally concerned about the possibility that there will be a gap between living 
standards in present and that prevalent in subsequent generations. Thus, while 
Arneson's account is motivated at its core by an abstract notion of equality according 
to which `other things being equal, it is bad if some people are worse off than others 
through no voluntary choice or fault of their own', 37 there seems to be no obvious 
motivation an egalitarian would have for thinking that these people must be members 
of the present generation. 
34 Arneson, `Equality and Equal Opportunity for welfare', p. 85. 35 Arneson, `Equality and Equal Opportunity for welfare', p. 86. 36 Arneson, `Equality and Equal Opportunity for welfare', p. 77. 37 Arneson, 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for welfare', p. 85 - emphasis added. 
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Moreover, the impacts of climate change discussed in the previous chapter seem to 
raise questions of distributive significance for the Arnesonian view, just as they do for 
other welfarist views. This is because these impacts will affect the opportunities 
which future people will have to satisfy their preferences, and with them the extent to 
which existing and future people are equal in terms of the metric of opportunities for 
welfare. Consider, for example, the problem of global warming. The extent to which 
people of different generations will face life-plans trees that are identical in the sense 
that they exhibit `equivalent arrays of options'38 will be determined in part by their 
health, and the health of their contemporaries. But the increased instances of heat 
waves and generally warmer seasons will surely impact upon the health of future 
persons, and in turn on their opportunity to realise various life-plans. 
It can be predicted, for example, that in many countries global warming will limit the 
options people have to pursue activities in the open air at certain times of the year (as 
well as during heat waves and other extreme weather events). Because existing 
persons do not experience such limited options at present (or at least not to the same 
extent), this could be a source of intergenerational inequality on the Arnesonian view. 
Obviously the presence of such inequality is susceptible to other developments, such 
as the fact that the existing generation may create and bequeath additional technology 
to their successors in order to compensate for the lost opportunities for welfare 
brought about by certain aspects of the global warming phenomenon. Nevertheless, 
global warming could be expected to be a prima facie source of intergenerational 
equality of opportunity. 
38 Arneson, 'Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare', p. 86. 
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One obstacle in the path of these claims, however, has been discussed above - 
namely, the prospect of adaptations in the preference base of future persons. Suppose 
that the policy-makers in charge of climate policy decide to invest a large amount of 
money in a programme of genetic engineering which has the aim of ensuring that 
people coming into existence in the future will be generally well adapted, 
constitutionally, to a world changed by climate change. The alternative, let us assume, 
would have been to invest an even larger sum on measures which would avoid 
climate change altogether. Would the policy-makers' actions, here, violate the norm 
of equality of opportunity for welfare? 
The future persons concerned, let us imagine, would have access to far fewer natural 
resources than present persons, and many of the natural resources which they do have 
access to (e. g. air or water) would be contaminated. However, the genetic engineering 
programme would enable the creation of persons who do not mind only having access 
to contaminated air or water: perhaps they could be engineered to possess a sunny 
disposition (as in the case of Tiny Tim) such that the sum of the expected utilities of 
their possible life-plans are at least as great as those enjoyed by members of the 
present generation. These people would enjoy neither less welfare, nor less equality 
opportunity for welfare, as members of previous generations - despite the fact that 
they have access to less natural resources and so forth. This is because the sum of the 
expected levels of welfare achieved by the branches of their life-plan trees will be 
equal, or at least not smaller, than the life-plan trees of present persons. The 
intergenerational extension of equality of opportunity for welfare, then, seems to be as 
open to the problem of adaptive preferences as is simple equality of welfare. 
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Let us, however, put this problem to one side. To the extent to which the 
intergenerational extension of Arneson's view might be saved from these problems, 
and to the extent to which climate change will impact upon the distribution of 
opportunities for welfare across generations, the IPCC's research findings should be 
of at least some concern for opportunity for welfare egalitarians. 
2.4.2 Cohen and Equality of Access to Advantage 
Like Arneson, Cohen proposes that equality of condition requires that compensation 
be paid to people who experience involuntary disadvantage. However, his proposal - 
that egalitarians should seek to equalise access to advantage - marks a subtle, if 
important, departure from the Arnesonian view. Put simply, while he agrees with 
Arneson that people are responsible for outcomes but not for the opportunities they 
face, he proposes that egalitarians should adopt a broader, more heterogeneous, 
understanding of the measure of social and economic benefit which they wish to 
equalise across persons. 
The main improvement which Cohen thinks his view makes to Arneson's is that it 
can make sense of two particularly troubling cases which seem to undermine the 
Arnesonian construction. The first, the case of Tiny Tim, has been discussed above. 
Tim is paralysed, though because of his sunny disposition he is still better endowed in 
terms of welfare than most other people in society. Moreover, because of this sunny 
disposition, Tim also possesses a life-plan tree which is superior to others in the sense 
that the sum of all the expected levels of welfare of each of his possible life-plans is 
greater than that of many of his contemporaries. 
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It seems that the Arnesonian view will not only refuse to allocate Tim extra resources 
so that he can purchase a wheel-chair, but will also require that some resources be 
taken from him due to the superior opportunities of welfare he derives in part from 
his sunny disposition. According to Cohen, however, this line of reasoning is wrong- 
headed. He thinks that distributive equality requires that Tim be given the wheelchair, 
for egalitarians should seek to equalise a conception of interpersonal advantage which 
recognises the importance of resources and functionings, as well as welfare. Cohen 
thinks that any theory, such as Ameson's, which maintains that `wheelchair 
distribution should be controlled exclusively by the welfare opportunity requirements 
39 of those that need them', is a flawed embodiment of the egalitarian ideal. 
Next, we turn to the case of Jude, which Cohen argues undermines both the 
Dworkinian and the Arnesonian views. Here, Jude, who is a member of a society in 
which equality of welfare has been achieved, possesses a smaller resource share than 
his fellow citizens as a result of the fact that his preferences are inexpensive to satisfy. 
However, on reading Hemingway, Jude comes to the conclusion that there is 
39 Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', p. 918. Cohen seeks to show that welfare 
itself is an important, if not sole, component of advantage with a further case, which does not 
actually undermine Arneson's view. Here a person whose arms are otherwise healthy and in 
working order suffers from a condition which causes him great pain whenever he moves his 
arms. This pain, however, can be prevented if he takes an expensive drug, and does not affect 
his ability to move his hands normally -a drug which he cannot, at present, afford. Can this 
person claim that distributive equality entails that he be given extra resources so that he can 
acquire this drug? Cohen thinks that he certainly can, as his disadvantage is not something 
which he is responsible for. However, he argues that while the Arnesonian view can explain 
the basis of this conviction, the Dworkinian view cannot, for the disadvantage here is one of 
welfare rather than resources. The conclusion Cohen comes to is that egalitarians should 
seek to equalise a conception of interpersonal advantage which recognises not just the 
importance of functionings or resources, but also of welfare (Cohen, 'On the Currency of 
Egalitarian Justice', pp. 918-921). 
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something missing in his life, and as a result he cultivates, quite voluntarily, the 
preference to travel to Spain in order to attend bullfights. 40 
Although the trip would require more money than he has at present, Jude's generally 
modest tastes entail that the amount of money he would require in order to travel to 
Spain, and thereby reach the average welfare level in his society, would still be much 
less than others require to do the same. Cohen argues that the case of Jude raises what 
he calls the cheap expensive tastes objection to equality of opportunity for welfare 
and equality of resources. This is that these views of what distributive equality 
amounts to, quite counter-intuitively, will not permit Jude being given the additional 
resources necessary for him to satisfy his newly acquired taste, even though the 
additional resources Jude requires will still leave him with a less than equal share of 
his society's resources. 
In effect, Cohen appeals to the case of Jude in order to argue that when we are 
concerned to equalise peoples' opportunities of condition, this condition cannot be 
expressed solely in terms of peoples' welfare. Rather it must be expressed in a wider 
notion of what a person's condition, or advantage, consist in. Otherwise, we could not 
explain the conviction that Jude ought to receive additional resources despite the fact 
that he acquired his new tastes (which are more expensive than they were, but still 
less expensive than those of others) quite voluntarily. The Arnesonian view would, 
for example, keep Jude poor since he could have chosen not to acquire the his new 
40 This example is discussed by Dworkin, `What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare', 
pp. 239ff; Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', pp. 925ff; and Roemer, Theories 
of Distributive Justice, pp. 273-4. 
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tastes, and this view does not compensate people for welfare deficiencies which arise 
from behaviour which we can hold these people responsible for. 
On the other hand, the Dworkinian view would not take Jude's altered preferences 
into consideration at all in its determination of what Jude is owed in terms of 
distributive equality - so Jude will end up with much more income and wealth than he 
requires to satisfy even his most expensive tastes. According to Cohen, however, Jude 
should indeed be allocated the resources required for him to take the trip to Spain, but 
should expect `some deduction from the normal resource stipend because of his 
fortunate high ability to get welfare out of resources', 41 and such a view can only be 
maintained if we embrace a conception of advantage, or condition, which 
incorporates both welfare and resources. 
As Cohen remarks, the superiority of his view rests on the `heterogeneity of its 
conception of advantage'; 2 and it is this conception which appears to have some 
application to issues of intergenerational equality and climate change ethics. This is 
because there will be instances where climate change will bring about inequalities in 
peoples' possession of Cohen's heterogeneous measure of advantage, but not in 
Arneson's, welfarist measure. Recall the case of the policy-makers who adopted a 
programme of genetic engineering in order to finesse the requirements of 
intergenerational equality of opportunity. On Cohen's view, their actions would 
violate the requirements of equality of access to advantage if this view could be 
extended intergenerationally. This is because the future persons it brings into 
41 Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', p. 925. 42 Cohen, `On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', p. 925. 
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existence will be disadvantaged, if not in terms of opportunities for welfare, then in 
terms of opportunities for resources (and possibly functionings as well). 
Thus, intergenerational equality of access to advantage would probably not be 
consistent with a policy of bringing into existence generation upon generation of Tiny 
Tim's who are happy in the face of the environmental adversity brought about by 
climate change, for this would not reflect the heterogeneity of the concept of 
advantage which egalitarians should focus on. On the other hand, much of what was 
said above regarding the significance of climate change for welfarist views will also 
apply to Cohen's view, for climate change impacts such as rising sea-levels, extremes 
of temperature and famine will (putting aside the possibility of radical changes in the 
way people set about having offspring) impact upon the intergenerational distribution 
of advantages and access to advantages. 
3. Equality or Priority? 
While theories of equality of condition differ according to the view they take of the 
appropriate currency of advantage by which distributive outcomes should be 
evaluated, they share the view that the task of distributive ethics is to secure equality 
of life-chances. Supporters of equality of condition often appeal to the relative lack of 
life-chances which the poor and physically impaired enjoy in modem societies in 
order to gain intuitive support for their view. However, few writers in the egalitarian 
tradition acknowledge that the aim of distributing resources so that no one is worse 
off than others through no fault of their own can conflict with the aim of distributing 
resources for the sake of the worse off in society. This distinction - between the ideals 
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of equality and priority - is a subtle one, and easy to overlook. One writer who is 
sensitive to the distinction, however, is Derek Parfit. Parfit clarifies and taxonomises 
the debate between those who seek to equalise the fortunes of persons according to 
some metric and those who seek to give priority to the worst off. This section 
examines some of Parfit's central claims, and relates them to issues of 
intergenerational distribution. 
3.1 Parfit on Giving Priority to the Worst Off 
In `Equality or Priority? ', Parfit suggests that theories of equality of condition can be 
divided into two groups, that is, those which assume that inequality is always in itself 
bad (telic egalitarians), and those which assume that inequality is bad only if it has 
certain origins - for example, it having arisen from human action (deontic 
egalitarians). 3 According to both deontic and telic versions of egalitarianism, 
however, equality is still non-instrumentally valuable, and as such its goodness does 
not depend on it promoting the achievement of other values. 
Parfit observes that there are serious problems with both telic and deontic 
egalitarianism in virtue of the fact that both view a move towards greater equality as 
being non-instrumentally valuable, and thus always a good thing in at least one 
respect. One of these problems is captured in the following example. 4 Suppose that 
half of some population are blind while the other half is sighted, and that this is the 
only relevant difference between the two groups. Both telic and deontic egalitarianism 
43 Derek Parf it, `Equality or Priority? ', Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas, 1995, pp. 3ff. 44 Parfit, `Equality or Priority? ', pp. 16-18. A version of the objection is also discussed by 
Joseph Raz. See Raz The Morality of Freedom, pp. 230-1; p. 235. 
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would view the act of putting out the eyes of the sighted in order that all be equally 
blind as a good thing to do in at least one respect. Because such an implication seems 
quite counter-intuitive, Parfit claims it raises the Levelling Down Problem. 
The Levelling Down Problem seems to apply to both the deontic and the telic view, 
although because either view might be defended in forms which are restricted in their 
scope, either view might avoid the problem in certain cases. 5 Suppose, for a different 
example, that we think that the next generation will in fact be better off than the 
present generation despite the many environmental and social problems they will 
inherit from us. According to the Levelling Down Problem, it might be better in at 
least one respect that the present generation simply destroy a certain amount of 
resources so that our descendants will not be any better off than us. 
Parfit suggests that one way in which those who are broadly sympathetic to the aims 
of egalitarianism might attempt to avoid the levelling down problem is to embrace the 
idea of priority. According to this view, the worse off people are the more it matters 
from the ethical point of view that they be benefited. Parfit calls this the Priority 
View, and those holding it prioritarians. 46 Prioritarians reject the basis of both telic 
and deontic egalitarianism, namely, that it is bad, or unjust, that some people are 
worse off than others though no fault of their own. 47 This is because they are 
unconcerned with the relational or comparative properties of resource allocations as 
45 Thus Parfit suggests that deontic egalitarians might appeal to the notion of reciprocity in 
order to argue that inequalities matter only between persons who can engage in mutually 
beneficial interaction, or the notion of community in order to argue that inequalities matter 
only between persons who belong to the same political community. Here, there would be no 
pressure to 'level down' if the inequalities worked against the interests of non-compatriots or 
non-contributors. For an extended discussion of the relation between reciprocity and 
distributive ethics, see chapters 3 and 4 below. 
46 Parfit, `Equality or Priority? ', p. 19. 
47 Parfit, `Equality or Priority? ', p. 22. 
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such. Instead, they think it bad that people are badly off regardless of the position of 
others. 8 On this view, Parfit writes, 
benefits to the worst off matter more, but that is only because these 
people are at a lower absolute level. It is irrelevant that these people 
are worse off than others. Benefits to them would matter just as 
much even if there were no others who were better off. 49 
For illustration, consider the following distributive dilemma discussed by Arneson. 
Here the newly arrived sole inhabitants of some desert island are in the process of 
dividing up the island's impersonal resources according to the dictates of distributive 
ethics. In this special case, however, there is only one resource to be distributed, 
Resource X, and this resource has some rather special characteristics. Arneson writes, 
Suppose we have on hand a fixed stock of the good X, which can be 
divided as finely as one pleases. X is intrinsically valuable, not 
merely valuable as a means to further goods, and the morally 
appropriate distribution of X is thought to be desirable for its own 
sake and not merely as a means to achieving a distribution of some 
further good. There are N individuals in society and for each of 
them, the more of X one has, the better off he is. 50 
In the above circumstances, Arneson observes that theories of equality and priority 
will require that X be divided such that that each of the N persons in the population 
48 Parfit, `Equality or Priority? ', p. 23. See also Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 242. 49 Parf it, `Equality or Priority? ', p. 23. 
50 Arneson, `Equality', p. 502. 
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will receive an equal (1/N) share of it. 51 Suppose next, however, that we relax the 
assumption that Resource X can be divided as thinly as we might like, and that as a 
result not all of the ways in which the island's resources might be divided will leave 
each islander with a 1/N share of resource X. Suppose, in fact, that two sets of 
different, and mutually exclusive, divisions were possible, such that immediately after 
the division people would derive the following levels of well-being from the 
impersonal resources they are allocated: 
Division 1 
(1) all at 50 (2) half at 40, half at 70 (3) half at 20, half at 80 
Division 2 
(1) half at 49, half at 46 (2) half at 60, half at 45 (3) half at 40, half at 40 
In the case of Division 1, the requirements of equality and priority are, once more, 
interchangeable. That is, they require that we choose outcome (1), either because all 
are equal here with respect to resource X (the equality view) or that the position of the 
worst off islanders here is best off as compared with outcomes (2) and (3) (the 
priority view). However, in the case of Distribution 2, the equality and priority views 
do not require the same distributions of X- for the equality view requires that we 
choose outcome (3), whereas the priority view requires that we choose outcome (1). It 
appears, then, that there will be cases in which the equality and priority views will 
conflict. 
51 Arneson, `Equality', p. 502. 
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Two issues arise here. First, the issue of the way in which equality and priority can 
diverge in what they require of distributive ethics in intergenerational contexts; 
second, the issue of whether the IPCC's findings matter from the prioritarian point of 
view. Regarding the first issue, suppose that the groups possessing differential 
amounts of resource X above each belonged to a different generation (one of the 20th 
century and one of the 21st century) and the lives of none of the members of these 
generations overlap. In this case, whether we are prioritarians or egalitarians could 
make a tremendous difference, at least in principle, to the way in which we view the 
distributions of X across generations as well as within generations. 
Suppose that the differential prospects of the populations in the Distribution 2 
example arise as a consequence of the different environmental policy choices adopted 
by previous generations (the population halves representing the earlier and the later 
generation respectively). For simplicity, we might say that choice (1) equates to a 
moderate conservation stance, (2) to no conservation at all, and (3) to a quite radical 
conservationist stance. According to equality we should chose (3), whereas according 
to priority we should choose (1). Quite apart from the question of what metric of 
advantage we adopt, then, it can matter that we are prioritarians and not egalitarians 
from the intergenerational ethical point of view. 
Turning to the second issue, it seems that the IPCC's predictions about climate 
change do indeed appear to matter a great deal from the prioritarian view when it is 
extended intergenerationally. This is because climate change impacts will influence 
the quality of life enjoyed by the worst off members of future generations. It will do 
this in two ways. First, it will impact upon the issue of which regions, and 
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populations, of the world will be worst off in the future and to what extent (consider 
here the way in which global sea-level rises and climate induced reductions in food 
production and food quality are expected to exacerbate inequalities between nations). 
Second, it will impact upon the issue of which generations taken as a whole will be 
worst off in the future and to what extent (consider here the problems posed by 
climate induced air pollution and consequent cardiovascular disorders which may 
well plague developing and developed nations alike). 
It is worth noting, however, that there is one problem with the view that global 
environmental problems such as climate change pose particular challenges for 
prioritarians. This is that, barring what the IPCC terms catastrophic 'surprises', 52 one 
might think that it is unlikely that climate change (or any other contemporary 
environmental problem) will reduce the quality of life of future generations to that of, 
or below, the quality of life enjoyed by many previous generations. Economists such 
as Beckerman, for example, argue that even if no attempts are made to stabilise or 
reduce emissions of GHGs in the near future, future generations will be able to adapt 
relatively easily to rising sea-levels and surface air temperatures by virtue of the fact 
that they will also be the beneficiaries of greater technology and other resources. 53 In 
short, Beckerman thinks that it would be unfair to the worst off members of the 
present generation to invest a great deal of energy and resources on the climate 
change problem which could otherwise be spent on alleviating present suffering. 
Beckerman and Malkin, for example, argue that 
52 See IPCC, 1996a, p. 7. 
53 Wilfrid Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing The Whistle on the Greens, pp. 96ff. 
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Global warming is far more glamorous and telegenic, of course, 
than the need for better toilets and drains in the Third World. But if 
we truly care about the welfare of our fellow world citizens, it is 
these kinds of environmental issues upon which we must focus our 
attention. 54 
There are at least some grounds for being sceptical about Beckerman's view, 
however, for much depends here on empirical evidence about (1) the exact impact 
which climate change will have on future quality of life and (2) the extent to which 
future generations will be beneficiaries of technological advancements which enable 
them to adapt to these impacts - and this empirical evidence is simply unavailable at 
present. It is at the very least possible that the impacts of global climate change will 
have such profound long-term effects that they will bring about a lowering in the 
quality of life for future generations relative to their predecessors. To the extent that 
the IPCC's recent research suggests that this is at least possible, then, this research is 
of ethical importance for prioritarians. 
4. Equality, Priority, or Sufficiency? 
In contrast to egalitarians and prioritarians, some theorists of distributive ethics, such 
as Harry Frankfurt, have claimed that social and economic benefits should be 
distributed in line with the ideal of sufficiency. The view here is that as many people 
as possible should have enough, or in other words sufficient, to pursue the aims and 
aspirations they affirm (where the aims and aspirations which are ethically relevant 
54 See W. Beckerman and J. Malkin, `How Much Does Global Warming Matter? ', The 
Public Interest, 114,1994, pp. 15-16. 
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are defined by some objective account of human well-being). 55 It is important to note 
that `having enough', here, cannot be equated with just having enough to make life 
bearable in the sense that one does not regret one's existence. Rather it involves both 
the fact that a person experiences no `substantial distress or dissatisfaction with his 
life' and that the dissatisfaction that he does experience could not be offset or 
reversed by an additional allocation of resources. 56 People have enough on 
Frankfurt's view only when they have the wherewithal to discover what they really 
care about and what will actually satisfy them. 
There are three main sufficiency based objections to thinking in terms of equality or 
priority. First, that both of these ideals, but particularly equality, has no apparent 
justification and is actually dangerous in virtue of eclipsing what a distributive theory 
should really take seriously, to wit, bringing as many people as possible up to the 
point where they have enough (where enough is defined in objective terms). Second, 
that the concerns which lead many writers to endorse what they think are egalitarian 
positions are actually grounded, at a deeper level, in considerations of sufficiency. 
57 
Third, that these ideals are less easily operationalised or attained than the ideal of 
sufficiency. 58 After a brief review of the first objection, I turn to the intergenerational 
application of the sufficiency view and the relevance to it of the IPCC's claims about 
climate change. 
55 Harry Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', Ethics, 98, October 1987, p. 21 - original 
emphasis. See also A. Rosenburg, `Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just 
Society', in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller, and J. Paul, eds., The Just Society, pp. 54-71; and 
Arneson, `Equality', pp. 496-500. 
56 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', pp. 39-40. 57 For Frankfurt's argument that many egalitarians, such as Dworkin, appeal at a deeper 
level to considerations of sufficiency, see `Equality as a Moral Ideal', pp. 32-4. 
58 See Rosenburg, `Equality, Sufficiency, and Opportunity in the Just Society', pp. 66-70. 
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4.1 The Divisiveness of Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism 
According to Frankfurt, the key flaw in theories of equality of outcome `lies in 
supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another 
regardless of how much either of them has. '59 What matters, Frankfurt argues, `is not 
that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone 
had enough it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than 
others. 60 
This does not mean, however, that a concern to equalise peoples' holdings of 
resources, for example, will always run counter to the concern that as many people as 
possible have enough. If this egalitarian concern has the result that more people are 
brought up to the point where they have enough, then the values of equality and 
sufficiency will converge (that is, so long as an equal division of resources will not 
result in nobody having enough). If Bill, for example, has less of what makes life go 
well than Ben, and in fact Ben has just about enough whereas Bill has not, then both 
equality and sufficiency (as well as priority) will converge in requiring that Bill be 
given extra resources so that he is brought up to Ben's (i. e. the sufficiency) level. 
Recall the case of Distribution 1. Here the payoffs were as follows: 
(1) all at 50 (2) half at 40, half at 70 (3) half at 20, half at 80 
Suppose that the sufficiency level for all were 50. Then equality, priority, and 
sufficiency will all apparently require the same distribution be enforced, namely, (1). 
59 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', p. 34. 60 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal' - original emphasis. 
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In such cases, Frankfurt observes, `even if equality is not as such morally important, a 
commitment to an egalitarian social policy may be indispensable to promoting the 
enjoyment of significant goods besides equality or to avoiding their impairment. 61 
The differences between the three views only become manifest when we turn to the 
case of Distribution 2. Recall that the payoffs here were the following: 
(1) half at 49, half at 46 (2) half at 60, half at 45 (3) half at 40, half at 40 
Suppose, again, that the sufficiency level for all was 50. Here, whereas the equality 
view (on some interpretations) would favour allocation (3), and the priority view 
would certainly favour allocation (1), the sufficiency view would favour allocation (2) 
- as this would be the only allocation where at least some people had enough to be 
content. It is in this sort of case that Frankfurt thinks that egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism contribute `to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time. '62 
A different example which explains what Frankfurt is getting at here is the following. 
There are two groups in some society, one of which is very rich and the other merely 
rich, where the latter have many more resources than the former, where both groups 
have enough resources, and where the inequalities are undeserved. Resource 
egalitarians will claim that the rich, here, ought to be compensated for their relative 
resource deficit. Moreover, they will argue that the case for this compensation will be 
as strong as some other case for compensation grounded in some proportionate 
inequality between a moderately well off and a very poor population. 
61 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', p. 22. 62 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', pp. 22-3. 
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When we turn to the sufficiency view, however, the case for compensating the merely 
rich population for their relative impoverishment falls away altogether. This is 
because compensating the rich in such circumstances will not bring it about that 
anyone who did not have enough before will have enough after compensation is 
awarded. It is not the fact that those badly off have smaller shares of resources that 
should be worry us, Frankfurt thinks, but rather that they have such small shares that 
they simply do not have enough. 63 Frankfurt writes, `there is no necessary conceptual 
connection between a person's relative economic position and whether he has needs 
of any degree of urgency [for] it is possible for those who are worse off not to have 
more urgent needs or claims than those who are better off because it is possible for 
them to have no urgent needs or claims at all. '64 According to the sufficiency view, 
then, there is a wholly contingent relation between what a person requires in order to 
have enough and the question of whether he is the worst off in some population. 
4.2 The Sufficiency View and Intergenerational Ethics 
The Distribution Two example shows that, at least in principle, the ideals of equality, 
priority and sufficiency can all diverge in what they require of distributive ethics in 
both intergenerational and intragenerational contexts. Moreover, we have at least 
some reason (grounded in the wide ranging research of the IPCC into the impacts of 
climate change) to think that future generations, and the persons which belong to 
them, may inherit fewer resources than are required for them to have enough to meet 
their basic needs, or exercise their basic capabilities. 
63 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', p. 33; Arneson, `Equality', p. 497. 64 Frankfurt, `Equality as a Moral Ideal', p. 35. 
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Two examples of note concern the issues clean air and food security. People require a 
certain quality of air, and food, in order to pursue whatever it is they really care about. 
It is true that there are limits to the purity of air, or to the quality of food, which are 
necessary for a person to have enough to pursue whatever the life plan they endorse. 
However, to the extent which the actions of members of successive generations 
damage air and food quality for their successors with the result that these successors 
cannot pursue the life-plans which they both affirm and are objectively valuable, then 
this would seem to violate the principle of sufficiency. 
It should be of little surprise, then, that the sufficiency view has attracted considerable 
support in environmentalist circles in the guise of the pre-eminent understanding of 
`sustainable development. ' According to this understanding, sustainable development 
is `development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. '65 The idea here is that 
intergenerational ethics requires that existing persons not act so as to leave members 
of future generations without enough, but that this does not mean that they must leave 
for them either exactly the same, or indeed a more abundant, range of natural 
resources as they themselves inherited from previous generations. 66 
65 The World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 43. 
66 Note that the sufficiency version of the sustainable development idea will result in a 
somewhat less demanding set of intergenerational requirements than its egalitarian counter- 
part, according to which `each generation is entitled to inherit a planet and cultural resource 
base at least as good as that of previous generations' (see IPCC, 1996c, p. 15n - emphasis 
added). 
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5. Other theories of intergenerational ethics 
I hope to have shown in this chapter that the IPCC's research on climate change does 
indeed raise important questions of intergenerational distributive ethics that are robust 
across the equality, priority, and sufficiency views. This is because climate change 
will impact upon the issue of who will have a lower quality of life, who will be worst 
off, and who will have enough both within and between the generations to come. 
However, it also seems reasonable to assume that it will raise similar questions for 
other ethical views which have distributive significance, such as communitarianism 
and libertarianism. 
Climate change would appear to raise questions for libertarians, for example, in virtue 
of the fact that it threatens to render people in the future worse off than they otherwise 
might have been if this change had not occurred. 7 Libertarians such as Robert 
Nozick, for example, tend to embrace the notion that, even if it is not the 
responsibility of public institutions to provide positive benefits for existing or future 
members of society, acts or social policies which render people worse off through no 
fault of their own are impermissible. Consequently, many libertarians have endorsed 
the principle, derived from Locke, that appropriations and transfers of natural 
resources should not harm or worsen the condition of others, whether these others 
belong to their generation or not. According to Nozick's version of the Lockean 
principle, for example, 
67 See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 161ff. As I will argue in chapters 5 
and 6, considerations of Non-Identity considerably complicate the application of worsening, 
or harm-based, ethical requirements to issues of intergenerational distribution. 
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the crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object 
worsens the situation of others ... A process normally giving rise 
to a permanent bequethable property right in a previously unowned 
thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to 
u. the thing is thereby worsened. 68 
Nozick's version of the Lockean Proviso is rather weak. It is markedly less restrictive 
on the class of acquisitions and transfers of natural resources which it will prohibit 
being appropriated than the Lockean version of the proviso it is based upon. 
69 
However, even this principle will still prohibit the depletion of much of the Earth's 
stock of non-renewable natural resources by earlier generations so long as we assume 
that the future generations who will suffer as a result of the bad effects of depletion 
and climate change are not net gainers from the system of private property which 
provided the context for these to occur. Because this seems a reasonable assumption, 
it would seem that the IPCC's research raises questions even for Nozickian 
libertarians. 70 
Next consider the communitarian view of ethics. Communitarianism is not easily 
pinned down in terms of a stable set of ideas. However a key idea to be found in 
many communitarian accounts does have intergenerational ethical application. This is 
that one's obligations of distributive ethics are owed only, mainly, or at least more 
68Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 175,178. 
69 See G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1995, pp. 74ff. 
70 Robert Elliot defends a similar conclusion in `Future Generations, Locke's Proviso, and 
Libertarian Justice', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3,1986. He writes that, `provided that 
libertarian justice involves some such device as Locke's proviso the enforcement of 
substantial environmentalist policies comes within the ambit of the liberal minimalist state' 
(p. 217). 
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extensively to those who belong to one's own political, or ethical, community. This 
appears to raise the possibility that communitarians will not view environmental 
problems caused by the members of one community for another as raising questions 
of distributive ethics. 
However, as suggested in a recent book by Avner de Shalit, even if it were the case 
that communitarians were committed to radical restrictions on the scope of inter- 
community distributive ethics amongst contemporaries, it seems that they would be 
much less likely to embrace similar restrictions on the scope of intra-community 
distributive ethics amongst non-contemporaries. This is because most communitarian 
accounts conceptualise ethical, or political, communities as being entities which have 
an inherently intergenerational or intertemporal dimension. 7' Here, on virtually any 
view of what a communitarian view of intergenerational ethics amounts to, the 
IPCC's findings concerning the largely, if not uniformly, adverse future effects of 
climate change appear to be of major relevance. Put simply, the failure of existing 
persons to address global environmental problems, such as climate change, will 
jeopardise the future integrity of the cultures and communities they belong to. One 
particularly striking example of the vulnerability of nations to climate change, for 
example, concerns the way in which climate change induced global sea-level rises are 
expected to impact negatively upon the economic and cultural practices of coastal 
regions and small-islands. 72 
71 See Avner de Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, London, Routledge, 1996, Chapter 1. See 
also Peter Marshall, `Thinking for Tomorrow', Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10,1,1993, 
pp. 113-4. 
72 1 return to this issue in Chapter 6. 
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This cursory look at two other ethical theories suggests, I think, that the IPCC's 
findings raise intergenerational ethical questions for a much wider range of theories 
than discussed in detail earlier under the heading of equality, priority, and sufficiency 
- that is, on the assumption that the best way to approach intergenerational ethical 
issues lies not in attempts to construct a wholly novel theory, but rather in the 
extension of familiar principles of intragenerational distributive ethics. However, the 
possibility that there might be independent reasons which undermine the view that 
familiar theories of distributive ethics can be extended in this way has yet to be 
addressed. Thus, some of those sceptical about the possibility of far reaching norms 
of intergenerational distributive ethics claim that, due to the problems of Non- 
Reciprocity and Non-Identity, the `extensional assumption' I have relied upon is 
flawed. In what follows, I devote most of my time to an examination of whether or 
not such sceptical claims are defensible. 
Chapter 3: The Non-Reciprocity Problem 
1. Introduction 
Theories of distributive ethics can usefully be divided into two types. There are those 
which posit a strong connection between the scope of principles of distribution and 
the notion of reciprocity, and there are those that posit no such strong connection. 
One way of explaining this is to say that we can distinguish between theories of 
distributive ethics by the way they answer the following question: `Are duties of 
distributive ethics owed only to agents who can engage in mutually beneficial, that is 
reciprocal, interaction with us? ' Any theory of distributive ethics which responds `no' 
to this question, I will say, denies that there is any strong connection between 
distributive ethics and reciprocity. I shall call such theories non reciprocity-based 
distributive theories. Any theory that responds `yes' to this question, however, does 
appear to posit a strong connection between the ideas of ethics and reciprocity, and 
consequently I shall call these reciprocity-based distributive theories. One reason for 
distinguishing between, and evaluating the relative merits of, reciprocity-based and 
non-reciprocity based theories of distribution is that they appear to diverge markedly 
in the accounts they will offer of how social and economic benefits should be 
distributed across generations. 
In this and the next chapter I want to consider the claim that the lack of reciprocity 
evident in dealings between persons belonging to different generations means that the 
distributive theories considered in the last chapter cannot, after all, be extended to 
cover issues of intergenerational distribution; and consequently that such theories 
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cannot be appealed to in order to explain why social policies which reduce the long- 
term threats of climate change ought to be adopted. As such, the aims of this chapter 
are two-fold. First, to provide an overview of reciprocity-based theories of 
distributive ethics and the way in which they would seem to be inimical to the idea 
that present persons have extensive duties of to persons belonging to future 
generations. Second, to investigate some interesting ways in which reciprocity-based 
theories of ethics might be modified in order for them to be reconciled with certain 
norms of intergenerational obligation. 
Throughout the chapter, I will be assuming, as a background hypothesis, what might 
be called the Asymmetry View. According to this view, existing persons are in a 
position to harm or benefit members of future generations in a number of important 
ways with no fear of retaliation (or indeed hope of requital). By contrast, I will argue 
in the next chapter that the Asymmetry View is not beyond criticism, and will attempt 
to draw out the coherence, and some of the implications, of the claim that there are 
ways in which people who belong to remote generations can interact with each other 
in mutually beneficial ways. This, it will be argued, strengthens the claim that 
reciprocity-based ethical theories can be applied to questions of intergenerational 
distributive ethics. 
In the next section, I outline briefly two alternative sets of reciprocity-based theories 
of distributive ethics. In section 3, I explain how the intergenerational extension of 
both sets of theories are prone to the problem that there can be no dealings of mutual 
benefit between persons belonging to different generations (I call this the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem). I also go on to discuss two ways in which reciprocity-based 
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theories might be saved from the Non-Reciprocity Problem in some revised form. In 
section 4, I go on to argue that the Non-Reciprocity Problem does not call into 
question the intergenerational extension of a large range of theories which deny that 
the scope of distributive ethics is determined by considerations of reciprocity. Finally, 
in sections 5 and 6, I develop in greater detail two lines of thought which seek to 
explain how persons can be obliged, on grounds of fair reciprocity, to do things for 
the sake of future persons even if there exists no direct dealings between people 
belonging to different generations. 
2. Reciprocity-Based Distributive Ethics 
The central premise of reciprocity-based ethics is that only individuals who possess 
the potential to contribute to others' well-being are owed ethical duties. We might call 
this the Contribution Requirement. Here the fact that a person is especially needy, and 
would benefit greatly from receiving certain resources, does not in itself mean that 
they have any claim to these resources. That is to say, the scope of reciprocity-based 
ethics is sensitive to an agent's contributiveness and insensitive to an agent's needs. 
There are two sets of reciprocity-based theories. The first proposes that the 
requirements of distributive ethics are determined by considerations concerning the 
way in which individuals seek to pursue their own self-interest; the second proposes 
that the requirements of distributive ethics are determined by considerations of 
fairness or fair-play. The relation between these two sets of theories, and those which 
deny that the presence of distributive claims are linked to issues of social 
contributiveness, is explored in Figure 1 and in the following two sections. 
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Figure 1: Reciprocity and Distributive Ethics 
(Q1) Do those who cannot contribute to the fruits 
of social co-operation have claims on these fruits? 
No Yes 
Reciprocity-Based 
Distributive Theories 
1 (Q2) How are the requirements of 
distributive ethics determined? 
Consistency with individuals' Consistency with notion of 
pursuit of self-interest fairness or fair-play 
Reciprocity as Self-Interest Reciprocity as Fairness 
Non Reciprocity-Based 
Distributive Theories 
2.1 Reciprocity as Self-Interest 
According to reciprocity-based theories which appeal to a notion of self-interest to 
determine the requirements of distributive ethics (hereafter, theories of Reciprocity as 
Self-Interest), ethical requirements must be consistent with the pursuit of advantage 
of the individuals who are bound by those requirements. The Hobbesian variant, for 
example, proceeds from the claim that individuals naturally seek their own advantage, 
to the idea that if everyone pursued their advantage without constraint (i. e. in the 
absence of a `common power to keep them in awe'), there would result a war of 
`every man against every man. " Here we have the Hobbesian perspective of a state of 
nature where peoples' lives would be `solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short. '2 
I Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, London, Penguin, 1968, Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 185. 2 Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 186. 
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This, Hobbes argues famously, would be a significantly worse outcome (in terms of 
advantage) for everyone concerned than if certain `articles of peace', regulating social 
co-operation and interaction and so forth, were agreed upon. 
According to David Gauthier's derivation of this view, the only way to generate 
norms of distributive ethics is to do so as `a rational constraint from the non-moral 
premises of rational choice. '3 Here the existence of such norms are defensible only 
insofar as they can be shown to be rational, and they are rational only if they are 
conducive to the interests of rational individuals whose overriding goal is to pursue 
their own good. As `constrained' self-interested utility maximisers, Gauthier argues, 
persons will agree on, and comply with, ethical requirements given (1) it is in their 
own interest to do so and (2) the selection of these requirements is the outcome of a 
rational bargaining situation which reflects the relative bargaining powers of 
individuals. So long as these two conditions are satisfied, Reciprocity as Self-Interest 
can be counted on to generate constraints on the pursuit of self-interest `as the 
minimum price that has to be paid in order to obtain the co-operation of others. '4 
2.2 Reciprocity as Fairness 
Suppose I have promised a friend to give him a lift to the airport. He, in return, has 
promised that he will wash my car when he gets back from his trip. Some time later 
while he washes my car, as promised, we discuss the connection between the notions 
of ethics and reciprocity. He suggests that he is returning the favour so that we will 
both continue to do each other favours in the future, and in so doing we will both 
3 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 4. 
4 See Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 6. 
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better pursue our respective individual self-interests. I suggest, however, that when I 
return his favours I do this, not only to `keep the favours rolling' as it were, but for 
some reason which is more `intrinsically reciprocal. 'S I suggest further that I would 
prefer to keep the promises I make to people who treat me well even if this would 
quite obviously not maximise my individual self-interest. Finally, I claim that if I 
found out that my friend had reneged on some duty of reciprocity owed me, I would 
let him know how disgusted I was with him, even if it would positively harm me to 
do so. 
Anyone sympathetic to such a view recognises the ethos of reciprocity-based theories 
which appeal to the notion of fairness in order to specify the requirements of 
distributive ethics (hereafter theories of Reciprocity as Fairness). Here it is a 
particular notion of fair-play, and not merely prudential self-concern, which lies at the 
heart of the justification of ethical obligations; the idea, as Rawls puts it, is that `we 
are not to gain from the co-operative labours of others without doing our fair share. '6 
But how, exactly, one might ask, do theories of Reciprocity as Fairness differ from (i) 
theories of Reciprocity as Self-Interest on the one side and (ii) non reciprocity-based 
theories on the other? The difference between Reciprocity as Fairness and non 
reciprocity-based theories is best explained by exploring the general weaknesses of 
reciprocity-based ethics, to which I return in section 4.1. The difference between 
Reciprocity as Fairness and Reciprocity as Self-Interest, though, is easier to define. It 
5 See Allan Gibbard, `Constructing Justice', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20,1991, 
pp. 266ff. 
6 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 112. Rawls' discussion of the duty of fair-play draws upon 
an earlier treatment of this idea by H. L. A. Hart. See Hart, `Are There Any Natural Rights', 
Philosophical Review, 64, April 1955, pp. 185ff. 
Chapter 3: The Non-Reciprocity Problem 91 
exists since, unlike theories of Reciprocity as Self-Interest, Reciprocity as Fairness 
does not propose that distributive ethics is grounded on the idea of rationality as the 
maximisation of individual advantage; here persons are motivated to act reciprocally 
not simply out of self-concern, but also because the disposition to act reciprocally has 
itself some intrinsic merit. 
Writers such as Gauthier, of course, claim that motivations of fairness are justifiable 
purely on self-interested grounds. Part of his theory of `constrained' utility 
maximisation is that it is rational to cultivate a disposition to reciprocate fairly given 
the transparency of human motivations (if one cheated on one's reciprocal duties or 
agreements, Gauthier thinks, this would be seen as it were `on one's face' and 
consequently he regards such cheating as being imprudent). Nevertheless, such 
motivations do not, for Gauthier, possess any kind of non-prudentially grounded 
value or virtue in their own right 7 This defines the basic disagreement between 
Gauthier and proponents of Reciprocity as Fairness, such as Gibbard. 
3. The Non-Reciprocity Problem 
The IPCC's recent research suggests that, if concerted and far reaching action to 
reduce GHG emissions is not taken in the near future, climate change could well 
bring about a lowering of the quality of life for future generations. However, it also 
appears that actions to avoid, or adapt to, the adverse consequences of climate change 
will require certain sacrifices to be borne by persons belonging to existing and 
7 Gibbard, `Constructing Justice', p. 266. 
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proximate future generations, particularly regarding those residing in developing 
countries. 
Suppose that, in spite of these sacrifices, stringent legally binding agreements on the 
reduction of global GHG emissions had been secured at the recent Kyoto meeting of 
the parties to the UNFCCC, as opposed to the rather modest cuts which were agreed 
in reality. 8 Suppose, in addition, that the parties to these agreements abide by them in 
the future. 9 The members of future generations which the IPCC predict will be the 
main beneficiaries of these agreements will never, it seems, be in a position to repay 
the members of predecessor generations for their restraint in this regard. On the other 
hand, as we have seen, some hold that the requirements of distributive ethics oblige 
us to act so as to provide benefits for others, including members of different nations 
or generations, only if these persons are in a position to benefit us in return. If this 
view can be defended, it seems that members of present generations are required to 
conserve resources only for the sake of members of future generations, such as their 
children and grand-children, with whom they share some real possibility of entering 
into dealings of mutual benefit or reciprocity. 
8 Although the reaction to the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC has been mixed, the general 
consensus amongst the global climatological community appears to be that, even if adhered 
to, the cuts will not go very far towards avoiding the. adverse consequences which climate 
change will have on future generations. This is mainly because the rapidly expanding GHG 
emissions of developing countries are not included in the protocol's terms, and these 
emissions will outweigh any future cuts in emissions made by developed countries. See 
`Getting Warmer, but still a long way from our goal', The Independent, Friday 12 December 
1997, p. 19; `All that Kyoto heat, for next to nothing', The Guardian, Thursday 11 December 
1997, p. 1; and 'Kyoto Deal Will Not Stop Global Warming', Friends of the Earth Press 
Release (http: //www. foe. co. uk/publisinfo/infoteam/pressrel/1997/19971211101102. html). 
9 This itself requires a certain leap of faith. To be effective, any legally binding international 
agreement designed to reduce GHG emissions must secure the full co-operation and 
ratification of the US. However, this itself requires that it be ratified by US Congress and 
many commentators have argued that this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. 
See, for example, and `Mixed reaction to Kyoto agreement', BBC World News, Friday 
December 12 1997 (http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/world/rrewsid_38000/38504. stm). 
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Let us call this the Non-Reciprocity Problem. The basis of the Non-Reciprocity 
Problem is captured in Barry's observation that: 
On the face of it, there is no room for justice as reciprocity to 
operate between people who are not alive at the same time. The man 
who asked what posterity has ever done for us got to the heart of the 
problem. Since, in the nature of the case, posterity cannot do 
anything for us, there can be no obligation arising from justice as 
reciprocity to do anything for posterity. 10 
Other writers sceptical of the intergenerational application of reciprocity-based 
theories of distribution include Rawls, Goodin, Pogge, and Kymlicka. 11 However, 
none of these writers claim that present persons have no duties of distributive ethics 
to future persons. Rather they all regard the key to the construction of a robust theory 
of intergenerational obligation as the rejection of reciprocity-based ethics. 
It is interesting, however, that these writers devote little if any time to the crucial 
premise that future persons can be harmed or benefited by the predecessors but not 
vice versa. Rather this premise is treated as not requiring defence of any kind. Thus, 
Barry observes that `we can be certain ... that people alive in several centuries' time 
will not be able to do anything that will make us better off or worse off now, although 
we can to some degree make them better off or worse off , 12 and Rawls observes that 
10 Barry, `Justice as Reciprocity', in Democracy, Power and Justice, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1989, p. 483. 
11 See Robert Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, Chicago, University of Chicago, 1985, 
p. 177; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 291ff; Thomas Pogge, 'Review of Theories of Justice', 
Journal of Philosophy, 87,7, July 1990, p. 382; and Will Kymlicka, `Two Theories of 
Justice', Inquiry, 33,1990, pp. 105ff. 
12 Barry, `Justice Between Generations', in P. M. S. Hacker and J. Raz, Law, Morality and 
Society: Essays in Honour of H. L. Hart, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977. p. 270. 
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`It is a natural fact that generations are spread out in time and actual exchanges 
between them take place only in one direction. We can do something for posterity but 
it can do nothing for us. ' 13 
Perhaps these writers endorse this premise of asymmetric dealings between 
generations, which I referred to above as the Asymmetry View, in virtue of the 
apparent absurdity of the notion of backwards causation. Here, whatever the persons 
of the further future think about us, the lives we choose to live in the present, and the 
events of the past in general, the impossibility of causal chains being anything other 
than unidirectional means that future persons, when they come into existence, will not 
be in a position to change any aspect of the way in which their dead ancestors lived 
their lives. Members of future generations could not, for example, bring it about that 
tougher measures to combat climate change had been adopted in Kyoto in December 
1997, for, as Aristotle observed, even God cannot change the past. 14 
Suppose, next, that neither the modest measures agreed upon in Kyoto, nor any 
further measures agreed upon in the near future, prevent many of the unpleasant long- 
term consequences of climate change outlined in Chapter 1. The low regard which the 
future victims of these consequences will form of our generation could not, it seems, 
have any causal influence over the environmentally- damaging actions (or social 
policies) which our generation performed (or adopted). In this sense, generations to 
come always seem to be at the mercy of the action, negligent or otherwise, of their 
predecessors. Of course, the expectations which presently existing persons have 
concerning the potential effects of their actions on their successors may well play a 
13 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 291. 14 See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, London, Penguin, 1953,1139b6-10. 
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role in the choices they make, particularly when these choices will obviously have 
significant implications for future well-being. But this is not to say that future persons 
themselves will have a causal influence on the behaviour of their ancestors. So one 
feature of a world without backwards causation is that persons, and groups, who exist 
in the present appear to be wholly invulnerable to the actions of persons, and groups, 
who will come into existence in the further future. 
I will argue in the next chapter that the Asymmetry View is more contentious than 
writers such as Barry and Rawls assume, and that this suggests that the scope of 
reciprocity-based ethics might be wider than is often thought. However, let us retain 
this view of dealings between generations for the time being. On the assumption that 
Barry and Rawls are correct in thinking that present persons can benefit (or harm) the 
vast majority of their successors with no hope (or fear) of requital, to what extent does 
the Non-Reciprocity Problem undermine the intergenerational extension of (i) 
theories of Reciprocity as Self-Interest, and (ii) theories of Reciprocity as Fairness? I 
attempt to answer this question in the next two sections. 
3.1 Reciprocity as Self-Interest and the Non-Reciprocity Problem 
Recall that Gauthier attempts to ground `impartial constraints on the maximisation of 
individual utility by appealing to the benefits of co-operation. "5 The problem is that 
social co-operation requires the existence of mutual interaction of some form or other. 
On the Asymmetry View, however, co-operation takes place only between 
contemporaries, so a present individual accepting a constraint on his pursuit of self- 
15 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 298. 
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interest in order to benefit future persons would appear to be bringing about a simple 
transfer of utility from him to future persons. Moreover, Gauthieran contractual 
parties must be aware of this fact, for Gauthier does not make use of a veil of 
ignorance to shield the knowledge of his individual utility maximisers' invulnerability 
to future persons. Here, principles of distributive ethics are to be selected from an 
initial situation characterised by fair bargaining between persons who have full 
knowledge of their situation. This is important because, according to Gauthier, 
theories of ethics `must explain and justify why people need to accept in their real 
situation, principles that they would have accepted had they been bargaining in a 
situation that lacked any moral constraints. ' 16 
Nor is the refusal to adopt such constraints a violation of the proviso (namely to leave 
`enough and as good' for others) which Gauthier borrows from Locke. The proviso, 
Gauthier claims, `prohibits bettering one's situation through interaction that worsens 
the situation of another. ' 17 However, the benefits which members of present 
generations derive from appropriating resources do not depend upon any pattern of 
interaction obtaining between present and future persons. Gauthier writes that 
Any costs that [individuals] impose on future persons are strictly 
incidental to the benefits [they receive]. They cannot then be 
violations of the proviso. So an individual does his descendants no 
injustice in not concerning himself with them. '8 
16 Avner de Shalit, `Bargaining With The Not-Yet-Born', International Journal of Moral 
Social Studies, Autumn 1990, p. 229. 
17 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 205. 
18 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 298. See also K. Sauve, `Gauthier, Property Rights, 
and Future Generations', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25,2,1995, pp. 164-5. 
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In short, then, Gauthier holds that (a) one can only violate the proviso if one renders a 
person whom one interacts with worse off, (b) persons belonging to future 
generations cannot interact with persons belonging to the present generation, and 
therefore (c) even if present persons render future persons worse off by adopting 
profligate policies regarding fossil fuel and GHG emission and so forth, this will not 
amount to a violation of the `enough and as good' proviso. 
It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that Gauthier attempts to defend a much more 
positive application of his theory to the issue of intergenerational distributive ethics 
by arguing that 'the moral relations among adult members of society may be extended 
to involve the young as future contributors giving a contractarian rationale for 
practices of inheritance and investment. ' 19 This is because 'each person interacts with 
others both older and younger than himself, and enters thereby into a continuous 
thread of interaction extending from the most remote human past to the farthest future 
of our kind' with the result that `mutually beneficial co-operation directly involves 
persons of different but overlapping generations. 920 The idea is that the potential 
benefits reaped by any generation refusing to abide by an intergenerational contract 
will be outweighed by the need to prolong the agreement reached with later, 
proximate, generations, and as a result of this need, Gauthier argues, the `exhaustion 
of the world's resources does not present itself as an option. '21 This has been called 
the `Continuing Contract Argument. '22 
19 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 269. 
20 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 299. 
21 Gauthier, Morals By Agreement, p. 299. 
22 Sauve, `Gauthier, Property Rights, and Future Generations', p. 166. 
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There are at least two serious problems with the Continuing Contract Argument, 
however. Firstly, there will be many cases in which there will be no outweighing 
benefits associated with being faithful to the existing intergenerational `contract. ' 
What benefits are available, for example, for the generation which adheres to an 
existing agreement with a non-proximate, or non-overlapping, past generation? Here 
persons inhabiting some later generation have already gained the lion's share of the 
agreement it had with previous generations, and now faces only costs in order to keep 
the agreement alive for the sake of coming generations. Moreover, nothing can 
apparently prevent a later generation refusing to honour the requirements of an 
intergenerational contract as there are no sanctions which can be brought to bear 
against such a rogue generation `going its own way. '23 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, not to exit a contract which a generation has 
already benefited from appears, on Gauthier's own terms, irrational. While a sense of 
self-interested reciprocity would in intragenerational cases often suffice to prevent a 
party from leaving the contract, this is precisely what is absent in dealings between 
persons belonging to remote or distant generations. So even if proximate generations 
can reach agreements according to the dictates of Gauthier's theory of bargaining, 
distant generations cannot, for in Gauthier's terms it cannot be rational for a member 
of any generation to constrain his pursuit of utility for the sake of someone he cannot 
co-operate or interact with. Gauthier fails to show that ethical requirements can be 
generated in the intergenerational context because it is not necessarily rational for 
generations to co-operate with later generations of the further future. 
23 de Shalit, 'Bargaining With The Not-Yet-Born', pp. 227-8. 
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3.2 Reciprocity as Fairness and the Non-Reciprocity Problem 
99 
Given the above problems, Reciprocity as Self-Interest appears to be untenable as a 
constitutive, rather than sceptical, approach to intergenerational distributive ethics. 
Can the same be said about Reciprocity as Fairness? If the idea of fairness is meant to 
bind present persons and their distant successors, then the export of Reciprocity as 
Fairness to the intergenerational context appears as equally suspect as its self- 
interested stable-mate. This is because members of future generations will benefit 
from the goods present persons produce and save for them without any need to 
contribute fruitfully to their construction. 
Consider Rawls' articulation of this point. Rawls remarks that reciprocity-based 
principles apply normally `when there is an exchange of advantages and each party 
gives something as a fair return to the other. '24 But, as he goes on to argue, over the 
course of history 
no generation gives to the preceding generations, the benefits of 
whose saving it has received. .. each generation makes a 
contribution to later generations and receives from its predecessors. 
The first generation may benefit hardly at all, whereas the last 
generations, those living when no further saving is required, gain 
the most and give the least 25 
24 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 290. 
25 Rawls, .4 Theory of Justice, p. 290. This explains why Rawls fails to apply the Difference 
Principle to questions of intergenerational distribution, for later generations cannot improve 
the situation of `the least fortunate' initial generation. In fact, in its intergenerational 
application this principle would apparently require that there ought to be no saving at all for 
the sake of future generations (see section 5 below). 
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Rawls is making the point here that there may well be a sort of "chronological 
unfairness" in both the present generation sacrificing itself too much for the sake of 
successor generations, as well as failing to sacrifice itself enough for the sake of 
successor generations. Perhaps surprisingly, this idea is almost wholly overlooked in 
recent literature on intergenerational distributive ethics. 
Another writer who appears to have been sensitive to such concerns was Alexander 
Herzen. According to Isaiah Berlin, Herzen claimed that, `human development is a 
form of chronological unfairness, since late-comers are able to profit by the labours of 
their predecessors without paying the same price. '26 And, like Herzen and Rawls, 
Kant was similarly worried. Kant remarks that 
earlier generations seem to perform their laborious tasks only for the 
sake of the later ones, so as to prepare for them a further stage from 
which they can rise still higher the structure intended by nature... 
only the later generations will in fact have the good fortune to 
inhabit the building on which a whole series of their forefathers... 
had worked without themselves being able to share in the happiness 
they were preparing. 7 
It is important to note that the point which Rawls, Herzen and Kant are trying to make 
here is not that we ought not sacrifice ourselves for the sake of future generations 
26 As quoted by Isaiah Berlin, in his introduction to F. Venturi's Roots of Revolution, New 
York, Alfred Knopf, 1960, p. xx. Berlin also notes the concurring opinion of Chernyshevsky 
who, according to Berlin, remarked `history is fond of her grandchildren for it offers them 
the marrow of the bones, which the previous generation had hurt its hands in breaking' 
(pp. xx-xxi). See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 290-1. 
27 I. Kant, 'Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in H. Reiss, ed., 
Kant's Political Writings, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970, p. 44. 
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because we have nothing to gain from our distant successors. Rather they are making 
a distinct point about the apparent unfairness of one generation sacrificing itself for 
the sake of the next when the next generation will enjoy the benefits of the savings 
without contributing to their production. Either present persons constrain their actions 
in various ways or they do not. If they do not then (considerations of Non-Identity 
aside) persons in the future may lose out; if they do then they, present persons, will 
lose out and future persons will gain. Either way, members of future generations 
cannot contribute in any direct fashion to the well-being of their ancestors in return 
for their earlier restraint. In deciding to save the first, or existing, generation will be 
sacrificing itself for the benefit of persons who are non-contributive to its well-being 
and incapable of restraining themselves in line with the demands of fairness. 
3.3 Four Inconsistent Beliefs 
One way of explaining the dilemma which the Non-Reciprocity Problem raises for 
those who are attracted to both reciprocity-based theories of distribution and certain 
norms of intergenerational distributive ethics is to show that these people wish to 
retain four, apparently inconsistent, beliefs. These are 
(1) performing acts, or adopting social policies, which threaten the 
well-being of members of future generations is wrong because it 
will violate certain requirements of distributive ethics. 
(2) requirements of distributive ethics are owed only to those who 
can reciprocate with those who are bound by those requirements. 
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(3) reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact 
with each other through some, direct, causal pathway. 
(4) the vast majority of future persons will never be in a position to 
engage in activities which will have a direct, causal, impact on 
members of previous generations. 
It seems that holders of the reciprocity-based view must (a) abandon the thought that 
distributive ethics can be extended intergenerationally beyond the nearest of 
generations (belief 1), (b) abandon their commitment to some aspect of reciprocity- 
based ethics (beliefs 2 and 3), or (c) abandon the view that present persons are not 
vulnerable to the actions of their distant successors (belief 4). The problem is that 
beliefs 2,3 and 4 are, for reciprocity-based theorists, hard to resist. In particular, 
belief 4 seems sound on any view of inter-temporal interaction. 
It seems, therefore, that if the notion of intergenerational distributive ethics is to be 
defended, the idea that distributive ethics might be reciprocity-based must be 
dropped; or if the notion that distributive ethics is reciprocity-based is to be defended, 
then the idea of far reaching norms of intergenerational distributive ethics must be 
dropped. In fact, the dilemma here is captured nicely in an example created by Parfit: 
Suppose that I leave some broken glass in the undergrowth of a 
wood. A hundred years later this glass wounds a child. My act 
harms this child. If I had safely buried the glass, this child would 
have walked through the wood unharmed. Does it make a moral 
difference that the child whom I harm does not now exist? On one 
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view, moral principles cover only people who can reciprocate, or 
harm and benefit, each other. If I cannot be harmed or benefited by 
this child, as we can plausibly suppose, the harm that I cause this 
child has no moral importance. 8 
Suppose that we put aside the suggestion that the scope of distributive ethics is not 
determined by the issue of reciprocity at all (a suggestion that I return to in section 4). 
There appear to be at least two ways in which the proponent of reciprocity-based 
distributive principles might respond, and both of these solutions turn on revising 
belief (3) in order that they might retain beliefs (1), (2), and (3). According to the first 
approach, it is claimed that a person, A, can engage in dealings of reciprocity with 
another person, C, even if there is no possibility of any genuine two-way causal 
interaction between A and C. This is because A, for example, might be in a position to 
engage in two-way causal interaction with a third-party, B, who in turn might be in a 
position to engage in two-way causal interaction with C. We might call the distinctive 
understanding of reciprocity evident in dealings between A and C, here, indirect 
reciprocity; and where A and C turn out to be members of different generations, the 
relation between them might be termed one of indirect intergenerational reciprocity. 
In effect, then, the first approach recommends we revise (3) to claim 
(3') reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact 
with each other through some direct or indirect causal pathway. 
28 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 356-7. Parfit's response to this dilemma is to reject the 
reciprocity-based view, and his response is endorsed, amongst others, by Hillel Steiner 
(Steiner, An Essay on Rights, p. 259). 
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According to the second approach, it is simply denied that to be engaged in dealings 
of reciprocity our two persons, A and C, must have the capacity to engage in two-way 
causal interaction - for example, by bringing about changes in each others' intrinsic 
properties. This is because A can bring about changes in C's well-being which do not 
require that A's activities have any causal impact at all on C's person - for example, 
by frustrating C's deeply held desires or interests in way that has no tangible impact 
on C's physical or mental life. We might call the distinctive category of reciprocity 
evident between A and C, here, non-causal reciprocity; and where A and C turn out to 
be members of different generations, the relation between them might be termed one 
of non-causal intergenerational reciprocity. In effect, then, the second approach 
recommends we revise (3) to claim 
(3') reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact 
with each other through some casual or non-causal pathway. 
In sections 5 and 6 of this chapter I discuss two alternative articulations, or models, of 
indirect intergenerational reciprocity. 29 The first of these develops a version of 
Reciprocity as Fairness where the fairness doing the work in the theory binds 
contemporaries, but is grounded in a chain of concern which connects members of 
successive generations. I call this the Chain of Concern Model. The second develops 
a version of Reciprocity as Fairness where the fairness doing the work binds present 
and past persons, and which is grounded in the obligation to pass on to future persons 
the benefits bequeathed to present persons by their predecessors. I call this the 
29 1 return to the second approach in the next chapter. 
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Trusteeship Model. Before I discuss these views, however, I want to discuss some 
limitations on the scope of the Non-Reciprocity Problem. 
4. The Limits of the Non-Reciprocity Problem 
Even if we suppose that the Non-Reciprocity Problem is of relevance for some 
theories of intergenerational distributive ethics, it does appear that considerations of 
non-reciprocity do not raise problems for all such theories. Moreover, the theories 
which it does appear to undermine (i. e. reciprocity-based theories) seen implausible 
on independent grounds. Finally, at best it only seems to undermine the view that 
future persons are owed positive duties of ethics. These three considerations suggest 
that there are important limits to the scope of the Non-Reciprocity Problem, and I 
outline each below. 
4.1 Non Reciprocity-Based Theories of Distributive Ethics 
Many, if not all, of the distributive theories proposed in recent years seem 
inconsistent with the idea that there exists a strong connection between the notion of 
reciprocity and the scope of distributive ethics. Such non reciprocity-based theories 
of ethics do not appear to be undermined by considerations of non-reciprocity, for 
they reject the thought that resources should only be allocated (across generations or 
otherwise) to those that can contribute to the well-being of others. As such, an 
extraordinary range of distributive theories will count as non reciprocity-based - 
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including utilitarian and contractualist theories - and this is underlined by recent 
statements of the key proponents of these theories 30 
Perhaps the most important set of non reciprocity-based theories are those which 
assume that `basic rights to resources are grounded not in the individual's strategic 
capacities but rather in other features of the individual herself - her needs or 
nonstrategic capacity. 31 These have been called subject-centred theories. 
2 The label 
`subject centred' is meant to convey the fact that, on this view, the scope of 
distributive ethics is determined with respect to features of individuals which are 
independent of their ability to affect others for the better or worse. Subject-Centred 
ethics, then, holds that the ethical status of persons and the issue of contributiveness 
are independent. 
At the heart of subject-centred ethics is the idea of the fundamental `equality of 
persons. ' The idea of equality, of course, can be taken in a number of different ways, 
and grounded in different theories. So the fact that subject-centred ethics does not 
ascribe rights to persons on the basis of their productivity, still less their ability to 
threaten others, leaves a wide variety of options available to ground this fundamental 
equality. One option might be to focus on quite high level conditions of rational 
agency, another might be to focus on sentience. The common thread running through 
these alternative ways of pursuing the moral equality idea, though, is the denial that 
30 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 356ff; and T. M. Scanlon, `Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond, pp. 1 l5ff. 
31 See Allen Buchanan, `Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centred Justice', Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, 19,3,1990, pp. 231 ff. 
32 In fact, Buchanan describes theories which endorse the quoted statement subject-centred 
theories ofjustice, but I do not think that anything significant turns on this difference. 
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the issue of a being's ethical standing is somehow determined by their ability to 
contribute to others' well-being. 
In common with theories of Reciprocity as Fairness, subject-centred ethics celebrates 
non-egoistic motivations to behave justly. Barry, a leading exponent of subject- 
centred ethics, for example, argues that the motive for behaving justly is `the desire to 
act in ways that can be defended to oneself and others without appealing to personal 
advantage. '33 And Scanlon, whose work Barry draws upon, remarks that according to 
the theory he calls contractualism, `the source of motivation that is directly triggered 
by the belief that an action is wrong is the desire to be able to justify one's actions to 
others on grounds they could not reasonably reject'34 
4.2 The Counter-Intuitive Implications of Reciprocity-Based Distributive Ethics 
Suppose that, despite the attractions of non reciprocity-based theories, we retained the 
view that distributive ethics was at least partly reciprocity-based. One problem is that 
the implications of reciprocity-based ethics appear to conflict starkly with many 
people's considered convictions about both the scope and contents of distributive 
ethics. In particular, this sort of theory seems irreconcilable with widely held beliefs 
about the rights and moral status of persons (or other entities) who cannot contribute 
to social co-operation, whether this arises from these people bearing certain natural 
disabilities (e. g. these people are permanently comatose) or that they possess talents 
33 Barry, Theories of Justice, p. 361. 
34 Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 116. Scanlon adds, `reasonably, that is, 
given the desire to find principles which others similarly motivated could not reasonably 
reject. ' 
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which are not drawn upon due to features peculiar to the society they live in (e. g. that 
these people are involuntarily idle). 
In fact, there are two groups at risk of ethical disenfranchisement on a reciprocity- 
based view. 35 The first group contains people (such as those who suffer from 
crippling disabilities from birth or those who belong to different generations) who 
possess some natural disadvantage which entails that they lack the capacities 
necessary to contribute to the well-being of others. The second group contains those 
(such as the unemployed or imprisoned) who have the capacity to contribute, but who 
are prevented from doing so by existing social arrangements. Reciprocity-based 
theories, it seems, will need to address the problems associated with the ethical status 
of these two groups if they are to offer an account of global or intergenerational 
distributive ethics which even remotely matches the convictions which most people 
entertain on these matters. 
Consider the position of the first group of persons liable to ethical disenfranchisement 
under reciprocity-based views. Many people, such as those who are congenitally 
weak or members or distant or future generations, seem to be excluded from the 
domain of Reciprocity as Fairness because of their inherent inability to benefit others 
in society. 36 On the other hand, most of us believe that withholding certain benefits 
35 See Gibbard, `Constructing Justice', pp. 272ff. 
36 Compare with Hume's well known remark that 
were there a species of creature intermingled with men, which, though 
rational, were possessed of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, 
that they were incapable of.. . 
[making] us feel the effects of their 
resentment. .. we should be bound by the laws of humanity, to give 
gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie 
under any restraint of justice with regard to them (David Hume, Enquiries 
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 190). 
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(such as food or nutrition or shelter) from the non-contributive would be 
impermissible. As a result, reciprocity-based theories presuppose a view of the scope 
of distributive ethics which strikes many as overly exclusive. Even if it could be 
maintained that many of these groups who appear on the surface to be non- 
contributive are in fact contributive, the point here is that this is not the sort of 
sophisticated manoeuvring that a theory of distributive ethics ought to require to bring 
such groups into its fold. According to Barry, for example, the claims of the severely 
handicapped, minors, impoverished foreigners, and future persons lie well within the 
scope of distributive ethics, and because reciprocity-based theories cannot 
accommodate this thought they are flawed 
37 
Consider next, the second group of persons vulnerable to disenfranchisement under 
reciprocity-based views. Suppose a group of potential contributors could be enslaved, 
and subsequently excluded from the terms of voluntary co-operation. These persons 
could contribute to others' benefit if they were given the chance, so in this respect 
their position is quite different from the position of those - such as the not-yet-born - 
who cannot contribute in principle. Even so, in such a circumstance the slavers would 
appear to owe no obligations of fair reciprocity to their slaves. As Gibbard observes, 
`If an extant fair scheme of social co-operation included everyone, then everyone is 
owed fairness', 38 and in such circumstances the requirements of this brand of 
It is worth noting that there is some doubt about whether this remark is an early statement of 
a reciprocity-based ethic (as Barry has claimed) or whether Hume is merely making the 
explanatory, rather than normative, claim that norms of distributive ethics will only arise and 
be respected in contexts where certain conditions, such as relative equality of power, arise 
(as Pogge has claimed). See Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 186ff; and Thomas Pogge 
`Review of Theories of Justice', Journal of Philosophy, 87,7, July 1990, pp. 380-83. 
37 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, Oxford, Clarendon, 1995, pp. 40ff. 
38 Gibbard, `Constructing Justice', p. 273. 
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reciprocity=based ethics seem consistent with those of subject-centred ethics. 
However, if not everybody is not included in this scheme, then there will be some 
people who are not owed anything - at least no positive ethical duties 
39 
This raises the problem that, since the ability of a person to contribute is inevitably 
influenced by social conditions and practices which in fact will vary from society to 
society and over time (that is, being a contributor is relative to the co-operative 
framework one is located in), reciprocity-based theories seem ill placed to offer an 
account of whether these relativities are themselves permissible or not, and thus 
whether those excluded from co-operation are so excluded permissibly. This is 
because they only claim to offer an account of why those who happen to be capable of 
fruitful co-operation, and who belong to an already existing framework, will 
recognise each other as having claims of distributive ethics. But evaluating the extent 
to which a certain `frame of co-operation' is actually just or not, so the argument 
goes, is perhaps one of the most central things we ordinarily demand of a theory of 
distributive ethics. This might be thought to mark out a serious limitation of 
reciprocity-based theories 
40 
4.3 Negative Versus Positive Duties 
The third issue which limits the importance of the Non-Reciprocity Problem is that it 
only seems to call into question the scope of positive requirements defined by 
39 The above example is not, of course, as far fetched as it seemed. In the period between 
1933 and 1945 millions of Jews were effectively, and systematically, denied the ability to 
contribute to the schemes of social co-operation operating in their countries despite the fact 
that their ability to contribute in principle remained intact. 
40 See Buchanan, `Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centred Justice', p. 236. 
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reciprocity-based theories of ethics. The idea is that duties of reciprocity, as grounded 
in either considerations of fairness or self-interest, are plausible only when thought of 
as being restricted to the distribution of the fruits of social co-operation; but perhaps 
the most important aspect of the problem of intergenerational ethics, at least when 
theorising about environmental problems such as climate change, concerns duties not 
to harm the members of future generations or other nations, for example, by our 
profligate GHG emissions. So long as we think that reciprocity-based ethics is 
consistent with there being negative duties to those who are so weak that they cannot 
contribute to the well-being of others, it seems that even reciprocity-based ethics is 
consistent with the existence of quite stringent duties not to harm these persons, even 
if there are no positive duties to come to their aid as such. 
The notion that the duties of reciprocity are not exhaustive of the ethical obligations 
incumbent against us has been put well by Hart. Hart claims that 
[an] important source of special rights and obligations we recognise 
in many spheres of life is what may be termed mutuality of 
restrictions ... 
When a number of persons conduct any joint 
enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those 
who submitted to the restrictions when required have a right to a 
similar submission from those who have benefited by their 
submission. 41 
But these are special rights and obligations in the sense that they are owed to some, 
but not all, and are not exclusive of the range of obligations we have to others. As a 
41 H. L. A. Hart, `Are There any Natural Rights', Philosophical Review, 64, April 1955, 
p. 185. 
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result, considerations which undermine the presence of these obligations (such as 
those pertaining to the non reciprocity-problem) do not necessarily undermine the 
presence of other non-special, or in other words universal, obligations 42 
I have argued in the above sections that reciprocity-based theories are subject to 
certain serious flaws; that there is an alternative sort of distributive theory which is 
neither subject to these flaws nor to the Non-Reciprocity Problem; and that if we view 
reciprocity-based theories as being theories of positive (rather than negative) 
obligation, even this type of theory is consistent with certain requirements of 
intergenerational ethics. 
At this point, it might be questioned whether any further investigation into the 
implications of the Non-Reciprocity Problem is warranted. My response to this is 
two-fold. Firstly, much theorising about the scope of distributive ethics, and in 
particular intergenerational distributive ethics, has been located around the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem. Secondly, despite the way in which reciprocity-based ethics 
(particularly in its self-interested incarnation) violates our intuitions about the scope 
of distributive ethics, it remains a much discussed theory even in the context of 
intragenerational ethics. 
42 On the distinction between special and universal obligations, see O'Neill, Towards 
Justice and Virtue, pp. 125ff. It is worth noting that Gauthier rejects the idea that his version 
of the reciprocity-based ethic only specifies positive ethical duties. This is demonstrated by 
his discussion of the `Purples' and `Greens' (see Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, pp. 283-87; 
Buchanan, `Justice as Reciprocity and Subject-Centred Justice', pp. 250-1). 
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5. The Chain of Concern Model 
The Chain of Concern Model of intergenerational ethics is premised on the idea that, 
to the extent that people generally share a sentimental concern for the well-being of 
their nearest of descendants, this well-being can be treated as a public good; and as 
with other public goods, fairness requires that all capable people play their part in 
contributing to the cost of its upkeep. Here, present persons have obligations `with 
respect to' rather than `to' members of future generations; or, to put it slightly 
differently, although these obligations arise in part from sentimental concerns for 
future persons, they are owed to present persons. 
Although there are various formulations of the Chain of Concern Model in 
circulation, I will concentrate here on the one advanced by Rawls in A Theory of 
Justice. There are two good reasons for doing this. First, Rawls' version of the model 
is by far the most widely discussed. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it stands 
out among the alternative versions of the Chain of Concern Model as an attempt to 
rescue the idea of a fairness-based reciprocity ethic from the Non-Reciprocity 
Problem. 
The main features of Rawls's theory of justice are well known, and the egalitarian 
strand to his thinking was discussed in the previous chapter. For Rawls, social and 
political principles required as rules for the design of just institutions are those that 
would be chosen by rational, self-interested, persons in a hypothetical contractual 
situation (the original position) behind a veil of ignorance which precludes them 
certain types of knowledge, for instance regarding their prospective social identities, 
tastes and preferences. As there are no known preferences or tastes in the original 
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position, the contracting parties define social outcomes in terms of primary goods, 
which are generalised resources, such as liberty and opportunity, wealth and income, 
and which enable persons to pursue their life-plans or conceptions of the good 
regardless of what these actually turn out to be 43 
The result of the deliberations of the contracting parties in Rawls's construction, since 
they are ignorant of their prospective identities, is that principles which discriminate 
in favour of, or against, any one individual or group (regardless of the grounds for this 
discrimination) cannot be adopted in the original position. The contracting parties 
will, however, adopt two fundamental principles of justice. The first is the Principle 
Of Equal Liberty, which holds that, `each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of 
liberty for all. '44 The second is the Difference Principle, which states that, `social and 
economic equalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit 
of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality and opportunity. '45 
There is also held to be a clear system of priorities operating amongst these 
principles. Rawls takes the principle of equal liberty as fundamentally prior to the 
Difference Principle, such that benefits or advantages that come under the latter 
should not be 'traded-off' gainst those liberties protected by the former. In addition, 
with regard to the difference principle, the idea of fair equality of opportunity (i. e. (b) 
43 Rawls modifies his account of primary goods in later work (see Rawls 'Social Unity and 
Primary Goods', pp. l6ff), but as he had abandoned the Chain of Concern Model before these 
modifications were made I concentrate on the account of `justice as fairness' offered in A 
Theory of Justice. 
44 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 302. 
45 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 302. 
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above) is to be taken as prior to the idea that inequalities must benefit the least 
advantaged (i. e. (a) above). 
One last preliminary point worth making is that these principles are to be applied to 
what Rawls calls the `basic structure of society' rather than to the actions, choices, or 
deliberations of individual persons (although he does not deny that this structure will 
undoubtedly have an effect on the standards individuals apply to their own personal 
conduct). The basic structure, then, marks out `the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social co-operation. '46 
The question arises whether this theory can be reconciled with the sort of duties of 
intergenerational ethics which would require each generation to preserve a flourishing 
natural environment for the sake of their successors. There is at least some reason to 
doubt that it can. Take the idea that each generation ought to save a certain amount 
for the benefit of successor generations. Abiding by requirements of conservation will 
improve the prospects of later generations who benefit from it. On the other hand, 
endorsing this principle might well - depending on the the sentiments they entertain - 
be counter to the interests of the first, or early, generations of that society, because 
these generations will be required by the principle to sacrifice some of their prospects 
for the sake of the prospects of later generations with no possibility of requital. 
Rawls has already specified, however, that the contracting parties (1) do not know 
which generation they belong to exactly but (2) they do know that they are all 
contemporaries: he calls this the Present Time of Entry Interpretation. 7 But because 
46 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 7. 
47 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 140; pp. 287ff. 
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this assumption has more or less the consequence that the contracting parties consider 
themselves as the first generation of any intergenerational contract, they will have no 
reason based either on fairness or self-interest to adopt principles of savings or 
conservation. As Rawls himself writes, `in the course of history no generation gives 
to the preceding generations, the benefits of whose savings it has received. '48 Given 
that `previous generations have either saved or not', then, for the contracting parties 
to adopt conservationist principles would seem to counter normal applications of the 
Difference Principle. 49 This is because such applications would seem to deny that a 
worse-off earlier generation can be required to save at all for the sake of a better off 
later generation. Rawls concludes that, as the Difference Principle cannot be appealed 
to in order to explain why earlier generations should conserve resources for the sake 
of their successors, and as such conservation seems essential if the conditions for 
distributive ethics or justice are to be maintained across time, issues of 
intergenerational distribution `must be treated in another fashion. '50 
The `other fashion' Rawls is referring to is his interpretation of the Chain of Concern 
Model. This model has two main components. First, an adjustment to the way in 
which the contracting parties are viewed. Second, an adjustment to the motivations 
which these contracting parties entertain. The first adjustment re-conceptualises the 
contracting parties as what Rawls calls representatives or heads of `family lines. '51 I 
put this adjustment to one side. The second adjustment which Rawls makes, which I 
take to be more important in the present context, is an adjustment to the motivational 
48 Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, p. 290. 
49 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 292. 
50 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 291. 
51 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 292. 
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base of the contracting parties such that they care about the welfare of some `third 
parties. ' 
The `third parties' which Rawls has in mind are the immediate descendants of the 
contracting parties. According to what he calls the motivational assumption, the 
contracting parties will, as a general psychological fact, be motivated by a 
psychological concern for their immediate descendants: and in this way there exist 
`ties of sentiment between successive generations', as Rawls puts it. 
52 The contracting 
parties (viewed as representatives of family lines) desire to further the well-being of 
the next two or so generations. As such, the motivational assumption (as a 
psychological generalisation), appears to be compatible with his `thin theory of the 
good' as well as an intuitively plausible conception of self-interest. It is also 
reconcilable with the assumption that the contracting parties are mutually 
disinterested, for, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls claims that the contracting parties are 
all members of one generation (though they do not know which generation this is) 
whereas the motivational assumption holds between members of different generations 
(and thus is not in conflict with an assumption of mutual disinterest between members 
of a single generation). 53 
52 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 292. 
531t is worth noting that in later work, Rawls himself abandons the motivational assumption 
in favour of the stipulation that principles of savings and conservation will be agreed to by 
the contracting parties on the assumption that all previous generations have also complied 
with it. Given the veil of ignorance shields the parties' knowledge of what generation they 
belong to (i. e. the `present time of entry interpretation' is maintained) the problem of a 
generation free-riding on its predecessor's savings is removed. But there is still remaining a 
worry concerning the unfairness of such a principle when the veil is lifted for the first and 
subsequent early generations who will save without benefiting from the savings of previous 
generations. See `The Basic Structure as Subject', in Political Liberalism, p. 274. 
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The crux of Rawls' Chain of Concern Model is the thought that, as long as everyone 
in the present generation cares for someone in the next, this will be universalised into 
a constantly regenerating chain of concern which binds members of all generations, 
and which requires that a certain level of savings and investment be undertaken for 
the sake of later generations. 54 Rawls writes that each generation should `preserve the 
gains of culture and civilisation, and maintain intact those just institutions that have 
been established' in addition to putting aside `in each period of time a suitable 
amount of real capital accumulation. i55 Put simply, then, Rawls chooses to represent 
the interests of future generations in the `original position' by having their interests 
virtually represented. 
Consider the issue of climate change. Sustaining present levels of GHG emissions 
will result, I have argued, in the despoliation of the natural environment left to our 
descendants. Because the processes of climate change, such as global warming and 
sea-level rises, are already under way it is likely that some of the bad effects of 
climatic change will occur within the life-time of the immediate descendants of 
existing persons (e. g. our children and grand-children). 
54 A similar view is held by John Passmore in his Man's Responsibilityfor Nature, London, 
Duckworth, 1974, pp. 90-1. Passmore writes that there is 
no novelty in a concern for posterity, when posterity is thought of not 
abstractly - as the future of `mankind' - but as a world inhabited by 
individuals we love or feel a special interest in. .. Men do not 
love their 
grand-children's grand-children. They cannot love what they do not 
know. But in loving their grand-children... they hope that those grand- 
children, too, will have grand-children to love... by this means there is 
established a chain of love and concern running throughout the remote 
future. 
55 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 285. 
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According to the Chain of Concern Model, each existing person (who can be thought 
of as a `head' of a family line) will want to secure the conditions necessary for their 
children and grand-children to lead flourishing lives - conditions which are vulnerable 
to adverse changes in the climate system. But in order to preserve these conditions, it 
is necessary that all members of the present generation (or at least the governments 
who represent them) agree to implement social policies which protect the climate 
system, such as the modest reductions in GHG emissions negotiated at the Kyoto 
summit. Here the duties of intergenerational ethics are in fact owed to other existing 
people: given that we want our children and grand-children to prosper, it would be 
unethical for any of us not to contribute our fair share to collective efforts to secure a 
posterity free of climate change. 
The essential elements of the Chain of Concern are explored in Figure 2 (on the next 
page). 
5.1 Objections to the Chain of Concern Model 
I have space to consider two problems with the Chain of Concern Model. The first 
concerns the position of those who are not motivated to conserve resources for the 
sake of their immediate descendants. The second concerns the possibility that some 
human practices might damage the environment which will be enjoyed by remote 
future generations with no similar impact on intervening generations. 
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Figure 2: Rawls' Chain of Concern Model 
Existing persons (who are viewed as 'heads 
of family lines') are motivated to conserve 
natural and non-natural resources by virtue 
of entertaining a sentimental concern for 
their nearest descendants. 
Concern is vertical into the future 
Existing persons are bound by the principle .4º 
of fairness to reciprocate the efforts of their .4º 
contemporaries which secure the aim of -4 º 
conserving resources for the sake of members º 
of immediate future generations. 
Obligations are owed & held horizontally 
within the existing generation 
5.1.1 People Who Are Not Motivated To Save For Their Descendants 
The `Chain of Concern' model assumes that if A cares for his son, B for his, C for his 
and so on, it will be not only mutually beneficial, but in addition a matter of fairness, 
for the A-Z population to agree to save (collectively) for the sake of the next 
generation. As such, the model assumes that every person is in fact moved to care for 
their descendants. 
It is clear, though, that this stipulation is certainly false for at least some persons who 
lack children and the sentimental attachment to children who are not their own, and 
yet the model will presumably not be ready to exempt these people from the 
hardships of saving for other persons' children. Rawls' view, for example, implies 
that these people will be required to bear certain sacrifices in order to save for other 
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people's children, and one might think that this is itself unfair in the same way that 
one might think that a person who does not benefit from a co-operative activity ought 
not be forced to pay for its upkeep. 
5.1.2 Harming Remote Future Generations 
The Chain of Concern view seems quite naturally applied to questions of distribution 
between proximate generations, such as issues of savings and investment policy. 
However, it seems rather more limited in its application for questions of distribution 
between remote generations. The problem here is that certain acts, or social policies, 
might have extremely adverse impacts on remote future generations without bringing 
about similarly adverse effects on intervening generations, and the wrong-doing 
associated with these acts and policies does not seem obviously captured by the 
thought that they violate duties of savings or investment. Indeed, such acts could be 
required by principles of savings or conservation if it is known that they will protect 
the interests of proximate generations. 
Rawls' Chain of Concern Model, for example, does not appear to generate any 
requirements against a generation polluting the environment, or choosing depletionist 
policies, when these pursuits will not merely fail to improve, but will also gravely 
harm distant future generations as his contracting parties are not taken to possess 
sentimental concerns for their remote descendants. So while the chain of obligation 
which this theory defines is constantly regenerating, the links in the chain do not bind 
in any direct fashion those belonging to remote generations, and as a result the 
intergenerational obligations which the Chain of Concern Model gives rise to appear 
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quite limited in scope. Indeed one Chain of Concern theorist states openly that the 
obligations we have in virtue of the chain `are to immediate posterity, we ought to try 
to improve the world so that we shall be able to hand it over to our immediate 
successors in a better condition, and that is all. '56 
This is a significant shortcoming, however, because some of the environmental 
problems which mark out a context for questions of intergenerational distributive 
ethics will have bad effects which `skip' many generations. After Barry, we might 
call these sleeper effects. " The problem which these sleeper effects pose is that it 
seems difficult to believe that present actions which result in a significant lowering in 
the quality of life enjoyed by members of remote future generations violate no 
distributive requirements, but this cannot be explained by the obligations generated 
by the Chain of Concern Model. 
Take the example of climate change. Some of the bad effects of climate change will 
impact upon members of present persons and their immediate descendants. This will 
be the case, for example, of those living in very low-lying or very and regions of 
developing countries. However, it might take several centuries before other climatic 
changes have any sort of negative effect on human populations. This seems likely to 
describe the position of the melting polar ice-caps, for instance. It would almost 
certainly take several hundreds of years of pronounced warming before either ice-cap 
was subject to significant melting. However, if this were to occur the implications for 
human (as well as non-human animal and plant) life would be immense. 
56 Passmore, Man's Responsibilityfor Nature, p. 91. 57 Barry, 'Justice Between Generations', p. 279. 
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At this point one might suggest that the Chain of Concern Model can be interpreted to 
cover such cases in virtue of describing moral relations between persons belonging to 
different generations which are transitive. 58 After all, could we not make the leap of 
imagination that if we care for our nearest descendants, we also care for the concerns 
of these descendants and so on? The problem with this response is that it does not 
seem to provide a robust explanation of why we ought to cease environmental 
practices which will harm future persons who have little connection to us, or our 
children, because it assumes mistakenly that we ought to love the immediate 
successors of our immediate successors simply in virtue of the fact that they do. That 
is to say, the relation of sentimental concern which we are seeking to use to generate 
obligations of intergenerational distributive ethics is one of the most common 
instances of a non-transitive relation: we might love the loved ones of those we love 
but then again we might not. As de Shalit observes, `if we love our children, we look 
after them. This, however, is not a sufficient justification for feeling obligations to 
people who will live three, six, or ten generations from now. '59 
It might be objected at this point that Rawls at no point claims that his Chain of 
Concern Model can explain the justification for duties of distributive ethics which 
present persons have to their remote successors. This might seem to be a rather thin 
response, given the overwhelming importance of these duties. It is important to note, 
58A relation is transitive if when A bears this relation to B, and B bears it to C, then A also 
bears it to C. Common transitive relations are `being the same age' or `being taller than. ' A 
relation is intransitive if it is such that whenever X bears it to Y and Y to Z, X does not bear 
it to Z. Intransitive relations include `being the father of' or `being the next biggest number 
to. ' A relation is non-transitive when it is neither transitive or intransitive: i. e. whenever P 
bears the relation to Q, Q to R, P need not bear the relation to R. Standard examples of non- 
transitive relations include `loving', `liking' and `disliking. ' See W. H. Newton-Smith, Logic, 
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp. 168-9. 
59 Avner de Shalit, Why Posterity Matters, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 32-3. 
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however, that Rawls seems to have an independent argument for the existence of 
duties of distributive ethics to remote future generations, although this argument is 
mentioned only briefly in A Theory of Justice. Rawls remarks that, in addition to the 
duties specified by the Chain of Concern Model, `men have a natural duty to uphold 
and to further just institutions and for this the improvement of civilisation up to a 
certain level is required. 960 Perhaps, then, the Chain of Concern Model should be 
viewed as merely one of a package of theories of intergenerational distribution, in 
particular the one which is concerned with obligations which can be reduced to a 
paradigm of savings and accumulation. 
6. The Trusteeship Model 
According to the Trusteeship Model of indirect intergenerational reciprocity, existing 
persons are obligated to protect the environment for the sake of their successors in 
return for the benefits which they have inherited from their ancestors 
61 This view is 
explored in Figure 3 (on the next page). 
As with the Chain of Concern Model, the strength of the Trusteeship Model is that it 
is not obviously undermined by the Non-Reciprocity Problem. This is because it 
grounds intergenerational obligations in the debts existing persons owe to their 
predecessors rather than their successors, and consequently in a more indirect 
understanding of reciprocity. Even if we accept that the lack of direct reciprocal 
dealings between different generations renders social co-operation with the not yet 
born untenable, this is not inconsistent with the thought that people possess duties to 
60 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 293. 
61 See, for example, Barry, `Justice as Reciprocity', p. 483. 
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reciprocate for benefits inherited from their ancestors. So, unlike the case of future 
persons, there is at least a prima facie case that present persons might owe their 
ancestors something as a matter of fairness. On the other hand, because this view 
appeals to a conception of Reciprocity as Fairness, rather than of self-interest, it is not 
relevant that the Trusteeship Model cannot obviously be grounded in the prudential 
benefits of transmitting to future persons the goods we receive from past persons. 
Figure 3: The Trusteeship Model 
Future Generations 
Present persons 
discharge their duties 
Flo of ben fits to past persons by 
passing on benefits 
to future persons 
Present Generation 
Benefits run vertically forward from past, 
to present, and then to future, generations 
Present Generation Present Generation 
Present persons have 
AAAA 
duties to past persons 
in virtue of benefits F ow of ut es Fl w of en fits 
received from past 
Past Generations Past Generations 
Obligations run backwards in time, to past persons/generations 
6.1 Becker's Model Of Intergenerational Trusteeship 
The most thoroughly developed version of the Trusteeship Model is proposed by 
Becker. 62 The general justification of duties of indirect reciprocity offered by Becker 
62 Lawrence Becker, Reciprocity, London, Routledge, 1986, pp. 229-51. 
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is as follows. A large proportion of the benefits which people receive in their lives is 
produced by persons with whom they have no face to face, or direct, exchanges. In 
such cases the identities of the producers of these benefits might be known, but 
despite this it might be impossible for the receivers to reciprocate these benefits for 
(1) nothing can be produced which the original producers might value or (2) even if it 
could, nothing could be made which could subsequently be transferred to, and 
received by, them. 
This does not show, however, that there is no obligation to reciprocate for such 
benefits, for an obligation of reciprocity may remain in place even in situations where 
a mutual exchange of benefits is impossible. Here an obligation to reciprocate arises 
in any situation where a person finds himself in receipt of a good `for which some 
sort of fitting and proportional return is possible, and it is often perfectly fitting to 
make our returns to people other than those who have benefited us. '63 One example 
Becker gives to explicate this idea is that of a blood bank. Here the donors of blood 
do not identify or specify the person who should benefit from their donation. The 
donation is unspecified in this sense, though it is expected that those who will, or 
potentially might, benefit from the blood bank (virtually everybody in actual fact) 
ought to play a reciprocal part in contributing to the blood bank's survival. 
Becker also thinks that duties of reciprocity - such as those relating to the blood bank 
- can be owed to persons who belonged to previous generations; and that a subset of 
such obligations can be discharged by producing some benefit for the sake of 
63 Becker, Reciprocity, pp. 230-1. 
64 Becker, Reciprocity, pp. 110-11; pp. 230-1. 
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members of future generations. In fact, there appear to be four steps in his defence of 
duties of intergenerational trusteeship, which are roughly: 
(1) much of the good which present generations benefit from in 
their lives was produced by past generations with the intention that 
it should be passed on to future generations. 
(2) though the intended recipients of these benefits are not always 
specified, these benefits are nonetheless intended for someone (`for 
whomever might exist' as Becker puts it). 65 
(3) the obligation to pass on, to reciprocate for, these benefits to 
future persons is analogous to the obligation to reciprocate for 
benefits received from unknown contemporaries (who also had 
indefinite intentions). 
(4) it is `fitting and proportionate', therefore, that we pass on these 
benefits by producing goods for the future, and in this sense acting 
in this way will `in principle satisfy the moral requirements of 
reciprocity. ' 66 
So the `fitting and proportionate return' in Becker's argument is owed to past 
persons, the obligation binds present persons, and the performance associated with 
this obligation is directed towards future persons. In this sense, then, it is a truly 
intergenerational understanding of reciprocity-based ethics, as all three tenses are 
doing some work in the argument. 
65 Becker, Reciprocity, p. 231. 
66 Becker, Reciprocity, p. 231. 
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6.2 Objections to the Trusteeship Model 
I think that the main weaknesses of the Trusteeship Model can be traced to problems 
with these four premises, and in particular premises (1) and (4). Suppose we grant the 
general point that certain duties can be discharged only if we perform actions which 
benefit someone other than the party who is owed this performance, and that these 
duties can, at least in principle, be owed to past persons and discharged by benefiting 
future ones. It still might be objected that premise (1) is highly contentious. 
As Barry argues, for example, there seems to be little evidence that our ancestors, 
beyond certain legally entrenched trusts, intended the good they produced to be 
preserved for the sake of remote future generations. 
67 Premise (4), on the other hand, 
assumes precisely that it is fitting and proportionate that such goods be saved rather 
than consumed by present persons, for example the present impoverished, and this 
might seem hard to believe. 
I consider these problems below. 
6.2.1 Involuntary Receipt and Unintentional Production 
The duties of intergenerational ethics specified by Becker's Trusteeship Model appear 
in many cases to have been grounded in the receipt of unintentionally produced and 
involuntarily received inherited goods. However, we do not normally assume that 
benefits which come as unintended side-effects of other peoples' actions give rise to 
obligations on the part of recipients to reciprocate for them. Suppose, for example, 
67 Barry, `Justice as Reciprocity', p. 486. 
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that a government adopts an initiative to reduce CO2 emissions solely for the 
moderate benefits this will have for the well-being of existing people. A century later, 
however, it is demonstrated that this prior initiative also led to an unpredicted 
reduction, for one reason or another, in the incidence of certain varieties of cancer. 
We would not usually suppose that those belonging to later generations owe any 
obligations of requital to their predecessors for this unintentionally produced benefit. 
For, it might be asked, why should such good fortune generate any obligations of 
requital on behalf of its beneficiaries? Of course, if the link were known in advance 
and that was part of the reasons for the initiative being adopted, then this view would 
be more plausible. 
Becker, however, argues that the receipt of unintentionally produced goods does give 
rise to obligations of reciprocity on the part of those that receive them, in particular to 
sustain and preserve the institutions or practices which enabled their production. `We 
owe to the future' he argues `only as much as we were given, and we must make our 
`returns' in the very way we were benefited (e. g. intentionally or unintentionally), and 
to the very institutions that benefited us. '68 But this seems to be as much a worrying, 
as it is a liberating, conclusion as far as intergenerational distributive ethics is 
concerned. For if we accepted that unintentionally produced benefits gave rise to the 
same duties as intentionally produced benefits we would be swamped by duties of 
reciprocation. Aside from the difficult issue of whether, on such a view, it is equally 
in line with the duty of reciprocity to preserve good or bad practices that we are 
68 Becker, Reciprocity, pp. 238-9. 
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bequeathed unintentionally by our ancestors, we would have the problem of just how 
one makes a fitting and proportionate return for an indirectly produced good. 
I say no more about the problem of unintentionally produced benefits because it 
seems clear to me that at least some of the benefits created for present persons have 
been more or less intentionally produced. Worries about the unintentional production 
of benefits bequeathed by past generations could not possibly, then, pose a complete 
objection to the Trusteeship Model. 
Turning to the issue of involuntary receipt, the problems raised here seem even less 
soluble. This is because just about all of the benefits which our predecessors have 
passed down to us appear to have been foisted upon us in the sense that we could not 
possibly have refused them; and there is a large literature which calls into question 
whether benefits which are not received voluntarily confer any obligations of 
reciprocity on their beneficiaries. A great deal depends, for instance, on how wide the 
principle of fairness is that one works with. 
Consider, for example, the question of whether, as someone who is benefiting from a 
certain social practice (or institution), a person has a duty of fairness to pay his fair 
share of the costs of this practice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls, following the lead of 
H. L. A. Hart, claims that there are two conditions on an affirmative answer. First, that 
the benefit providing institution is just and, second, that the benefits concerned are 
voluntarily accepted. 69 Let us put the first condition to one side on the grounds that it 
brings unnecessary complications into the discussion. 70 If, as in Rawls' view, fairness 
69 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 111-12. 
70 As pointed out by Garett Cullity, `Moral Free Riding', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24, 
1995, p. 9. 
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is about making a fitting and proportionate contribution to benefits one receives only 
as a result of voluntary social co-operation, the fact that one did not willingly co- 
operate in the production (or receipt) of certain goods would mean both that (1) one 
has no duty to contribute to the production costs of such benefits, and (2) one has no 
right to such benefits in the first place. 
This `voluntary acceptance' condition is also canvassed by Nozick. In Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia, Nozick argues that benefits that have not been voluntarily accepted 
generate no duties of distributive ethics against the receiver to reciprocate for these 
benefits. 1 Nozick cites the case of the nuisance who hurls books into people's 
houses, without prior solicitation, and later demands payment for the these 
unrequested books. Nozick concludes that in both this and in any relevantly similar 
case of involuntarily received benefit, there are no grounds for thinking the decision 
not to pay, or reciprocate, for such benefits is unfair: `One cannot, whatever one's 
purposes', Nozick argues, `just act so as to give people benefits and then demand (or 
seize) payment. '72 As Cullity puts it, Nozick's position in a nutshell is that such an 
implication `would appear to ground an accusation of unfairness against the 
benefactors rather than the beneficiary. ' 73 
The Rawls-Nozick view, however, is not endorsed by all contributors to this debate. 
One suggestion regarding the relaxation of the Rawls-Nozick `voluntary acceptance' 
condition which is of note is proposed by Arneson. He argues that there are cases in 
which involuntarily received benefits can give rise to obligations of fairness, but that 
71 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 95ff. 
72 Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 95. 
73 Garrett Cullity, `Moral Free Riding', p. 10. 
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these cases are limited to those where the goods in question are non-excludable - that 
is they cannot be provided for some without them also being provided for others. In 
simple terms, Arneson offers four necessary, and jointly sufficient, conditions on us 
claiming that `those who contribute their assigned fair share of the costs of the 
scheme [of co-operation] have a right, against the remaining beneficiaries, that they 
should also pay their fair share. '74 These are: (1) that the benefit concerned is non- 
excludable; (2) that the practice resulting in the benefits concerned be worth an equal 
cost to all benefited; (3) that there is fair division of the benefits concerned; and (4) 
that there is voluntary acceptance of the benefit, or if there is no such acceptance then 
this acceptance is impossible to obtain. 
Although I have not the space here to prove it, it seems to me that all of these 
conditions will be met in the case of some of the benefits with which the Trusteeship 
Model is concerned. In particular, note that the sorts of inherited benefits with which 
we are most concerned with are precisely non-excludable public goods, such as clean 
air, a healthy climate system, or a flourishing cultural environment. I conclude that 
worries about the involuntary receipt of benefits bequeathed by past generations does 
not raise a decisive objection to the existence of duties of trusteeship when the right 
pre-conditions obtain. 
7. Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, I have dealt with some of the problems which face those who wish to 
extend reciprocity-based theories of distributive ethics to the intergenerational 
74 Arneson, `The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems', Elhics, 92,1982, p. 623. 
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context. I began by demonstrating that, as a result of what I called the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem, there appears to be little room for such extensions. I then 
explored Barry's suggestion that there are two ways in which those sympathetic to 
reciprocity-based ethics might escape this conclusion. One was premised on the idea 
that present persons are obliged to conserve resources for the sake of future 
generations as a result of duties they owe to other contemporaries; the other on the 
idea that present persons are obliged to conserve resources for the sake of future 
generations as a result of duties they owe to their ancestors. 
As I explained, both ideas are subject to formidable objections when conceived as 
complete solutions to the problem of intergenerational distributive ethics, but both 
seem to generate a limited range of obligations of intergenerational distributive ethics 
- even if we cannot, on these bases, speak of obligations to members of future 
generations in any direct sense. I hope to have shown, then, that so long as we appeal 
to some notion of fairness, even reciprocity-based views are consistent with the 
thought that there exist some obligations of intergenerational distributive ethics. In the 
next chapter, I attempt to defend the view that even endorsing the self-interested 
variant of reciprocity-based ethics is consistent with such obligations if the idea that 
people can be harmed after their death can be defended. 
Chapter 4: Reciprocity and Posthumous Harm 
1. Introduction 
There are at least three reasons why students of intergenerational ethics might benefit 
from investigating the idea of posthumous harms in more detail than has been done 
previously. First, it appears to play an interesting role in attempts to save 
intergenerational applications of reciprocity-based theories from the Non-Reciprocity 
Problem. Second, the existence of posthumous harms suggests that the problem of 
intergenerational ethics, as conceived of as the problem of what obligations existing 
persons owe to future persons, has been wrongly characterised. Third, any re- 
characterisation of the problem of intergenerational ethics as a result of incorporating 
the phenomenon of posthumous harms would suggest a corresponding re-evaluation 
of theories of intergenerational ethics as trusteeship. 
Let us briefly examine these three ideas in turn. 
Firstly, recall that the Non-Reciprocity Problem relies on two key premises, one 
normative and the other descriptive. The normative premise maintains that persons 
who cannot engage with us in mutually beneficial dealings are owed no, or at least no 
positive, ethical duties. The descriptive premise maintains that the vast majority of 
members of future generations cannot enter into dealings of mutual benefit with those 
who belong to existing generations. Suppose that we accept the normative premise 
(and it is worth reminding ourselves that many, including those who subscribe to non 
reciprocity-based theories, do not). It is perhaps surprising that the descriptive 
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premise has attracted such little critical interest in the past. In fact, almost all the 
contributors to the literature on intergenerational ethics - with the exception of John 
O'Neill - have taken it for granted that this premise is obviously true. As I will be 
attempting to show in this chapter, however, the possibility that people can be harmed 
after their biological death seems to call into question the veracity of this premise, and 
in so doing appears to play an important role in a further novel response to the non 
reciprocity-problem. 
Let me explain. If persons can be harmed after they are dead, two implications follow 
swiftly. First, the actions of present persons can harm their ancestors. Second, 
existing persons will at some point be vulnerable to harm at the hands of their 
descendants. But if future persons will be able to harm present persons, there would 
appear to be potential for some reciprocity here; it is not the case, as Rawls put it, that 
`we can do something for posterity but it can do nothing for us. " If the idea of 
posthumous harms can be defended, then, it appears that we have at least some reason 
to reject the above descriptive premise and with it the Non-Reciprocity Problem. 
Secondly, suppose that persons can be harmed after their death. An account of 
whether inflicting a harm on someone is permissible is an important component of 
any theory of justice. It is frequently asserted, for example, that acts or social policies 
can be wrong only if they result in at least one person being harmed 31 hesitate to say 
I Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 291. 
2 It might also be claimed that posthumous events can benefit people. For simplicity, 
however, the concerns of the chapter are limited for the most part to the problem of whether 
the dead can be harmed rather than benefited. 
3 The classic source of this view is John Stuart Mill's `simple principle' of liberty. Mill 
writes, `the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the only 
purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others' (Mill, On Liberty, London, 
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that such a theory is all there is to a theory of ethics, because a fully developed 
account of ethics will deal with a number of other issues, including what it is for a 
person to be wronged, for a person to be benefited, for a person to exercise their 
rights, and an account of the scope of ethics. 
However, to the extent that any account or theory of intergenerational ethics would be 
inadequate if it relied on an inadequate understanding of harm, the fact that 
mainstream theories of intergenerational ethics ignore the possibility that the dead, as 
well as the not yet born, can be harmed by the actions of existing persons marks a 
serious omission. Such mainstream theories assume that the only problem of 
intergenerational ethics worth any attention is the problem of what obligations 
existing persons have (not to harm, for example) future persons. If the idea of 
posthumous harm turns out to be coherent, however, the problem of intergenerational 
ethics would better be described by the problem of what obligations existing persons 
have to those who will live and have lived - that is to both past and future persons. 
This opens up the possibility that duties to past persons might define quite strong 
constraints on present persons, as we often take duties of well-being to be stronger 
than duties of respect. 
Thirdly, this last point has particular relevance for certain theories of intergenerational 
ethics which make reference to the debts which present persons owe to past persons in 
virtue of what the latter have produced for the former. Theories of intergenerational 
trusteeship are often thought to be quite weak due to the fact that the obligations they 
Penguin, 1974, p. 68). The principle is adopted, and extended, by Joel Feinberg in his four 
volume work, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. See, for example, Harm to Others, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. llf. See also John Kleinig, `Crime and the 
Concept of Harm', American Philosophical Quarterly, 15,1978,1978, p. 27. 
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generate are owed in respect of, rather than to, past persons. The usual view is that the 
dead themselves are beyond harm of any sort, and that we would not be harming the 
dead if we renege on our obligations of trusteeship. Rather, we would be harming 
either ourselves in that we would not be living up to an appropriate ethical ideal, or 
possibly our descendants by virtue of robbing them of their rightful inheritance. The 
posthumous harms idea suggests, however, that if we squander the resources which a 
previous generation has entrusted to us to pass down to our successors, we will not 
only be harming ourselves in some way, and possibly our descendants, but in addition 
the people, whether dead or not, that entrusted the resources to us in the first place. 
A cursory look at these three issues, I think, demonstrates the ethical significance of 
the idea of posthumous harms. However, it gets us no further along on the question of 
whether events after our deaths can in principle harm us, or whether certain events 
after our deaths do in fact harm us. Let us focus on the former issue. The idea that the 
dead can be harmed is contentious. As noted, many contributors to the literature on 
intergenerational ethics think the idea absurd. 4 However, it is worth noting that the 
idea has been treated seriously from time to time - particularly in antiquity. Thus, 
Aristotle observes that, 
the notion that the dead are not affected at all by the fortunes of 
their descendants or any of those whom they love seems unduly 
heartless and contrary to accepted beliefs... it appears that the dead 
4 See, for example, Barry, `Justice Between Generations', p. 280; Ernest Partridge, 
`Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect', Ethics, 91,1981, pp. 243ff; Goodin, 
Protecting the Vulnerable, p. 179; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 290-1. 
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are affected to some extent by the good fortunes of whom they love, 
and similarly by their misfortunes. 5 
Let us concentrate solely on the connection between the idea of posthumous harm and 
the intergenerational extension of reciprocity-based theories of ethics, a connection 
which seems to have been almost entirely neglected. 6 In this chapter, I will be 
investigating the way in which the notion of posthumous harms seems to provide a 
third line of defence for a reciprocity-based theory of intergenerational ethics over 
and above those defined by the Chain of Concern and Trusteeship models discussed 
earlier. 
In the next section, I outline a positive theory of how persons might be harmed even 
after they have ceased to exist. In section 3, I show how the existence of these 
posthumous harms might rescue certain reciprocity-based accounts of 
intergenerational distributive ethics from considerations of non-reciprocity. In section 
4, I consider several arguments which might be raised against the view that a person's 
well-being is vulnerable to events which take place after their biological death, and 
maintain that each of these arguments is flawed. In section 5, I go on to show that the 
existence of posthumous harms is consistent with two pre-eminent theories of well- 
being, and a hybrid version of these theories. Finally, in section 6,1 outline some of 
5 See Aristotle, Ethics, Bk. 1, Ch. 10,1101 a-b. See also Feinberg, Harm to Others, pp. 79-93; 
George Pitcher, `The Misfortunes of the Dead', American Philosophical Quarterly, 21,1984, 
pp. 183f; Dorothy Grover, 'Posthumous Harm', The Philosophical Quarterly, 39,1987, 
pp. 350ff; John Callahan, `On Harming the Dead', Ethics, 97, pp. 341ff; Barbara Levenbrook, 
`Harming Someone After his Death', Ethics, 94,1984, pp. 407ff. 
6 John O'Neill appears to be the only writer to have noted the connection, and even he does 
not envisage using the idea of posthumous harms to defend the intergenerational extension 
of reciprocity-based theories of ethics, but instead against non-objectivist theories of well- 
being. See John O'Neill, 'Future Generations: Present Harms', Philosophy, 1993, pp. 36-43; 
and O'Neill, Ecology, Politics and Policy, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 28-38. 
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the limitations of attempts to rescue intergenerational applications of reciprocity- 
based ethics by virtue of an appeal to the existence of posthumous harms. 
2. A Theory of Posthumous Harms 
Recall that the main reason why writers such as Rawls and Barry regard the notion of 
pothumous harm with suspicion is that they think that it presupposes that events 
which occur at earlier moments in time can be brought about, or caused, by events (or 
actions) that take place (or are performed) at later moments in time. That is, such 
writers think that the notion of posthumous harm presupposes the presence of 
backwards causation. In this section, I will argue that there is a clear flaw in such 
reasoning. This is that the presence of backwards causation is unnecessary for 
posthumous harm to occur, and that this follows from the fact that it is unnecessary 
for an act or social policy to affect a person's well-being that this act or social policy 
cause, or bring about, any change in this person's physical being or that the effects of 
this act or social policy be experienced by this person. 
7 
For the purposes of illustration, consider 
The Case of Smith. Smith is a conscientious fellow; an emigre who 
cherishes his unblemished reputation amongst his present and 
former compatriots. Without Smith's knowledge, an old 
acquaintance, Jones, spreads damaging rumours about Smith 
7 It has been suggested to me that some events which occur after one's death might harm one 
in a way which does not reduce one's well-being. However, I put this possibility to one side 
in order to concentrate on the question of whether a person's well-being is vulnerable to 
events that take place after their death. I do this partly for reasons of economy, partly 
because this is a simpler idea to grasp, and partly because it is the understanding of 
posthumous harms to which the bulk of the literature on this issue is addressed. 
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throughout the populace of his former homeland. As a result, Smith 
becomes the object of much unfavourable gossip and general 
mockery there. As it happens, there are sufficiently few links 
between Smith's old homeland and his new one that the effects of 
this treachery (i. e. Smith's reputation being ruined) at no stage 
impinge upon Smith's conscious experience. 9 
Cases of this sort appeal to our intuitions about what we, as persons, would prefer not 
to happen to us, and it seems that one of these things would be not to be talked about 
unfavourably, even if there is so much distance between us and this unfavourable 
gossiping that we never come to experience any of its harmful effects. We think that 
Smith's well-being has been adversely affected by Jones' actions despite the fact that 
these actions do not bring about any noticeable unpleasantness, such as Smith being 
ridiculed in public, or being the victim of threats or abuse, or being disadvantaged in 
terms of social or employment opportunities and so forth. The example, then, turns on 
our conviction that Smith's life has gone worse (his well-being has been diminished) 
as a result of Jones' deeds, despite no aspect of this loss impinging on Smith's life. 
Next consider a different example. 
The Case of Jones (& Smith Junior). Several years have passed 
and Smith has since died. Smith's son, Smith Junior, however, 
decides to travel to his father's homeland to capture the flavour of 
his roots. He is appalled to discover that Jones had succeeded in 
8A similar case is discussed by Thomas Nagel, 'Death', in his Mortal Questions, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 4; and Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 87. 
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destroying his father's reputation amongst his former compatriots 
and vows to take revenge. He cannot confront Jones about his 
behaviour, however, because he has also recently died. 
Nevertheless, the bitter Smith Junior not only succeeds in 
demonstrating the nature of Jones' outrageous lies, but also, in order 
to take revenge, manages to persuade everyone that Jones himself 
performed a number of despicable acts during his life-time that no 
one was previously aware of. These acts, however, were figments of 
Smith Junior's vengeful imagination. 
The account of posthumous harms I propose is that Jones' well-being is vulnerable to 
Smith Junior's actions in the same way as Smith's well-being was vulnerable to the 
earlier actions of Jones. Here, both Smith's and Jones' well-being have been 
diminished despite the fact that, at the time of these well-being diminishing actions' 
performance, the physical properties of neither Smith nor Jones were altered. The idea 
is that just as we should not be mislead into thinking that the harming of Smith in the 
first case requires `instantaneous causation at a distance', ' we should not be mislead 
into thinking that the harming of Jones in the second case required the presence of 
backwards causation. I propose, then, that posthumous harms are acts which diminish 
a person's well-being after their biological death in a non-causal fashion; and that on 
any plausible account of well-being, they are a rather common phenomenon. 
9 Pitcher's phrase - see 'The Misfortunes of the Dead', p. 186; and Grover, `Posthumous 
Harm', pp. 335ff. 
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3. Posthumous Harm and the Non-Reciprocity Problem 
Recall that the Non-Reciprocity Problem attracts proponents of reciprocity-based 
theories of distribution into subscribing to four, mutually inconsistent, beliefs: 
(1) performing acts, or adopting social policies, which threaten the 
well-being of members of future generations is wrong because it 
will violate certain requirements of distributive ethics. 
(2) requirements of distributive ethics are owed only to those who 
can reciprocate with those who are bound by those requirements. 
(3) reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact 
with each other through some, direct, causal pathway. 
(4) the vast majority of future persons will never be in a position to 
engage in activities which will have a direct, causal, impact on 
members of previous generations. 
Suppose that the account of posthumous harms outlined in the previous section could 
be defended. It would seem that, despite the absurdity of backwards causation, at least 
some members of later generations would have the capacity to influence, non- 
causally, (1) the posthumous reputations of certain persons who belong to earlier 
generations, as well as (2) the success of certain projects, plans and goals which 
members of earlier generations adopted and which are vulnerable to success or failure 
after their deaths. This would appear to open up the possibility that, counter to the 
descriptive premise mentioned earlier, and which appears in the guise of belief (4) 
above, there is some degree of direct reciprocity binding persons whose lives at no 
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stage overlap. In effect, the room for this new type of, non-casual, intergenerational 
reciprocity is created by the revising of belief (3) above to read `reciprocity exists 
only between those persons who can interact with each other through some casual or 
non-causal pathway. ' Quite apart from revising belief (3) in line with the notion of 
indirect reciprocity, then, the existence of posthumous harms has given us a second 
reason to abandon belief 4 in line with the notion of non-causal reciprocity. 
The reciprocity created by this revision, of course, does not mirror in every respect 
the paradigmatic dealings of mutual benefit between members of the same generation, 
for the participants here, lacking any contemporaneity, cannot enter into face to face 
dealings with each other. However, a certain sort of reciprocity exists nevertheless, 
and has at least two important implications for theorising about intergenerational 
ethics. Firstly, it suggests that we ought to abandon the Asymmetry View (according to 
which intertemporal dealings are unidirectional), in favour of what I will call the 
Symmetry View. According to the Symmetry View, intergenerational dealings are bi- 
directional in the sense that present persons can harm or benefit their descendants, 
while future persons can harm or benefit their ancestors. Secondly, because it 
involves the abandonment of the Asymmetry View, the appeal to non-causal 
reciprocity (like the appeal to indirect reciprocity) appears to solve the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem. 1° 
10 If, as seems to be the case, the two suggested revisions turn out to be both plausible and 
compatible, the revised belief (3) would become 
(3") reciprocity exists only between those persons who can interact with 
each other either through some direct or indirect pathway, or through 
some casual or non-causal pathway. 
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Consider theories of Self-Interested Reciprocity. I argued earlier that such theories 
were unlikely to generate obligations of distributive ethics to persons beyond those 
who belong to all but the most proximate of future generations. However, if the 
Symmetry View could be defended, there would exist self-interested considerations in 
favour of existing persons thinking twice before they hand down to future generations 
a less than equitable natural, cultural, or socio-economic environment. If members of 
present generations act responsibly as far as the preservation of the environment 
bequeathed to future persons is concerned, for example, then future persons will be in 
a position to judge present persons favourably as far as their posthumous reputations 
are concerned, as well as being generally disposed to reciprocate these earlier benign 
actions by carrying on the posthumously surviving projects and goals of persons 
belonging to earlier generations (or at least those persons or groups which behaved 
benignly). 
A perhaps more puzzling problem associated with using the existence of posthumous 
harms in order to bolster the intergenerational application of Reciprocity as Self- 
Interest has more to do with the lack of rational motivation of , 
future persons to 
reciprocate for the benign actions of present persons than with the motivations of 
present persons to do the right thing by future persons. Thus, because these views do 
not appeal to any inherent idea of fairness, even if present persons conserve in order 
that (1) future persons will treat their posthumous reputations well or (2) that future 
persons will continue, rather than terminate, the posthumously surviving desires of 
present persons, then (3) the rational move for future persons when they come into 
existence will still be to defect on the `good faith' of their ancestors wherever this will 
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be to their advantage to do so. Nevertheless the existence of posthumous harms would 
seem to bring these views more in line with many peoples' convictions about the 
existence of duties of intergenerational ethics. 
The Symmetry View also has certain, albeit complex, implications for the 
intergenerational extension of indirect conceptions of reciprocity, such as the 
Trusteeship and Chain of Concern models. Take the former. This model would appear 
to be strengthened by the Symmetry View for, here, we do not merely have duties to 
the dead simply out of respect for the interests they had when they were alive, the 
recognition of which smoothes the way for practices, such as inheritance, that are 
useful for present day society. Rather, this arises because the dead have interests 
which can be invaded, and thus ought to be respected, quite independently of the 
social utility of doing so; and some of these interests concern the manner in which the 
benefits which they handed down to existing people should be disposed of. The third- 
party obligations of reciprocity imposed on us by our receipt of benefits produced in 
the past certainly do not stand or fall with the veracity of the posthumous harms idea, 
but they are certainly compatible with, and possibly strengthened by, it. 
4. Objections To The Idea of Posthumous Harms 
There are a number of objections which might be raised against the claim that a 
person's well-being can, even in principle, be diminished by events which take place 
after their death. The most prominent of these are grounded in certain requirements 
which delimit the scope of events which can impact upon how well a person's life is 
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going. In sections 4.1 through 4.3, I consider some of these requirements and suggest 
that they are all problematic. 
4.1 The Experience Requirement 
According to the Experience Requirement (ER), an event cannot be bad for a person if 
this event has no tangible effect on (that is makes a difference to) their conscious 
experience. " The ER might be distinguished from the Narrow Experience 
Requirement (NER) which states that an event cannot be bad if a person does not 
experience it as bad. 12 Though these requirements are similar, they are not identical. 
Recall the cases of Smith and Jones. Suppose that, contrary to my initial stipulation, 
Smith did suffer in some tangible way from Jones' malicious actions, although he was 
not consciously aware of this (perhaps he was the victim of `inexplicable stares, by 
job opportunities refused, by invitations not received, etc. '). 13 In such a case, the 
narrow (NER) version of the requirement would imply that this turn of events was not 
bad for Smith. The wider (ER) version of the requirement would, on the other hand, 
view the events as harmful to Smith. Despite being unaware of the deceit himself, 
Smith's conscious-states would undoubtedly be other than those which he would 
entertain if he was not the victim of these cold stares and lost job opportunities. 
Turning to the original version of this case, however, it seems that accepting either of 
these requirements would appear to leave no room at all from which to say that Jones 
harmed any of Smith's interests by his actions, for in this case there are no tangible 
11 The term appears to have been introduced by James Griffin. See Griffin, Well-Being, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 13; pp. 16-17. 
12 See Jefferson McMahan, `Death and the value of life', Ethics, 99,1988, p. 33. 13 Partridge's phrase - see Partridge, `Posthumous Interests, Posthumous Respect', p. 251. 
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effects of Jones' actions on Smith whatsoever. Each of these requirements implies 
that Smith has an interest only in avoiding the bad effects of a bad reputation - either 
solely in terms of the unpleasant conscious states or experiences it causes him (NER) 
or, in addition, other events which impact upon his conscious experience, such as 
economic injury and so on (ER). In pure cases of unexperienced harm such as this, 
then, both the ER and NER deny that a person's well-being, whether they presently 
exist or not, can be affected by actions and events which have no affect on their 
conscious states. 
Let us focus our energies on the, more plausible, ER. What sort of account of well- 
being would endorse such a requirement? The answer must be, I think, only a 
hedonistic theory of well-being. Hedonism holds that a person's well-being, or self- 
interest, consists in the presence of pleasurable conscious states. Hedonism, because it 
appeals to the ER, is irreconcilable with the view that a person's well-being can be 
adversely affected by acts or events which have no impact on their conscious states. If 
Hedonism turns out to be the only, or the most, plausible theory of well-being then 
there can be no such thing as well-being connected harms which are not experienced. 
There are, however, significant objections to Hedonism which arise from the claim 
that theories of well-being which endorse the ER pre-suppose an implausibly narrow 
understanding of well-being. Thus, Hedonism cannot explain the view of many 
people that there are some things which improve their well-being even if they 
experience these things as painful (or indeed they do not experience them at all); and 
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there are other things which reduce their well-being even if they are experienced as 
pleasurable (or indeed they are not experienced at all). 14 
Consider, for example, Nozick's example of the `experience machine. ' Nozick 
supposes that a machine has been invented which can simulate any experience by 
stimulating parts of the brain. If attached to this machine, he argues, `superduper 
neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you 
were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book'; and, 
furthermore, these experiences would be indistinguishable from their `real-world' 
counter-parts. 15 Nozick points out that, despite the fact that those attached to the 
experience machine would experience pleasurable sensations, we would not normally 
think that the lives of these people are going well. For example, being plugged into 
the machine would result in the loss of contact with other people and the outside 
world in general, and we think that entering into meaningful relationships with others 
is at the very least a necessary condition of leading a life which is worth living. 
It seems then that theories of well-being which endorse the ER are too narrow; things 
other than pleasant conscious states matter from the point of view of human well- 
being. As a result, the fact that endorsing the ER would necessarily rule out the idea 
that a person's well-being is vulnerable to posthumous events ought not lead us to 
abandon this idea, or the symmetrical view of intergenerational dealings it lends 
credence to. 
14 See, for example, Griffin, Wellbeing, p. 8; Parf it, Reasons and Persons, pp. 493-4; Larry 
Temkin, `Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads', in R. G. Frey and C. Morris, eds., Value, Welfare, 
and Morality, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 298ff. 15 Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, p. 42. 
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4.2 The Existence Requirement 
In this section, I want to suggest that there is a way of defending the thought that it is 
possible to harm an existing person's well-being even if they do not experience this, 
but not to harm a dead person's well-being. This is to endorse an existence, as 
opposed to an experience, requirement. 16 The Existence Requirement (EXR) states 
that a person's well-being cannot be harmed, or diminished, unless he exists at the 
time this harm is inflicted. '? To say that persons who do not currently exist cannot be 
harmed, of course, is not necessarily to say that non-existent persons cannot be 
harmed because they cannot experience any alleged harms that befall them. Thus the 
implications of the EXR, when incorporated into a wider theory of well-being, might 
depart from Hedonism quite markedly. 
Recall the earlier case of the Smith. The EXR diverges from the ER in its implication 
for this case. Despite the fact that Smith is unaware of Jones' actions, and that no bad 
effects of these actions impact upon Smith's conscious experience, the EXR, taken on 
its own, is compatible with the claim that Smith's well-being is diminished by Jones' 
acts. This is because Smith exists at the time of his reputation being ruined by Jones. 
The EXR, then, appears to be a less narrow restriction on the limits of well-being than 
either experience requirement. 
The EXR will also have important implications in other cases involving prima facie 
posthumous harms (such as the case of Jones). Consider the following example: 
16 See MacMahan, `Death and the Value of Life', pp. 38-40. 
17 The harmed person must exist at the time of infliction rather than cause of said harm in 
order not to rule out uncontroversial cases of harm which proceeded from negligent acts and 
so forth before one was born (as in the case where I deliberately plant a bomb which goes off 
some months later in a maternity ward). 
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The Case of Mulder. Fox Mulder's life's work as an FBI agent 
attached to the X Files unexpectedly collapses when a freak fire in 
his office building destroys all of his case notes and computer files. 
However, because he is killed by an assailant while working on a 
routine murder case just after the collapse occurs, he never finds out 
about this. 
According to the EXR, it is perfectly plausible to argue that Mulder is harmed by the 
collapse of his work on the `X Files', and to claim that, if the collapse had not 
occurred when it did, his life might have gone better than it did. Obviously, to get to 
this conclusion several premises pertaining to what we take a person's well-being to 
consist in must be added here. However, unlike the ER, the EXR is at least 
compatible with providing such an account. The problem with the EXR arises when 
we add further examples, such as: 
The Case of Scully. Dana Scully's life's work as an FBI 
investigator on the X Files unexpectedly collapses (in the same 
circumstances as Mulder's) while she is on holiday in the Bahamas. 
However, because she is killed on a scuba diving excursion a few 
minutes before the collapse occurs, she never finds out about it. 18 
The problem with the EXR, here, is that whereas it appears to provide a sound answer 
to the question of whether Mulder could be said to be harmed by this unknown 
collapse given that it occurred some minutes before his untimely death (i. e., yes), it 
implies that Scully is not harmed give that the collapse of her work occurred some 
18 A similar example is discussed by McMahan, `Death and the Value of Life', p. 38. 
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few minutes after her death. Herein lies the `logical wedge' which holding the EXR 
allows us to drive between cases of posthumous non-causal harm on the one side and 
non posthumous non-causal harm on the other. However, the price of using this 
wedge is that we must hold that, regarding the Mulder and Scully cases, as far as the 
harming is concerned `the timing makes all the difference. ' 19 But this seems hard to 
believe. 
One way in which we might explain the problem that the EXR poses in the Scully 
(and Jones) cases is that it encourages us to subscribe to three mutually incompatible 
beliefs: 
(1) had Scully's life's work not collapsed as it did, she would have 
been better off - her life would have gone better. 
(2) to say that a person's life went worse because of an event, this 
event must have taken place while the person is alive. 
(3) the collapse of Scully's life's work did not take place while she 
was alive. 
The account of the Scully case which I have been urging assumes that (1) and (3) are 
so evidently true that (2) must be false. The account of the Scully case which the EXR 
urges, however, is that (2) and (3) are true, and therefore (1) must be rejected. Part of 
the intuitive case for my account is that the EXR seems to be an ugly sister of the ER, 
mentioned earlier. The ER at least had a sort of brutal logic about it (it represented the 
logical conclusion of holding a view of well-being which ties people's well-being 
exclusively to the pleasurable conscious states they possess). But the EXR seems not 
19 McMahan, `Death and the Value of Life', p. 38 
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even to have this - it does not seem to represent any coherent account of well-being. 
Thus, whereas it departs from the implications of Hedonism in Smith type cases, it 
departs from non-hedonist theories of well-being in Jones type cases. The EXR, then, 
appears to be a restricting principle on well-being without a wider theory which can 
incorporate it. 
A recent article by Shelly Kagan, however, suggests that the EXR captures something 
of a view that might well be more plausible than either experience requirement, and 
possibly suggests that we ought to reject (1). The suggestion is that the EXR would be 
a special instance of, or an approximation to, what I call the Intrinsic Properties 
Requirement (IPR). 
4.3 The Intrinsic Properties Requirement 
Kagan proposes that there are three conditions that any plausible theory of well-being 
must meet: these are the content, value, and benefit conditions. The content condition 
states that the facts specified by the theory to be relevant to a person's well-being 
must be facts about that person. The value condition states that a plausible account 
must be offered of why it is good that these facts obtain. The benefit condition states 
that these facts must be good in some respect for the person who is well-off: as Kagan 
writes, the `well-off individual must benefit from being well-off in a way that 
involves the state of their intrinsic properties. 20 
20 Shelly Kagan, `The Limits of Well-Being', Social Philosophy and Policy, 9,1992, p. 185. 
A person's intrinsic properties, here, refer to properties of their brain and/or body. They 
include their conscious-states, talents, handicaps and so on. A person's extrinsic states, by 
contrast, are those properties of a person which arise as a consequence of relations to other 
people and objects, such as the way in which their physical and mental powers compare to 
those of others. 
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It is the third condition which gives rise to what I call the Intrinsic Properties 
Requirement (IPR) The IPR might be stated as follows: 
For an act or event to be bad for a person's well-being, it must 
affect him, that is make a difference to him, in a way that alters his 
intrinsic properties. 
The relevance of the IPR for the issue of posthumous harms is relatively straight- 
forward. In none of these alleged cases of posthumous harm will this requirement be 
satisfied. Consider, for example, the case of Scully. Kagan would maintain that the 
fact that it is her life's work which collapses, that she spent a great deal of time on it, 
and it is indeed generally harmful to a person if their important projects go badly, 
means that the first of the above two conditions will be met. However, because the 
collapse did not plausibly effect a change in Scully's body and/or mind (and all there 
was to Scully as a person was her body and mind) the benefit condition, and thus the 
IPR, is not satisfied in this case. The result, according to Kagan's view, is that it 
cannot be claimed that Scully's well-being suffered as a result of her work's 
destruction. 
In fact, the IPR will not be satisfied in the case of the Mulder, Smith or Jones cases - 
or in any other prima facie case of posthumous, or non-posthumous, non-causal harm 
we care to mention. For, in these cases, while the relevant entities might have had 
their extrinsic properties affected by the events discussed, their intrinsic properties 
will not have been affected. 
Note that the axiom is not identical with any of the requirements I have mentioned so 
far. It will, or might, conflict with either experience requirement in certain cases 
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where a person goes through some beneficial or harmful bodily change without a 
corresponding experiential change. On the other hand, although it implies the EXR as 
an incomplete approximation (a change in a person's brain or body cannot occur 
unless they exist) it is not interchangeable with it (one might, like Smith, not be 
affected in body or mind by a harming act, but the EXR would be consistent with this 
person's well-being having been diminished, whereas the axiom would not be). 
Now it is important to point out that Kagan offers no positive argument for the axiom 
other than observing that it seems `overwhelmingly plausible. '21 I do not agree, 
however, as it leaves Kagan juggling with roughly the same three inconsistent beliefs 
in Scully-type cases as those who endorse the EXR, namely: 
(1) for a person's well-being to be affected by an act or event, it 
must trigger some intrinsic change in them (The IPR). 
(2) had Scully's life's work not collapsed as it did, she would have 
been better off, her life would have gone better. 
(3) the failure of her life's work does not affect Scully intrinsically. 
Faced with these incompatible beliefs, Kagan holds that (2) is false. Cases such as 
this, he argues, merely `appear to be cases where well-being is affected, but they must 
not be, for they cannot be. '22 
Although I think that Kagan's suggestion should be rejected, Kagan's discussion does 
at the very least pave the way for a more felicitous taxonomy with which to approach 
the issues of well-being and unexperienced harms. Let me explain. The IPR calls into 
21 Kagan, `The Limits of Well-Being', p. 186. 22 Kagan, `The Limits of Well-Being', p. 187. 
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question the traditional tripartite classification of theories of well-being into hedonist 
desire-based, and objectivist accounts. The axiom does not stand or fall, for example, 
with hedonistic accounts (well-being here is tied to changes in appropriate intrinsic 
states of mind or body) and it is left in the air whether changes in the body will 
always be matched by changes in conscious states. 
Consider, for illustration, 
The Case of Evans. Through the negligence of a colleague at work, 
Evans becomes infected with a rare disease. The disease is 
completely undetectable, and has a very long incubation period. 
However, having this disease means that on or around Evans' 
sixtieth birthday he will succumb to it and die soon after. As it turns 
out, however, Evans dies a few months before his sixtieth birthday 
in a car accident, apparently suffering from no symptoms of the 
disease, and completely that he ever had the disease. 
The IPR suggests, I think correctly, that contracting the disease in these 
circumstances could constitute a harm to him despite it never altering for the worse 
any of his conscious states. This is because it affected adversely many of his bodily 
states 23 
On the other hand, when we consider the cases of Mulder and Evans side by side, it 
becomes clear that theories of well-being which endorse the IPR will be led to make a 
distinction between these cases which no other theory would draw. This is that Evans 
23 Perhaps, as in the case of Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease (CJD), the progressive replication of 
infected protein molecules gradually turned his brain to mush, but it never reached the 
critical stage that the degeneration impacted upon his conscious life. 
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is harmed by his ailment, but Mulder is not harmed by the collapse of his life's-work, 
despite the fact that neither Evans' illness nor the collapse of Mulder's work is 
experienced, and despite the fact that both are alive at the time of the putative well- 
being diminishing events. 
This, I think, suggests that any theory which endorses the IPR will be a new type of 
theory, not presentable in terms of the traditional tripartite distinction between 
hedonistic, desire based, and objectivist theories - or at least not as they have been 
traditionally conceived. 4 But it will be a theory that purchases its novelty at the price 
of being cut off from the motivation of theories which endorse an experience 
requirement on personal good -a requirement which entails that what one does not 
experience cannot harm one. 
In fact, Kagan thinks that the main upshot of finding the axiom plausible is that we 
also find plausible the thought that theories of well-being should be seen in terms of 
two separate sets of distinctions, as opposed to separating them into the three camps 
noted above. The distinctions he proposes are (1) whether the theory is objective as 
opposed to subjective; and (2) whether the theory restricts well-being to facts about 
intrinsic properties of the person, or allows in addition facts about extrinsic, 
properties of the person to count as well25 
24 Such a theory is not discussed by proponents of the classification, such as Parfit and 
Temkin. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 493f; and Temkin, 'Harmful Goods, Harmless 
Bads', pp. 297ff. Neither it is proposed by Griffin, but Griffin's view is complicated by the 
fact that he adds a fourth theory to the classification which he calls `perfectionism. ' 
However, to the extent that perfectionism, here, is more or less a development of 
objectivism, Griffin is a third example of a philosopher which takes this tri-partite 
classification seriously. See Griffin, Well-Being, Part One. 
25 Taking a person to consist of simply a body and a mind, a changes in a person's intrinsic 
properties simply require corresponding changes in a person's body and/or mind. Changes in 
a person's extrinsic properties, on the other hand, require changes not in a person's body 
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These distinctions in turn yield a four-fold classification of theories of well-being, 
which I tentatively surmise would pan out as Hedonism and desire fulfilment on the 
subjectivist side, and objective list theory and a new theory which we might call 
`restricted objectivism' on the objectivist side. 26 The way these positions relate to 
each other is explored in Figure 4 (on the next page). 
The point I want to make here is that, even if we regard the IPR as implausible as a 
limiting principle on well-being, we might hold that Kagan has provided a very useful 
taxonomy for the purposes of thinking about well-being. It shows us, in particular, 
that a plausible account of posthumous harms must reject intrinsicism, as we might 
call it, rather than subjectivism as such as some (such as O'Neill) have argued. 
27 
Intrinsicism is the view that a person's well-being is not vulnerable to events which 
do not involve changes in their intrinsic properties. 
It seems safe to say, then, that no intrinsicist view of well-being will have room for 
the view that people can be harmed posthumously, for death certainly renders its 
victim's intrinsic properties beyond the reach of posthumous events. So if we are to 
retain the thought that people can be harmed after their death, we must endorse an 
extrinsicist view of well-being. In the following two sections I discuss two such 
theories, and argue that they are both consistent with the notion of posthumous harm. 
and/or mind but in a person's relational properties. See Kagan, `The Limits of Well-Being', 
pp. 188-9. 
26 Restricted in the sense that only goods whose possession impacted on a person's intrinsic 
properties could be objectively valuable to persons. 
27 O'Neill, Ecology, Politics and Policy, pp. 36-8. 
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Figure 4: The Source of Well-Being 
(Q1): Is the source of a person's well-being more than a matter of 
the conscious states (including desires) which they possess? 
No 
"'Yes 
Subjectivist Theories of Well-Being Objectivist Theories of Well-Being 
The Intrinsic Properties Requirement 
(Q2): Can changes in a person's well-being involve 
more than changes in that person's intrinsic properties? 
No. 'x es. 
Intrinsicist Extrinsicist 
Subjectivism Subjectivism 
No. es. 
Intrinsicist Extrinsicist 
Objectivism Objectivism 
5. Two Theories of Well-Being 
Let us suppose that I have created enough doubt about plausibility of the Experience, 
Existence, and Intrinsic Properties Requirements that the reader is at least not 
convinced of the non-existence of posthumous harms. In the next two sections I turn 
to a deeper examination of two theories of well-being which, despite taking a quite 
different view of what the well-being of persons consists in, are reconcilable with the 
existence of posthumous harms. These are the Subjective Desire Fulfilment Theory 
and the (extrinsicist) Objectivist Theory. 
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5.1 The Subjective Desire Fulfilment Theory 
According to the Subjective Desire-Fulfilment Theory (SDFT), a person's well-being 
consists in having their desires fulfilled. The theory which Parfit calls the Success 
Theory is a good example of this type theory. The Success Theory simply states that 
which is best for a person's well-being is what would best fulfil those, and only those, 
desires which he has about his own life, with the condition that these desires must 
mark out a central, or main, aim of his28 This might be contrasted with a less 
plausible version of the SDFT which Parfit calls the Unrestricted Theory. This theory 
holds that what is best for a person's well-being is that all of his desires are fulfilled, 
even if they are not about his own life 
29 The SDFT in either its restricted or 
unrestricted incarnations is most plausible when it is counts only informed desires, 
that is desires which would are entertained in full knowledge of the alternatives. 
The main contrast between the SDFT and Hedonism is that the SDFT is consistent 
with the thought that certain things can affect a person's well-being without entering 
their conscious experience. It is true that, according to the SDFT, desires are sorts of 
mental-states. However, it is also the case that this view is consistent with the thought 
that there will be cases where the fulfilment of an informed desire will fail to bring 
about pleasurable experiences in that desire's owner. In such cases, one might be 
unaware that one's desire has been fulfilled, or one is aware that it has been fulfilled 
28 See Parf it, Reasons and Persons, pp. 494ff; Griffin, Well-Being, p. 21. 
29 In fact, the Unrestricted Theory is subject to some serious objections. Take Parfit's 
example of the disease-stricken stranger whom we meet and feel an instant liking for. When 
we part company with the stranger we wish him well, and in particular we entertain a strong 
wish that he could be cured. Should SDFT include such desires? It seems that it should not, 
for if it did proponents of SDFT would have to accept that if long after we have met him the 
stranger is miraculously cured then this will impact favourably upon our own well-being 
(see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 484). 
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but this brings no satisfaction, as in the case of fulfilled, but ill-considered, wants or 
when counter-adaptive preference formation is at work. 
30 Finally, there seem to be 
cases where the experience of a desire being fulfilled is enjoyed by a person in the 
absence of this desire's actual fulfilment - as when one is deluded into thinking, 
falsely, that one's desire to write a good academic paper has been fulfilled (perhaps as 
a result of being patronised by colleagues or of the taking of mind altering drugs). 
In the following, I will use a discussion of several examples in order to show that (1) 
the most obvious interpretation of the SDFT would involve the inclusion of 
posthumous desires in calculations of certain people's well-being, and (2) that the 
desires which the SDFT will count in this respect will extend to some self-regarding 
and some other-regarding desires (as well as difficult cases which appear to be an 
Consider first, amalgam of both) 31 
The Case of Brown. Brown has a strong, and persistent, desire that 
his children lead a flourishing life. Indeed, Brown would prefer the 
state of affairs where his children flourish despite his lack of 
awareness of this to the state of affairs where he is pleasantly 
deluded into thinking that they are flourishing when they are not. 
30 Counter-adaptive preference formation arises when a person has a desire which, while 
blocked, is strongly identified with by its owner, but when fulfilled it brings little satisfaction 
because its owner has taken on board a new desire in its place. Elster gives the example of 
someone who lives in London and wishes to live in Paris in the knowledge that if he moved 
to Paris he would almost certainly cultivate a desire that he lived in London. See Jon Elster, 
Sour Grapes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 111. 
31 Here I take `other-regarding desires' to be those desires which people are primarily 
concerned with the bringing about of states of the world which are not primarily concerned 
with themselves. Examples might be the desire that a certain political party, or cause, 
succeed. By contrast, I take `self-regarding desires' to be those desires which are concerned 
primarily with states of the world which they themselves participate in. Examples might be 
the desire to be a certain sort of person, or that one be respected by others. 
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However, some time after his death it transpires that his children do 
not flourish, and moreover many of Brown's own attempts to secure 
their flourishing have been shown to have failed. 
The first thing to say, here, is that such cases illustrate that a person's desires are best 
explained as being fulfilled by objectively observable states of the world rather than 
by subjectively discernible states of their minds. Feinberg remarks that, `the object of 
our efforts is to fulfil our desires in the external world, not to bring about states of our 
own minds... If the objects of our desires were valuable to us as a means to our 
pleasant inner states, those inner glows would never come. '32 According to this 
account of well-being, a person will be harmed only when the fulfilment of their 
desires is blocked in some way, not when they fail to experience the pleasant feelings 
generally triggered by this fulfilment when it occurs. 
The second thing to say about the example is that Brown's desire is other-regarding, 
or vicarious. That is, it picks out a state of the world which Brown wants to bring 
about which does not concern himself, or his own intrinsic properties. It seems that 
other-regarding desires are particularly good candidates for posthumous survival 
because of this very feature. The problem is that desire-based theories, such as the 
SDFT, are typically wary of including other-regarding desires within their account of 
human well-being. Of course, it is sometimes pointed out that desires such as 
Brown's are not fully vicarious, or other-regarding, because parents want not just 
their children to be well fed, well educated and well resourced in general, but that 
32 Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 85; see also Griffin, Well-Being, p. 13. 
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they want this to be brought about by themselves. This will in fact be true of many 
desires. Feinberg remarks that 
most of our interests require not simply that some result be brought 
about, but rather that it be brought about by us. .. 
My interest in 
producing an excellent book, or a beautiful art object, is not fully 
satisfied by another person's creation of such objects. My interest 
was not simply that such objects exist, but that I bring them into 
existence. '33 
To the extent that this is true of Brown's desire, it would be an unlikely candidate for 
posthumous survival. However, to the extent that Brown entertains a desire that his 
children are well fed and educated and so forth which does not specify that he himself 
has to bring this about (which I imagine is a well rooted interest for most people) this 
desire would, on the above account, survive his death. 
Suppose that desires, such as Brown's, are legitimately included in judgements of 
people's well-being while they are still alive. Could it be a relevant fact in the 
fulfilment of this other-regarding desire that Brown perishes before it is frustrated? It 
seems not. It is the fact that desires such as these, and the plans which they ground, 
are entertained by many people in reality which provides some of the best evidence 
for the existence of posthumous harms. Many people appear to act as if what happens 
after their deaths can affect the value which their lives have for them, for example by 
investing in projects and causes which will, in many cases, not come to fruition in 
their own life-times. 
33 Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 81. 
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It has already been seen that the SDFT will regard it as bad for me if certain desires 
that I entertain are not fulfilled despite me being unaware of this. But in this case, on 
what grounds can proponents of the SDFT rule out Brown's unfulfilled desire, for 
example, from impacting on their evaluations of how his life went? All that Brown's 
death seems to do here is to ensure that he will never know or experience that his 
desire had been frustrated. But, if in more apparently mundane cases, the proponent of 
the SDFT thinks it irrelevant that an owner of a frustrated desire never discovers the 
truth of this frustration, surely the proponent of the SDFT will not be drawn to the 
claim that Brown's death makes a difference to the fact that his well-being had been 
adversely affected here? 
Next consider 
The Case of Swampy. Swampy is a committed road protester and 
wildlife lover who entertains a lifetime wish that the marshland 
surrounding the Salisbury area be preserved, and as a result expends 
much effort during his life-time in an attempt to secure the 
fulfilment of this desire. Shortly after Swampy's death, however, 
the developers finally move in and within a short space of time, the 
marshlands are replaced with the new Salisbury bypass. 
If we reject a Hedonistic view of well-being in favour of the SDFT, we might think 
that the marshlands being lost even after Swampy's death could diminish Swampy's 
well-being. This is because one of Swampy's strongest, global, 34 and informed, 
desires was frustrated; one aspect of his life's work had been thwarted. According to 
34 A person's global desires are those deepest desires which relate to their life as a whole, 
and which are not entertained for a short space of time. 
Chapter 4: Reciprocity and Posthumous Harm 164 
the SDFT, Swampy's life went worse than could have been the case, for, as Hare 
observes, `to frustrate a desire is against my interest even if I do not know that it is 
being frustrated, or if I am dead. '35 
Consider, lastly, 
The Case of Leonardo. Leonardo spends some considerable time 
in an earlier century thinking about how people might be able to 
build machines in order that they can take to the skies. In particular, 
he produces many designs and drawings of a design of aircraft 
which looks strikingly similar to the modem helicopter. Leonardo's 
attempts, though, are consistently frustrated. However, some 
centuries after his death completely different lines of thought lead to 
the development of modem aircraft. 
Has the ingenuity of later generations in building such aircraft, and taking to the skies 
as he imagined, fulfilled Leonardo's earlier desire (in which case it is an example of a 
posthumous interest being furthered) or did this desire go with Leonardo to the grave? 
It seems the latter is the case, for at least two reasons. Firstly, Leonardo's drawings 
and designs played almost no part whatsoever in the development of the modem 
helicopter. In fact, Leonardo's suggestions proved a complete failure in this respect. If 
a person's acts do not contribute to a desire they entertain being fulfilled, then this 
seems to weaken the claim that its fulfilment impacts on their well-being. Second, 
there is no evidence that Leonardo wished such aircraft to be built by future 
generations; in other words, there was no vicarious component to his desire. Rather, it 
35 R. M. Hare, `Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism', in H. Lewis, ed., Contemporary British 
Philosophy, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1976, p. 130. 
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was utterly self-regarding - grounded only in a personal fascination in the project. For 
these two reasons, it seems that Leonardo's desire lacks two of the components 
necessary for it to be vulnerable to posthumous events. 
The brief discussion of these three cases offered above, I think, brings us closer to an 
understanding of the conditions which the SDFT will set on a desire surviving 
posthumously. For example, it must, (1), be at least partly posthumously directed in 
the sense that states of the world which determine whether it is fulfilled or not must 
occur, or not, after the person's death. This condition rules in desires such as Jones' 
desire for a good reputation, which can be respected or ruined after his death. It rules 
out, however, Leonardo's desire that he himself contribute to the development of air 
travel within his own lifetime. This desire is self-contained in the sense that it does 
not require the actions of others to assist in its fulfilment 
36 
The second condition worth mentioning is, (2), that the desire in question must be 
about the owner in the sense that it picks out a strongly held and identified with 
global desire, whose fulfilment would in some direct sense benefit its possessor. 
Suppose that Parfit's attractive stranger is cured, though six months after my death. 
37 
(2) rules out the SDFT counting this preference in its account of how my life went. 
It seems then, that if these conditions are defensible, the range of posthumously 
surviving desires the SDFT will count will actually be quite extensive. And as we 
have seen, the distinction between those that survive and those that don't will cut 
across the distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding desires. 
8 It seemed 
36 The distinction between self-contained and self-centred desires, or wants, is discussed by 
Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 86. 
37 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 494. 
38 Feinberg, Harm to Others, p. 86. 
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at the outset that other-regarding desires, such as Swampy's, might not be vulnerable 
to posthumous events. However, Swampy's desires appear ironically to be more 
obvious candidates for posthumous survival than some purely self-regarding desires, 
such as Leonardo's (and there are obviously going to be some tough cases between 
these extremes where one's interests, and the desires they are grounded in, are partly 
self-regarding and partly other-regarding). 
To sum up, the attraction of the SDFT as an approach to these issues is that it seems 
reconcilable with the general idea that certain things (e. g. being slandered or 
deceived) can impact upon people's well-being even if they do not result in changes 
in these peoples' bodies and/or minds. Faced with cases such as Smith, then, the 
SDFT regards these unexperienced events as harming people's well-being because 
they have a significant bearing on the fulfilment of people's strongest, globally held, 
desires - regardless of whether the victims are aware of these events. On the other 
hand, faced with the Jones case, if Jones has an informed, global, desire that members 
of future generations, such as Jones, do not play fast and loose with his posthumous 
reputation (or that, as in the Scully case, her life's work flourish regardless of her 
continued presence at its helm) the SDFT will view distant or later developments 
which bear on these desires as playing a role in the determination of these peoples' 
well-being. 
One drawback with the SDFT is that, according to this theory, the extent to which a 
person's well-being is vulnerable to posthumous events is peculiarly dependent on the 
desires which these people entertained while they were alive. For example, it is 
consistent with the view that people, such as Brown, who care about the life-plans of 
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their children may be harmed posthumously by setbacks to their children's success 
(such as their failed enterprises or premature deaths) - but it is not consistent with 
people's well-being being harmed posthumously if they never possessed such 
posthumously-directed desires in the first place. Maybe such people are few and far 
between, but there are at least some people who do not entertain desires which cannot 
be fulfilled during their own life-times; and, according to the most obvious versions 
of the SDFT, even if people's well-being can be diminished by posthumous events in 
principle, the well-being of people who do not entertain future-orientated desires 
cannot be. 
5.2 Objectivist Theories of Well-Being 
The concern that the SDFT draws the limits of well-being too widely, as well as the 
general anti-subjectivist proposition that there isn't a particularly strong connection 
between the desires or conscious-states a person possesses and their well-being, has 
lead to pressure to abandon the SDFT in favour of a fully objectivist theory of well- 
being. Objectivists hold that a person's well-being consists in their possessing various 
objectively valuable goods, for example wisdom, knowledge, courage and so forth, 
while avoiding objective bads - for example, being deceived, slandered or betrayed. 
Though the exact list of these objective goods is open to dispute, the point is that the 
value of these goods is set independently of people desiring them. 
This is not to say, however, that coming to identify with these goods is not part of 
well-being. While the objectivist will be someone who sees, in a range of cases, a 
huge gap between the lives people which people wish to lead are those lives which 
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would be best for them to lead, in order to have a high level of well-being one must 
not only possess valuable goods or pursue objectively valuable goals, but also find 
these goods and goals fulfilling. 9 The basic point remains that for a person to 
maintain a high level of well-being, they must meet the demands of a certain, 
objective, standard. Here, well-being is determined by the possession of certain 
valuable goods, and a person's life does not go well if they merely falsely believe that 
they are achieving valuable goals. 
Recall the cases of the Smith and Jones, and the claim that people want not to be 
betrayed because it is bad to be betrayed, rather than because of the unpleasantness it 
brings. This is typical of the sort of claim made by the objectivist. The objectivist 
thinks that being betrayed is bad for people like Smith neither because it is the source 
of some unhappiness to him as the Hedonist would have us believe, nor that it 
frustrates some desire of his, as the SDFT implies. Rather, it is bad for Smith because 
the absence of betrayal is on the list of goods whose possession comprises Smith's 
(and possibly everyone's) well-being. Reconciling this claim with a subjectivist 
theory is difficult because this type of theory, as Parfit has put it, is insensitive to facts 
about values. What subjectivist theories are sensitive to are facts about the desires 
which people entertain or the conscious-states they possess 4° 
Because many variants of the SDFT are non-evaluative in this way, this theory cannot 
account for the common view that a good reputation is a conditionally valuable thing 
to possess - that is, one which is valuable only if it is merited by one's conduct. As 
39 See, for example, Roger Kraut, `Two Concepts of Happiness', The Philosophical Review, 
88,1979, p. 183. 
40 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 499-500. 
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Finnis observes, though, we tend to think that a good reputation (posthumous or 
otherwise) is valuable, for the most part, `as a reassuring sign or mark of one's own 
real achievements and perfections. ' 41 It would make little sense, on this view, to 
pursue a good reputation for its own sake, for genuine recognition of a person's 
successes are parasitic on that person doing things worth recognising in the first 
place. This, however, is not to preclude the thought that a good reputation is an 
additional intrinsic good, for one's life might go better, for example, if one is not only 
courageous but is also seen to be courageous by one's contemporaries and 
descendants. 
Objectivist theories of well-being can explain these thoughts, for this type of theory is 
sensitive to facts about value, indeed it appeals directly to facts about values which 
are held to be objectively true in the account which it gives of which things are good 
for persons (e. g. possessing courage and knowledge) and which things are bad for 
persons (e. g. being deceived or slandered). Respecting a person's reputation, then, 
will not necessarily enhance their well-being as measured by their possession of an 
index of these goods. Rather, a concern for one's reputation, and that of others, is 
justified by an objectivist theory to the extent that this ties in to `one's concern for 
truth, one's concern to be in harmony with other persons, and one's concern for 
practical reasonableness (an authentic realization of one's basic concerns). '42 
Objectivist theories of well-being also give more convincing answers in other cases 
where Hedonism and the SDFT look implausible. Consider the case of a person who 
possesses informed desires which seem so bizarre that their fulfilment seems utterly 
41 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 98-99. 
42 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 99. 
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unrelated to their well-being. One interesting example discussed by Nagel concerns a 
person who desires to pass his days attempting to communicate with asparagus 
plants. 3 Suppose that these desires are held despite a full consideration of the 
alternatives (they are informed desires). Neither the SDFT nor Hedonism can, without 
modification, avoid the implication that to pursue this life-plan would result in the 
best life for this person. 
According to the SDFT, for example, this person would be fulfilling his strongest, 
informed, and global preferences; according to Hedonism, the fulfilling of these 
preferences is most conducive to his obtaining pleasurable conscious-states. But this 
seems absurd. How can a person spending all of their time on something as clearly 
ridiculous as talking to asparagus plants make their life go well? Objectivist theories, 
of course, because they take a clear stand on the issue of whether a preference or 
desire is good or bad, i. e. whether it has value which is not reducible to its desirability 
or pleasantness, can explain what's going wrong in cases like this. This is that these 
persons are mistaken about the types of goods which are worth having, asparagus 
idolatry, for example, not being amongst the list of objectively valuable goods. 
There appear to be a number of alternative objectivist theories on the market, but let 
us restrict ourselves to an analysis of those theories which assume that the list of 
things which are objectively goods for a person to possess is robust across persons, 
and treats it as irrelevant that a person identifies with these goods 44 
43 See Nagel, `Death', p. 5; Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 500. 
44 Other theories might hold that the list of objective goods is not robust across persons, 
because it is determined in some way by that person's natural capacities or that, while the list 
of goods which are valuable is robust across persons, it is a necessary condition that people 
identify with these goods for them to be valuable. 
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This brief account of objectivism, and some of its attractions on issues regarding the 
well-being of contemporaries, must now be applied to the issue of posthumous harms. 
Does objectivism, as briefly summarised above, imply that people's well-being are 
vulnerable to posthumous events? The fact that the logic of objectivism when applied 
to the Smith case implies that it is simply bad to be betrayed even if one is not aware 
of being betrayed, appears to suggest that it does. The objectivist holds that if a good 
X is valuable to a person Y, then any change in facts about Y's possession of X will 
potentially alter facts about his well-being. This is certainly the case regardless of 
whether Y knows about this change in facts about his possession of X- indeed is the 
case even if Y was unaware that (1) he possessed X in the first place or (2) that Xis 
valuable to him/his well-being. If possessing a reputation that mirrors accurately what 
one has achieved in life is an objectively valuable good, then it seems that losing this 
good would most almost certainly affect its former owner's well-being. 
When we switch from the non-cognisant to the dead there is indeed a difference to be 
accounted for. The difference is that the dead person's intrinsic properties are 
logically immune from change, as they no longer exist. Before death, though, the 
person's intrinsic properties were only contingently immune from change. Does this 
make a difference? Only if all changes in well-being require a change in intrinsic 
properties. But I venture that the whole attraction of Kagan's IPR trades on an 
element of subjectivism. Suppose that one thinks that events can impact upon a 
person's well-being even if they (1) are not experienced by that person or (2) do not 
fulfil or thwart any of that person's desires. If one subscribed to this view, what 
reason could one possibly have for thinking that the fact that an event does not affect 
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some individual's intrinsic properties can be relevant to the issue of whether that 
event impacts upon this person's well-being? 
Next, suppose that one is unconvinced by either the SDFT or the objectivist theory of 
well-being when they are viewed in isolation. Some argue that the most coherent 
account of well-being is constructed from a reconciliation of SDFT and objectivism. 
The argument here is that a person's well-being consists of having their desires 
fulfilled, but where the desires which count are determined on objectivist grounds. 
According to this mixed theory, Hedonistic and simple desire-based accounts are 
flawed because they cannot accommodate the thought that there are some things 
which people should care about, but it is also maintained that our acting in ways 
which are worthy of desiring is good for us only if these acts connect up with our 
values and desires. For example, writing a great novel is good for a person - it makes 
their life go better - only if it is desired by them. 
45 
Suppose we find this view compelling. In moving to this view, either from a wholly 
objectivist or wholly desire-based position, we have no reason to view the notion of 
posthumous harms with any greater scepticism. This is because it is perfectly 
plausible (indeed overwhelming likely, I think) for a person to be engaged, and enjoy 
being engaged, in practices which Objectivists think worth caring about (such as child 
rearing) and which have inherently future orientated aspects - aspects which are 
vulnerable to events which take place beyond the biological lives of their 
participants. 
45 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 501-2; and Raz, Morality of Freedom, pp. 288ff. 
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6. Conclusions: The Limits of the Symmetry View 
Suppose that, despite the problems already outlined, one accepted that the well-being 
of the dead could - if certain conditions prevailed - be affected by posthumous 
developments, such as slanderous accusations or by the failure to develop certain 
plans or projects. Would this really give rise to any degree of symmetry of power, or 
reciprocity, even in the weak sense I identified in the previous chapter? There are at 
least three considerations which suggest that it would not. 
First, on the quantitative side, the magnitude of the reciprocity is a problem. Not all 
people have deeply felt, and globally directed, desires which will be liable to 
fulfilment, or frustration, by states of the world subsequent to their death. So the 
number of people whose well-being will be vulnerable to posthumous harm 
(considerations of Non-Identity aside) would appear to be far less than the number of 
future people whose well-being will be shaped before they are even born (for example 
by the climate policies adopted by the predecessors). Moreover, much of what 
determines a person's well-being will be determined by events which cannot be 
undone by posthumous events, such as whom they married, how their marriage fared, 
whether they brought up children successfully and so on. This substantial element of 
a person's well-being will go with them to the grave. 
Second, on the qualitative side, the nature of the reciprocity proposed by the 
Symmetry View is in doubt. Usually we think of reciprocity as arising from relations 
which can be characterised by `fitting and proportional returns of like for like. ' Even 
Becker's idea of intergenerational reciprocity, for example, entailed generation, N, 
passing on only a fitting and proportional simulacra of what it received from 
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generation N-1 to generation N+1. But the goods being traded, for want of a better 
expression, in the case of the intergenerational Symmetry View appear not only to be 
quantitatively very different, they also seem qualitatively different. Perhaps they are 
even incommensurable too, for how can we compare the good of a posthumous 
reputation or having one's unfinished plans and projects continued posthumously 
with the good of inheriting an attractive, habitable biosphere or flourishing cultural 
institutions? 
Bringing these two points together, even taking the most generous view of 
intergenerational symmetry possible, future persons are still looking more or less 
incapable of contributing to the well-being of most present persons; and even if we 
think that future persons can contribute to the well-being of some present persons (i. e. 
those with global future-orientated desires, or objectively grounded interests), this 
contribution is incommensurable with the contribution which future persons receive 
from the `future orientated' actions of present persons. Either way, the reciprocity 
proposed by the Symmetry View is beginning to look very thin indeed, and unlikely 
to provide a full solution to the Non-Reciprocity Problem. As a result, I think we have 
at least some reason to see if there are similar obstacles in the path of 
intergenerational extensions of non reciprocity-based theories of ethics. 
Chapter 5: The Non-Identity Problem 
1. Introduction 
I hope to have demonstrated in the previous two chapters that, even if it could be 
shown that there existed a tight connection between the notion of reciprocity and the 
scope of distributive ethics, this would not necessarily entail that only existing 
persons have valid claims to economic and social benefits. In this and the next 
chapter, I want to explore the thought that the intergenerational extension of some 
familiar Non-Reciprocity based theories of ethics is problematic for considerations 
unconnected with the alleged lack of reciprocal dealings between members of 
different generations. 
The problems I consider flow from a unique philosophical puzzle which confronts 
those who wish to explain our responsibilities to future generations in terms of the 
language of disadvantages and harms. Put simply, the puzzle flows from the fact that 
while many think that the performance of actions, or adoption of social policies, 
which lower the quality of life enjoyed by certain future persons relative to that of 
existing persons are unethical, it is unclear how future persons can be harmed, or 
disadvantaged, by acts or social policies which are necessary conditions of their 
coming into existence. Following Parfit, we might call this the Non-Identity 
Problem! The Non-Identity Problem presents a serious challenge for a whole range 
of accounts of environmental, and intergenerational, ethics which assume that actions 
I Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Chapter 16, pp. 351 ff. 
Chapter 5: The Non-Identity Problem 176 
or policies can be wrong only if they harm, disadvantage or victimise particular 
human or non-human animals (I call these identity-dependent accounts). 
In this chapter, I offer a critical discussion of the Non-Identity Problem, explain how 
it renders problematic the intergenerational extension of many non reciprocity-based 
ethical theories, and go on to evaluate one of the most interesting attempts to solve it. 
In section 2, I introduce the simplest sort of case in which the Non-Identity Problem 
arises. Here, a woman must choose between conceiving a handicapped child now or 
waiting a few months in order to receive some treatment which would have the result 
that she would conceive a non-handicapped child. I call this a single person instance 
of Non-Identity. Next, in section 3, I go on to describe a more complex sort of case in 
which the Non-Identity Problem arises. Here, a society must choose between different 
environmental policies which will have markedly different impacts on the distribution 
of benefits and burdens across generations. I call this a social policy instance of Non- 
Identity. Finally, in section 4, I consider the way in which right-based considerations 
might be applied to the cases of Non-Identity discussed in sections 2 and 3. 
2. The Single-Person Non-Identity Problem 
The identities of persons who come into existence are remarkably sensitive to the 
conditions which lead up to their conception. In fact, any given person who exists 
today would, on most familiar views of personal identity, not exist if they had not 
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grown from the pair of cells (ovum and sperm) which they did in fact grow from. This 
has been called the Time-Dependence Claim. 
The Time Dependence Claim, when combined with some other assumptions, gives 
rise to a puzzling problem for those who wish to extend familiar harm-based 
requirements of ethics to the intergenerational context. It renders problematic, for 
example, the idea that particular individuals who were born suffering from some 
serious illness (but who nevertheless will lead lives which are worth living) can claim 
that they had thereby been harmed or wronged, even if the cause of the illness could 
have been detected and treated prior to their conception. We might call these 
wrongful-handicap cases. 
With these preliminary remarks in mind, consider the following two cases which 
involve children suffering handicaps which could have been avoided. 
4 
2 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 351ff. Parfit's exact formulation of this claim is that `if 
any particular person had not been conceived when he was in fact conceived, it is in fact true 
that he would never have existed' (p. 351). See also Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 112-3; and N. J. Zohar, `Prospects for 
"Genetic Therapy" - Can a Person Benefit From Being Altered? ', Bioethics, 5,4,1991, 
pp. 281-82. Having developed from a singular egg and sperm is, of course, only a necessary 
condition of personal identity, otherwise identical twins would be the same person. 
3 See, for example, Dan W. Brock, `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', 
Bioethics, 9,3/4,1995. Wrongful handicap cases can be contrasted with wrongful-life cases, 
which differ only in that the child's ailment in a wrongful life case is incompatible with that 
child leading a life which is worth living. Both wrongful-life and wrongful-handicap cases 
might usefully be viewed as examples of the wider category of wrongful procreation cases. 
4 Similar examples are discussed by Brock, The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', 
pp. 270ff; Parfit, 'Rights, Interests, and Possible People' in Ethical Problems of Medicine, 
Samuel Gorowitz et al, eds., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1976, pp. 369ff; 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 358-61, pp. 375-77; and Michael Tooley Abortion and 
Infanticide, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, pp. 258-59. 
Chapter 5: The Non-Identity Problem 178 
2.1 The Cases of Anna & Bella 
Anna, a woman who intends to have a child but has yet to conceive, is diagnosed with 
a rare, but reversible, condition which heightens the risk of a handicap befalling any 
child she might conceive while suffering from it. As a result, Anna must choose 
between conceiving a child now in the knowledge that this child may well be born 
handicapped (call this the `no-treatment strategy') or having the condition cured and 
subsequently, say two months later, conceiving a different child who will, 
predictably, be born without the handicap (call this the `treatment strategy'). The 
child will be different because delaying her pregnancy by two months will result in 
her child having grown from a different combination of egg and sperm (the 
implication of the Time Dependence Claim for this case). Because Anna's choice, by 
stipulation, will affect the identity of a future person, but not the numbers of future 
people, it is what Parfit calls a Same Number Choice. 5 It is also a paradigmatic case of 
`wrongful handicap. ' 
In the case of Bella, a woman who is already pregnant is diagnosed with a similar 
condition as in the case of Anna. Bella must chose between not having the condition 
cured and as a result conceiving a handicapped child (the `no treatment strategy') or 
having the condition cured and conceiving the same child without genetic handicap 
(the 'treatment strategy'). Because Bella's choice will not affect the identity of her 
child, or, we suppose, the numbers of people who will ever live, it constitutes what 
Parfit refers to as a Same Person Choice. 6 
5 See Reasons and Persons, p. 3 56. 
6 See Reasons and Persons, p. 356. 
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Suppose that in both of these cases the `no treatment strategy' is adopted. What would 
be the ethical requirement that each woman ignores in doing so? One might think that 
the relevant requirement would quite obviously be `not to harm, and thereby wrong, 
one's child by bringing it into existence in an avoidably handicapped state'; and that 
the objection to the adoption of the `no treatment strategy' in each of the above cases 
would be 'equally and seriously wrong', as Brock has put it. 7 The idea here is that the 
fact that Anna's choice is of the Same Number, rather than Same Person variety, 
should make no difference to the way in which we evaluate it from the ethical point of 
view; in such cases the same regrettable outcome is brought about, namely, the 
existence of a single human being who will suffer unnecessarily. 
One ethical principle which appears to undermine the existence of such a 
requirement, however, is the following, which has been called the Person-Affecting 
Restriction. This states that 
An act is wrong only if it makes someone worse off than they would 
have been if this act had not been performed. 8 
The Person-Affecting Restriction captures what, for many, appears to be an 
intuitively plausible view of ethics according to which wrong-doing must always 
involve doing wrong to someone - to a particular human being. If we endorse this 
restriction, and the identity-dependent view of ethics it presupposes, it appears that we 
7 See Brock, `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', p. 270. 8 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 370; Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, pp. 285-6; 
Thomas Schwartz, 'Obligations to Posterity', in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., 
Obligations to Future Generations, Totowa, New Jersey, Temple University Press, 1978, 
pp. I 1-12; James Fishkin, The Dialogue of Justice, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992, 
p. 9; Jonathan Glover, What Sort Of People Should There Be, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, 1984, p. 146; and Temkin, `Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads', p. 290. 
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cannot also retain - if consistency of belief is anything to go by - the conviction that 
Anna's and Bella's adoption of the `no treatment strategy' is equally and seriously 
wrong. This is because Anna's choice, but not Bella's, does not result in any 
particular person being harmed or disadvantaged. 
Let me explain. Suppose that, irrespective of the choices made, the children which 
Anna and Bella give birth to will lead lives which are at least worth living. Each, we 
assume, will at no point in their lives regret that they had ever been born, and will not 
suffer from a handicap which calls into question their ability to maintain access to a 
minimal degree of personal mobility, or exercise a certain degree of autonomy, or 
experience some degree of self-respect. While Bella's actions are objectionable on the 
grounds that they cause a preventable harm to befall her child (who could either have 
existed in the harmed state of being handicapped or the non-harmed state of being 
non-handicapped), in the case of Anna the employment of the `treatment strategy' 
would have prevented the retardation of one child at the opportunity cost of bringing 
into existence a completely different, and non-handicapped, alternative child. 
Next suppose that, after weighing up her two possible courses of action, Anna adopts 
the `no treatment strategy'. Here the objection to Anna's actions cannot be grounded 
in the harm done to the child she actually conceives, but rather some feature of the 
good done to, or some other feature of the universe which includes, the child which 
she could have later conceived. But this objection to Anna's actions would be 
inconsistent with the Person-Affecting Restriction, and this could not be framed in 
identity-dependent terms. 
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2.2 Non-Identity, Reciprocity, and the Issue of Wrongful Handicap 
Recall the distinction between reciprocity and non reciprocity-based theories of 
distributive ethics. It was argued in the last chapter that one way of avoiding the 
problems associated with the lack of reciprocal dealings between generations and the 
persons belonging to them was to adopt an ethical theory which denied that there is 
any close connection between the notions of reciprocity and the scope of ethics. 
However, it appears that many non reciprocity-based theories, even if they avoid 
problems of Non-Reciprocity, are nonetheless prone to considerations of Non- 
Identity. Such theories seem ill placed to explain what the objection is to Anna's 
choice of the `no treatment strategy', for many (if not all) of these theories appear to 
adopt a person-affecting, or identity-dependent, structure. 
This should be disconcerting for the proponents of these theories, firstly, because the 
circumstances of the Anna case are not at all far fetched and, secondly, because cases 
like this raise important distributive questions. Thus, one of the by-products of the 
enormous efforts currently being made under the auspices of the Human Genome 
Project, for example, is that many more women in the future will be given the 
opportunity of pre-conception screening for genetic illnesses; and the results of these 
tests will influence the decisions of many women concerning whether or not to 
continue with their planned pregnancy without treatment, to delay pregnancy and seek 
treatment, or to delay pregnancy indefinitely. Moreover, these procreative actions will 
clearly have an impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens across generations; 
in this case, benefits and burdens which relate to the overwhelming costs of disability 
in young children which arise out of the negligence of their parents. 
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Reciprocity-based theories, of course, also appeal to the idea of the vulnerabilities of 
persons to harm at the hands of others, so one would expect that proponents of such 
theories would also be disconcerted by the issues raised by the Anna case. However, 
the interaction between the considerations of Non-Identity and reciprocity renders the 
implications of Anna-type cases for such theories quite complex to say the least, as 
the following line of thought demonstrates. 
Reciprocity based theories assume that a formal requirement of a person, X, being 
owed duties of distributive ethics by another person, Y, is that there be some, or some 
possibility of, dealings of mutual benefit between X and Y. In the intergenerational 
context, this implies that an existing person, EP, has no duties of distributive ethics to 
a future person, FP, so long as we assume that EP and FP will never engage in any 
kind of mutually beneficial interaction. As we have seen, this assumption can been 
challenged quite directly by invoking the idea of posthumous harms, and more 
indirectly by invoking the Trusteeship and Chain of Concern models. 
Suppose, next, that we find the idea of posthumous harms plausible. The implication 
of the Anna case is that it is, when certain conditions prevail, more difficult than we 
previously thought for existing persons to harm their successors. By contrast, the 
implication of the existence of posthumous harms is that it is, when certain conditions 
prevail, less difficult than we commonly think for an existing (future) person to harm 
a past (existing) person. 
When we bring these two implications together an interesting insight emerges. This is 
that it appears that it is existing persons, rather than their distant successors, who 
seem to be vulnerable to disenfranchisement from reciprocity-based ethics, for the 
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members of present generations seem to be highly limited in their ability to harm their 
successors, whereas our successors may one day be in a position to harm us 
posthumously with impunity. We might call this the Reverse Asymmetry view. 
2.3 The Appeal to Side-Effects 
One person-affecting, or identity-dependent, response to the idea that subscribing to 
the Person-Affecting Restriction rules out an account of the wrongness of the `no- 
treatment strategy' in the Anna case is captured by the idea of side-effects. Here the 
objection to Anna's actions are based on the indirect effects they have on the lives of 
other, already existing, people - for example, Anna herself, her partner, her relatives, 
or her contemporaries. Bringing handicapped persons into existence, it is claimed, 
will result in harms to already existing persons other than the handicapped persons 
themselves. It is these harms which provide an explanation of why Anna acts 
wrongly, and this wrong-doing would be explainable in person-affecting terms .9 
One problem with the side-effects response has been raised by Glover. He observes 
that the effects of raising a disabled child, particularly within the child's extended 
family, will vary enormously from case to case. 10 For some families, the effects of 
caring for a disabled family member might be disastrous, while for others it might 
prove to enrich, rather than restrict, the lives of other family members. Moreover, the 
same appears to hold for the effects of handicapped people on society as a whole. 
9 See David Heyd, Genethics: Ethical Issues in the Creation of People, Berkeley, University 
of California, 1992, pp. 197-203; Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, pp. 259-60. 
10 Jonathan Glover `Future People, Disability and Screening', in Peter Laslett and James S. 
Fishkin, eds., Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, New Haven, Yale University 
Press, 1992, p. 139-40. 
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Another problem is that the appeal to side-effects alone (granted certain assumptions 
about the nature of ethical requirements) cannot explain the conviction that, if Anna 
and Bella decide not to seek treatment, the actions of both would be `equally and 
seriously wrong. ' The assumptions concern the way in which acts which violate a 
single requirement are less regrettable than those which violate a set of requirements 
which also includes this single requirement within its number. Anna's adoption of the 
`no treatment strategy', for example, would be objectionable only because of bad 
side-effects on already existing people, whereas Bella's similar decision would be 
objectionable because it (1) involved the creation of the same adverse side-effects and 
(2) because it harmed the interests of her child who was thereby rendered predictably 
and avoidably handicapped. 
The assumption that an act which violates multiple ethical requirements must always 
be more wrong to perform than an act which violates only a single ethical requirement 
is, of course, controversial. Such controversies aside, I do think that many people's 
intuitions about the wrongness of Anna's actions here concern their effects on either 
of the children which she might have, rather than society in general, and as such it 
seems prudent to bracket the issue of side-effects in order to concentrate on the matter 
of these latter effects. 
2.4 Wrongful Handicap and Alternatives to the Person-Affecting Restriction 
According to the Person-Affecting Restriction, Anna's decision to have the 
handicapped child can only be wrong in virtue of its detrimental impact on the 
interests of the handicapped child. But as there is no such impact in contexts where 
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the Non-Identity Problem obtains, are there perhaps other ethical principles might 
explain our convictions here? One possibility would take the form of a principle 
which required the minimisation of the amount of suffering, or loss of opportunity, in 
the world. " Such a principle might require that Anna, and others in a similar 
situation, should wait in order to have a healthy child for the sake of benefits this will 
confer on that alternative (and healthier) child, rather than for the way in which this 
prevents a harm to befall her handicapped child. 
The idea is that we should resist the view that the handicap suffered by Anna's child 
constitutes a harmed state or that the child is in some way victimised by Anna's 
actions. Here, our convictions about the wrongness of the negligent strategy in Anna- 
type cases in general can only be accounted for at the theoretical level by the thought 
that it amounts to a wrong which fails to create a victim, or as Joel Feinberg puts it, 
an example of `harmless wrongdoing. ' 12 
At least two principles are at hand which seek to explain how Anna's adoption of the 
`no treatment strategy' might constitute an act of harmless wrong-doing. One is 
proposed by Brock. 13 Brock's principle, which he calls N, states that 
individuals are ethically required not to let any possible child or 
other dependent person for whose welfare they are responsible 
experience serious suffering or limited opportunity if they can act so 
that, without imposing substantial burdens or costs on themselves or 
11 See Brock, `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', pp. 273-4. 12 See Joel Feinberg, Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. xxvii-xxix; pp. 27-33; and pp. 325-28. 13 See Brock, `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', p. 275; and Parfit, Reasons 
and Persons, p. 360. 
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others, any alternative possible child or other dependent person for 
whose welfare they would be responsible will not experience 
serious suffering or limited opportunity. 14 
On the most natural reading of N, the decision to adopt the `treatment strategy' in the 
Anna and Bella cases is required in virtue of the fact that this will result in either the 
conception, or continued existence, of a child who will experience less suffering and 
limited opportunity than the child who would have been born had the 'no-treatment 
strategy' been adopted. N is not informed by the view that an act can be wrong only if 
it harms a particular person, and in this sense N is not consistent with the Person- 
Affecting Restriction. 
On the other hand, N does not assume that suffering or limited opportunity can exist 
except and in so far as it is experienced by some person or other, and in this sense it is 
a person-affecting ethical principle. It thus occupies a middle ground between 
identity-dependent principles, such as the Person-Affecting Restriction, on the one 
side, and identity-independent principles, such as impersonal utilitarian ethical 
principles, on the other. However, because N does not appeal to the notions of harm 
or disadvantage in the account it offers of why certain acts are impermissible, and 
others permissible, I will say that it is a special sort of identity-independent principle 
which we might call a Number-Sensitive Comparative Principle. 
According to Number-Sensitive Comparative Principles, an act, X, is worse than 
another act, Y, only if X is worse for people in the sense that X would not be as good 
14 Brock also accepts the following principle, N', as a sort of shorthand for N. N' states that, 
`it is ethically good to act in a way that results in less suffering and less limited opportunity 
in the world' (Brock, `The Non-Identity Problem and Genetic Harms', p. 275). 
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for the people who later live if X is performed as Y would be for the people who 
would later live if Y is performed, on the assumption that the same numbers of people 
will live in the future no matter which act (or social policy) is chosen. As such, these 
principles can be contrasted with other identity-independent principles which are 
applicable to acts or social policies even when these acts will lead to different 
numbers of people existing in the future (we might call these Number-Insensitive 
Comparative Principles). 
A different suggestion for a Number-Sensitive Comparative Principle which might 
provide an objection to Anna's choice of the `no treatment strategy' is proposed by 
Parfit. According to the principle which he calls Q: 
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people 
would ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, 
or have a lower quality of life, than those who would have lived. ' 5 
In the case of Anna, Q implies that it would have been ethically better if Anna had 
taken the `treatment strategy' because of what this would have done for the child she 
would have conceived if she had sought to have her condition cured before she 
conceived. In this sense, Parfit's Q and Brock's N appear to be quite similar attempts 
to reconcile Number-Sensitive Comparative Principles - which, recall, take up a sort 
of intermediary position between fully identity-independent (or impersonal) and fully 
identity-dependent (or person-affecting) ethics - with the view that Anna's decision to 
have the handicapped child is wrong. 
15 parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 360 
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Such a reconciliation seems plausible so long as the same numbers of persons will 
exist whatever we do. It remains to be seen, however, if similar principles can 
generate ethical requirements in analogous Parfitian cases where our actions do 
impact upon how many people will ever live. 
3. The Social-Choice Non-identity Problem 
Present decisions concerning the adoption of climate change policies will influence 
not just the quality of life of future generations (and the persons which belong to 
them) but also the size and composition of these generations. Take the choices which 
all industrialised societies faced in the run up to the Kyoto climate change summit 
concerning policy measures which might be adopted in order to stabilise, and 
eventually reduce, GHG emissions. There appear to be a variety of different measures 
which could be used to bring about decreases in such emissions (such as the 
introduction of carbon taxes and policies to increase energy efficiency to name but 
two) as well as a whole host of objectives for such measures to achieve (a maximum 
of a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere or a stabilisation 
of year on year carbon emissions being two examples). The adoption of any particular 
policy measure, because of its widespread effects on consumption, transport provision 
and on the conditions of human interaction, will influence the identities and numbers 
of future persons. In fact, it seems safe to say that any particular choice of climate 
policy which has macroeconomic significance will entirely repopulate the future with 
different persons than would exist if an alternative policy had been adopted. With 
these preliminary remarks in mind, consider: 
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The Conservation-Depletion Case. 
A choice must be made between two mutually exclusive, and 
exhaustive, climate change policies. The first, the Depletion Policy, 
involves a continuing commitment to non-renewable energy sources 
and associated high levels of GHG emissions with no commitment 
to any offsetting compensation measures for the sake of future 
generations. The second, the Conservation Policy, involves a move 
towards heavier reliance on renewable energy sources, tight 
restrictions on GHG emissions, as well as certain compensatory 
measures for the sake of future generations (e. g., increased 
investment in schemes to protect coastal areas which are vulnerable 
to climate change induced sea-level rises). 
Adopting the Conservation policy, it is known, will limit the 
damage caused by climate change. The Depletion Policy, though, 
would demand little or no sacrifice of present persons, and, because 
it would not check the increase of human originating GHG 
emissions, would have, relative to the Conservation Policy, more 
serious repercussions on future human well-being (e. g., higher 
social costs of adapting to higher temperatures and sea-levels). 
In fact, it is known with some confidence that, after one or two 
centuries after the choice has been made, many of the people who 
would later live if the Depletion Policy is chosen will enjoy a 
significantly lower quality of life than those who would live if the 
Conservation Policy is adopted. However, the long-term 
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disadvantages associated with choosing Depletion are not so severe 
that the persons who will come into existence if this option is 
chosen will lead lives which are not worth living 
Next, consider the following line of argument which seems to undermine the 
reasoning behind many people's intuitive objections to the Depletion Policy. 
16 
As a consequence of the profound impact it will have on even the smallest details of 
all people's lives, whatever decision is made in regard to the Conservation and 
Depletion policies will predictably, if indirectly, affect who mates with whom and 
when, and thus which individuals will be born in the future. This is because all 
persons owe their existence to the coming together of a singular egg and a singular 
sperm - and this `coming together' is highly sensitive to antecedent events. 
In fact, 
after a few generations, and depending on which policy we choose, completely 
different sets of people will come into existence and these sets of people will owe 
their existence to this prior choice (they would not have been born if this choice had 
not been made). 
Moreover, as we can predict with some accuracy that the adoption of neither policy 
will result in any of our distant successors leading lives which are not worth living, it 
appears that choosing Depletion over Conservation will not result in any particular 
future person being harmed. On the other hand, such a choice would benefit many in 
the present generation by doing so, as even the limited sacrifices which Conservation 
will demand of existing persons will be on balance harmful. It seems then that the 
policy that ought to be adopted is, perhaps counter-intuitively, the Depletion Policy. 
16 Various versions of this argument have been put forward, but by far the most influential 
is Parfit's. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 351 ff. 
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Is there an objection to this line of argument and, if so, what is it? The need to answer 
these questions gives rise to what has become known as the Non-Identity Problem, " 
and the way in which we approach this problem will have great significance for the 
way in which we approach issues of intergenerational distribution. 
3.1. Resourcism, Contractualism, and the Non-Identity Problem 
As a starting point for our enquiry into the ethical relevance of the Non-Identity 
Problem, consider its implication for Barry's theory of intergenerational resourcism - 
which was outlined earlier in Chapter 2. The Non-Identity Problem appears to pose a 
severe challenge for this view because Barry's view posits a strong connection 
between the requirements of distributive ethics on the one side, and the notions of 
harm and disadvantage on the other. Barry holds that failures to compensate future 
generations for deficits in the resource base they enjoy which are brought about by the 
actions of previous generations are unjust, and that they are unjust because such 
actions render future people, or the generations they belong to, worse off than they 
otherwise would have been. But the Non-Identity Problem demonstrates that there 
will be few, if any, cases where a future person will be rendered worse off by their 
ancestors' profligate emissions of GHGs, because these people would never have 
existed had policies been adopted by previous generations to restrict these emissions. 
This is not a problem which Barry's view faces alone. All views of intergenerational 
distribution which endorse what has become known as the 'contractualist' view will 
be prone to the Non-Identity Problem. According to contractualism, the source of 
17 Parf it, Reasons and Persons, p. 359. 
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moral motivation is `the desire to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds 
they could not reasonably reject' 
18 and an act is wrong only if its performance `would 
be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no 
one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement. ' 
19 
For a person to reasonably reject (or raise a decisive objection to) an act or social 
policy on the contractualist view, this person must (1) be disadvantaged or harmed by 
it in some way and (2) they must have a complaint grounded in this disadvantage 
which is unanswerable (we might call this the Unanswerable Complaints 
Requirement). 20 
Contractualism is quite clearly a Non-Reciprocity based ethical theory, so it is not 
prone to the Non-Reciprocity Problem. 
21 In fact, the whole ethos of this view is that 
room can be made for the interests of all relevant moral agents (whether human or 
non-human, present or future) to be considered in judgements about the wrongness of 
I8 T. M. Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 116. 
19 T. M. Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. Barry endorses the 
contractualist view in both Theories of Justice (pp. 284ff) and Justice as Impartiality (pp. 67- 
72). It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which the Non-Identity 
Problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and 
environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking 
cannot readily explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks 
that although `the interests of people in the future should have no less weight than those of 
people in the present', it does not appear that `the contractual apparatus is useful in this 
context; it throws up more problems than it solves. ' See `Contractual Justice: a Modest 
Defence', Utilitas, 8,1996, p. 365. Barry does not go on to state how he thinks we might 
reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears 
to be his desire to do so in future volumes of his Treatise on Social Justice. 
20 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, who observes that on the Scanlonian view `an act 
cannot be wrong unless it will affect someone in a way that cannot be justified - unless there 
will be some complainant whose complaint cannot be answered' (p. 523). 
21 Scanlon claims that, on the contractualist view, `what is fundamental to morality is the 
desire for reasonable agreement not the pursuit of mutual advantage... the desire for [self] 
protection is an important factor determining the content of morality because it determines 
what can reasonably be agreed to. But the idea of a general agreement does not arise as a 
means of securing protection. ' See Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', pp. 115, 
128. 
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actions or social policies. This is demonstrated by Scanlon's claim that `it should be 
clear that this version of contractualism can account for the moral standing of future 
persons who will be better or worse off as a result of what we do now. '22 
However, it is difficult to sustain the view that contractualism can be applied to policy 
choices which have intergenerational distributive significance. This is because in 
cases such as Depletion-Conservation there appear to be no particular people (either 
existing or future) whom our acts will affect for the worse, and will thus have a 
complaint against us, if we choose Depletion. Moreover, as even mildly 
conservationist policies will require some sacrifices of existing persons, it seems that 
if any people have unanswerable complaints, here, it will be existing people (for 
example, those living in the developing world who will suffer if their economies fail 
to keep growing), and these complaints will be raised against the adoption of the 
Conservation Policy, not the Depletion Policy. 
This is a tremendous problem for both Scanlon and Barry. For if we entertain the 
strong conviction that the choice of Depletion would be wrong regardless of the 
inapplicability of the Unanswerable Complaints Requirement, this would seem to 
undermine Scanlon's (and by extension, Barry's) whole construction. This would be 
because, as Parfit observes, it is a major failing that the `fundamental principle of 
Scanlon's theory draws a distinction where, on our view, no distinction should be 
drawn. '23 That is, while we think it ethically irrelevant that the test of reasonable 
rejection is not applicable in such cases, Scanlon's view suggests that it is ethically 
22 Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 115n. 23 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 523n. 
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relevant, and in fact it shows that we would be doing no wrong by choosing Depletion 
and thereby damaging the environment which our successors will inherit from us. 
For further clarification, let us call all those future persons who will only come into 
existence if the Depletion Policy is adopted, the Depletion People, and all those who 
will only come into existence if the Conservation Policy is chosen, the Conservation 
People. Can sense be made of the idea that the Depletion People have reason to reject 
the line of reasoning of those who decided to adopt this policy, even on Scanlon's 
generous view of the scope of ethics in general terms? The Conservation and 
Depletion People, though contingent on our choice of climate policy, will possess 
interests which can be harmed once they have been brought into existence. No one 
seriously doubts, I suspect, that people in the future will have the capacity to 
experience pain or distress, or for that matter joy or happiness, or that these capacities 
will be influenced by the state of the natural, cultural and socio-economic 
environments which these people inherit from their predecessors. 
The problem lies rather in the idea that the ethical basis of certain acts or social 
policies could be reasonably rejected on the grounds of the interests of persons which 
would not have been served better as a whole, or all things considered, had the policy 
in question (e. g. Depletion) not been adopted. The only alternative for the Depletion 
People to being born into the polluted future world, however, would have been non- 
existence; and the claim that a person's not being brought into existence might be in 
some respect better for that person than leading a life which is worth living (if limited 
in certain ways) does not seem plausible. As a result, it appears that just as Anna does 
not appear to be harming or wronging her child if she declines pre-conception 
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treatment, those who are responsible for choosing between the Depletion and 
Conservation policies appear neither to be harming nor wronging any members of 
future generations if they decline to adopt the Conservation Policy. 
Next suppose that the same people will exist whatever policy was adopted; that is we 
simply ignore for a moment the implications of the time-dependence claim for this 
case. This is not strictly speaking a plausible proposition, however it does enable us to 
clarify what ethical line of thought is ruled out by considerations of Non-Identity. 24 
On the assumption the same people would exist in the future whatever policy is 
adopted, a contractualist explanation could be provided for the wrongness of the 
Depletion Policy's adoption. This would be that many future persons will be worse 
off when they come into existence than they might otherwise have been - for in this 
case the Depletion and Conservation People will be one and the same. That is, in the 
one possible future (of Depletion) future people will inherit a world in which vector- 
borne diseases, rising sea-levels, and extreme weather events customarily injure and 
kill many more of them than in the alternative possible future (of Conservation). 
When we re-introduce ourselves to the reality of the precariousness of human origins, 
however, this objection - and the complaints which sustain it - seems to disappear. So 
the problem is that it is unclear how contractualism can cope with the problem raised 
by future people who owe their existence to actions which worsen the conditions in 
which they live. 
24 Parfit appeals to this supposition in his discussion of the implications of the Non-Identity 
Problem for right-based explanations of the wrongness of depletion in Reasons and Persons, 
pp. 365-6. 
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I have focused on the questions raised by the Non-Identity Problem for theories of 
intergenerational ethics, such as Barry's, which explicitly endorse the contractualist 
view. However, similar questions will be raised for numerous other theories which 
appeal, at least in part, to the way in which acts or social policies harm or 
disadvantage particular persons when they are extended to deal with questions of 
intergenerational justice. It would appear to call into doubt, for example, certain 
recent attempts to use Locke's well-known second proviso - according to which 
acquisitions of natural resources must leave `enough, and as good left in common for 
others' - to ground stringent requirements of environmental conservation, where this 
proviso is interpreted in an identity-dependent manner (i. e. when it is interpreted to 
require that appropriations of natural resources by existing persons ought to make 
future persons no worse off). 25 
3.2 Four Inconsistent Beliefs 
Recall that identity-dependent theories direct us to make particular human beings, or 
animals, healthier or happier or rescue people from harm or disadvantage - 
particularly if these disadvantages arise through no fault of their own. As such, 
identity-dependent theories can be contrasted with identity-independent theories, 
according to which it can be wrong to perform acts or adopt social policies, even if 
they do not harm any particular persons. Such theories direct us to promote health or 
happiness, and to eliminate poverty or disease from an impersonal point of view (that 
25 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, London, Everyman, 1924, Book II, Chapter V, 
Section 27, p. 130. See also R. Elliot, `Future Generations, Locke's Proviso and Libertarian 
Justice', pp. 217ff. 
Chapter 5: The Non-Identity Problem 197 
is for reasons quite apart from the way in which particular individuals are affected by 
these phenomena). 
One way of illustrating the problem that considerations of Non-Identity pose for 
identity-dependent theories of environmental and intergenerational ethics is to note 
that it tempts the proponents of these theories into holding four, mutually 
inconsistent, beliefs. According to these beliefs: 
(A) adopting the Depletion Policy is wrong. 
(B) an act or social policy can be wrong only if it harms or 
disadvantages a particular person 
(C) an act or social policy harms or disadvantages a particular 
person only if it makes them worse off than they would have been 
had the act not been performed all things considered 
(D) the adoption of the Depletion Policy is a remote, but necessary, 
condition of the Depletion People coming into existence and leading 
lives which are worth living. 
If we are inclined towards an identity-dependent view, it seems that we are faced with 
serious difficulties when we attempt to construct a consistent approach to questions of 
intergenerational distribution. For example, if we are to construct an account which 
explains why choosing the Depletion Policy in the above case would violate some 
requirement of distributive ethics, it would seem that one or a combination of beliefs 
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B and C must be revised26 However, both of these beliefs appear to command a 
measure of intuitive support in the literature. 
David Heyd, for example, has argued recently for the view that the price of 
abandoning either of these beliefs, and with them the identity-dependent view, is 
simply too high. 27 Endorsing a view which he calls generocentrism, Heyd claims that 
ethical obligations can be owed only to persons whose identities lie beyond the reach 
of the Non-Identity Problem. But because persons whose identities do not depend on 
present decisions will almost invariably belong to the present generation, Heyd claims 
that we have no ethical obligations to the vast majority of future individuals. 
8 If this 
rigidly identity-dependent view could be defended, it would appear that the Non- 
Identity Problem has massive implications for the nature and scope of 
intergenerational and environmental ethics. It would imply, for example, that acts or 
social policies which result in the emission of huge amounts of GHGs into the 
atmosphere, and a lowering of the quality of life of future generations, do not violate 
any requirements of distributive ethics. 
9 
Putting Heyd's approach to one side, there appear to be at least two main ways in 
which we might retain belief A in the context of social policy Non-Identity cases such 
26 I put aside the possibility of revising belief D in order to retain beliefs A, B and C-a 
move which seems at the very least inconsistent with the pre-eminent theories of personal 
identity. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-55. 27 Heyd, Genethics, pp. 80ff. 
28 This view is also defended by Thomas Schwartz. Schwartz argues that, `whatever we may 
owe ourselves or our near posterity, we've no obligation extending indefinitely or even 
terribly far into the future to provide any widespread, continuing benefit to our descendants. ' 
See Schwartz, `Obligations to Posterity', in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., Obligations to 
Future Generations, p. 3. 
29 It is worth noting that the Non-Identity Problem appears to call into question the idea of 
obligations to both future humans and non-humans. This is because the identity of particular 
non-human animals will be as contingent on events which pre-date their existence as their 
future human counterparts. 
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as Conservation-Depletion, while also retaining an identity-dependent view of ethics. 
First, we might revise belief B in order to retain beliefs A, C and D. This suggestion 
has been developed in quite different ways, although the most important of these 
proposes that, although no particular future members of the Depletion People 
population are harmed by the Depletion Policy's adoption, certain collectivities which 
make up the Depletion People population can be harmed by it. Second, we might 
revise belief C. The idea here is that the concept of harm should be broadened such 
that an act or social policy harms a person (or collectivity) so long as it renders them, 
or their interests, worse off in at least one respect. 
I return to these proposed revisions after some remarks about the limited scope of the 
problems which considerations of Non-Identity pose for environmental and 
intergenerational ethics. 
3.3 The Limits of the Non-Identity Problem 
Even if we suppose that the Non-Identity Problem is of relevance for debates about 
our obligations to future generations, and the issue of environmental ethics in more 
general terms, it does appear that considerations of Non-Identity do not pose a 
problem for all theories of environmental concern. One way of explaining why this is 
the case is to see how the problem relates to such theories. 
In what has become a standard taxonomy of this field of inquiry, we might 
distinguish between anthropocentric, zoocentric, and ecocentric modes of 
environmental thought. 0 Anthropocentric theories are those which attribute value 
30 See, for example, Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 20ff. 
Chapter 5: The Non-Identity Problem 200 
only to states of human beings. One prominent example is the `green theory of value' 
proposed by Robert Goodin. According to this view, the value of the natural world 
can be traced only `to its value to human beings and the place it occupies in their 
lives. 31 
Zoocentric theories, by contrast, attribute value only to states of sentient creatures, 
including human beings. The idea here is that the desire to restrict the concerns of 
environmental ethics to the well-being of human beings represents a sort of `human 
chauvinism'32 which ignores the fact that species membership is essentially `a 
morally irrelevant difference between individuals. ' 33 According to Singer, for 
example, if we are committed to the fundamental principle that each human being's 
interests must be treated with equal concern and respect, we are also committed to 
accepting this principle of equality `as a sound moral basis for relations with those 
outside our own species [such as] non-human animals. '34 
Finally, ecocentric theories reject the idea that the natural environment is only 
valuable to the extent that it provides a context for the flourishing of humans or other 
sentient creatures. In contrast, this mode of thought presupposes that components of 
31 Robert Goodin Green Political Theory, Cambridge, Polity, 1992, pp. 42-3. A similarly 
anthropocentric stance on the value of the natural environment is endorsed by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development's influential report Our Common Future. In 
the foreword to this report, Gro Harlem Brundlandt argues that human well-being `is the 
ultimate goal of all environment and development policies' (p. xiv). 
32 See Richard and Val Routley, `Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism', in 
Robert Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 104M 
33 Elliot, Environmental Ethics, p. 9. 
34 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 55. 
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the natural world such as plant life, and possibly the biotic community as a whole, 
possess value independently of humans or animals 35 
I do not think it is necessary to take a stand on which of these modes of theorising 
best captures our concerns about the environment, or indeed intergenerational ethics, 
in order to recognise that the Non-Identity Problem only calls into question the scope 
of certain varieties of anthropocentric and zoocentric (and possibly ecocentric) 
theorising, namely, those which appeal to ethical categories that make essential 
reference to how things are for particular individual humans, other sentient creatures, 
or particular natural objects. 
The Non-Identity Problem, for example, does not seem to undermine the 
intergenerational extension of identity-independent ethical theories such as 
impersonal utilitarianism or perfectionism, and this would appear to be true of certain 
variants of anthropocentric, zoocentric and ecocentric theorising as well. Here our 
convictions about the wrongness of choosing the Depletion over the Conservation 
Policy, and of Anna's decision to conceive the miserable child, remain intact because 
our view is essentially that ethics is at a fundamental level not grounded in concerns 
about the way things are for particular humans or groups of humans. 
Identity-independent ethical theories hold that damaging the environment, or bringing 
a miserable person into the world, here, is wrong solely because of the way that it 
violates certain impersonal ethical principles, such as the requirement to maximise 
the total utility of a population or promote the flourishing and perfection of mankind 
35 See Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986; 
Kenneth Goodpaster, `On Being Morally Considerable', Journal of Philosophy, 78,1978, 
pp. 308ff. 
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or promote the flourishing of the natural world and so forth - values which are only 
indirectly connected to the well-being of particular members of existing and future 
populations of human beings. The Non-Identity Problem is not really a problem at all 
for proponents of these norms, or for others who do not appeal even in part to 
identity-dependent principles such as the Person Affecting Restriction, for it is only 
these sorts of principles which explain the wrongness of actions, or policies, in terms 
of notions such as rights, interests, harms or volitions, which can themselves only be 
explained in the way they are attached to particular, usually human, bearers. 
Nevertheless, there are at least three considerations which support the view that an 
investigation of identity-dependent approaches to the Non-Identity Problem is worthy 
of closer inspection. First, even if we reject the view that identity-dependent 
theorising captures the whole of the story of intergenerational or environmental 
ethics, it seems likely that it at least plays some part in this story. Harm-based and 
victim-based theorising is extremely well rooted in discussion of intragenerational 
ethical issues, such as abortion, euthanasia, careless driving, freedom of speech and so 
forth. Such theorising is also to be found at the very heart of the legal system of most 
countries. As a result, it seems worth exploring the limits of such theorising in the 
novel context of intergenerational ethics if only for the possible insights this might 
bring us in our quest for further insights regarding issues of intragenerational, or 
same person, ethics. 
Second, environmental theories which makes no reference to how things are for 
particular individual entities, such as impersonal utilitarianism or biotic holism, are 
contentious to say the least. Parfit, for example, has done much to demonstrate that 
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applying identity-independent utilitarian principles to questions of intergenerational 
distribution leads to paradoxical results. 36 Moreover, the idea behind biotic holism, 
that ethical standing be extended to components of the biosphere (such as rocks, trees, 
species of plant or animal life) - or even the biosphere as a whole - seems wildly 
counter-intuitive to many. 37 
Third, as noted earlier, much theorising about the environment and intergenerational 
ethics remains stubbornly tied both to considerations of harm and victimhood on the 
one side, and the interests, needs, rights, and desires of particular sentient creatures on 
the other. This is revealed in the brief discussion of Barry's and Scanlon's views 
above, but an additional example of note arises from the work of Shue which 
specifically addresses the issue of climate change. 
Shue has claimed recently, for example, that we should conceive of the harmful 
effects of climate change as analogous to those of passive smoking, the idea being 
that both the activity of smokers, and of profligate emitters of GHGs, render other 
non-smokers and non-emitters worse off through no fault of their own. 
39 Shue, 
however, fails to acknowledge that the fact that future persons owe their very 
existence to the profligate actions of previous generations in these cases means that 
they cannot apparently complain that they have been harmed, or rendered worse off, 
36 One problem which Parfit raises is that, in line with the duty to maximise social utility 
across generations, utilitarianism could require us to adopt environmental policies which 
lead to a huge number of people existing in the future who lead lives of poor overall quality 
instead of policies which lead to a much smaller number of people existing in the future who 
lead lives of a much higher quality. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 381ff. 
37 For criticism of the ecocentric view, see Andrew Brennan, `Ecological Theory and Value 
in Nature', in Elliot, ed., Environmental Ethics, pp. 195ff. 38 See Henry Shue, 'Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and 
Alternative Energy', in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury, eds., The International Politics of the 
Environment, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 245-6. 
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by them. In this respect, the analogy between the effects of passive smoking on the 
one side, and the effects of depletionist policies on future generations on the other, 
seems unsound. 
4. Rights and the Non-Identity Problem 
Recall that the problem with applying identity-dependent theories, such as 
contractualism, to the Conservation-Depletion case is that no person who owes their 
existence in part to the adoption of the Depletion Policy appears to have a complaint 
against their predecessors adopting these policies, even if this policy would lead to a 
lower quality of life in the future. This is because this policy, although it appears 
objectionable, does not render any particular future people worse off than they 
otherwise would have been. It appears, then, that what proponents of identity- 
dependent principles need to do if they are to explain the objection to the adoption of 
the Depletion Policy is to show how actions can be harmful, and therefore 
impermissible, even if they render individuals no worse off than they otherwise would 
have been. This is the challenge which I take up in the remainder of this chapter, and 
in the whole of the next: a challenge which, I will argue, rests on the ethical 
convictions which I labelled B and C above being revised. 
The approach to the Non-Identity Problem that I will be investigating in the next 
chapter, which I will call the group-centred view, is based on the idea that belief B 
can be revised from stating that `an act is wrong only if it makes a person worse off 
than they would have been if this act had not been performed', to the view that 
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(B') an act is wrong only if it makes a person or collectivity worse 
off than they would have been if this act had not been performed. 
By contrast, the approach to the Non-Identity Problem that I will be dealing with in 
the remainder of this chapter, which I will call the appeal to specific-rights, is based 
on the idea that belief C can be revised from reading that `an act or social policy 
harms or disadvantages a particular person only if it makes them worse off than they 
would have been had the act not been performed all things considered' to the view 
that 
(C') an act or social policy harms or disadvantages a particular 
person only if it makes them worse off than they would have been 
had the act not been performed in at least one respect. 
Capturing the subtlety of these revisions, and their application to the issue of Non- 
Identity, requires some preliminary discussion both of the way in which the Non- 
Identity Problem undermines right-based theories of intergenerational ethics in the 
circumstances where it arises, and of the difficulties in extending rights discourse to 
questions of distribution between non-contemporaries in general terms. In the 
following, I review the contentious issue of the rights of future persons (section 4.1 
and 4.2) before going onto discuss the idea of revising belief C in line with an appeal 
to the notion of specific interests and rights (section 4.3 and 4.4). 
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4.1 Interests, Choices, and the Rights of Future Persons 
There are several objections to the claim that future persons, such as Anna's child or 
the Depletion or Conservation People, possess rights against their predecessors. 
According to the first, and perhaps the most sweeping of these objections, it is 
claimed that considerations connected with the formal, or analytical, nature of rights 
discourse rules out non-existing entities from being the bearers of rights claims of any 
sort. The objection is raised quite explicitly in the work of Hillel Steiner, 
39 but will be 
endorsed by all proponents of what has become known as the choice-theory of rights. 
According to this theory, rights are associated analytically with their bearers in a 
particular sort of way. In short, the right bearer possesses a right, not in virtue of any 
benefit he will derive from another being constrained so as not to violate it, but rather 
because `he is ethically in a position to claim the performance of a duty from another, 
or to waive it, and therefore to determine by his choice how the other ought to act. '40 
This aspect of the choice-theory (that right-bearers are viewed as active, choosing 
agents - that rights are `domains of choice'), entails that ascribing rights to entities 
which are incapable of making the sorts of choices which rights-possession requires is 
to make a formal mistake. But future people are precisely unable to make such 
choices in the present, so ascribing future persons rights in the present is to make just 
such a formal mistake. As Steiner puts it, `it is precisely because future persons are 
necessarily incapable of choice, that they cannot [according to the choice-theory] be 
39 See Hillel Steiner, 'The Rights of Future Generations', in D. Maclean and P. G. Brown, 
eds., Energy and the Future, pp. 154-5; An Essay on Rights, London, Blackwell, 1994, 
pp. 259-61; and `Markets and Law: The Case of Environmental Conservation', in M. Moran 
and M. Wright, eds., The Market and the State: Studies in Interdependence, London, 
Macmillan, 1991, pp. 49-52. 
40 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford, Clarendon, 1988, p. 95. 
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said to have rights against present persons. '41 This does not quite follow directly from 
such entities' inability to exercise or press their claims in person, for, as Steiner notes, 
in certain cases a third party can be authorised to do this 42 Rather, it follows from the 
logical incoherence of the claim that non-existent entities - such as members of future 
generations - can either exercise their rights or confer them on some third party to 
exercise on their behalf. 
It is worth pointing out that choice-theorists are not necessarily committed to the view 
that existing persons have no duties to protect the environment which future 
generations will inherit from us. Rather, they may hold that such duties exist but are 
not explicable in terms of an appeal to obligations which are owed to particular future 
individuals as such. Steiner, for example, although he denies that future persons 
possess rights against their ancestors, does concede that `we do have moral duties 
with respect to our own and our contemporaries' remote descendants. '43 Moreover, as 
he concedes that the choice-theory of rights is consistent with the thought that 
`present persons can have rights that other present persons conserve', Steiner's view 
seems reconcilable with the existence of duties which were suggested to arise from 
the Chain of Concern model discussed in Chapter 3. 
I take the liberty, here, of not reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the choice- 
theory of rights. 41 think that Steiner is quite correct that such a theory is not 
consistent with the possibility of a right-based objection to the sorts of actions (and 
41 Steiner, `The Case of Environmental Conservation', p. 52. 42 Steiner, `The Case of Environmental Conservation', p. 50. 43 Steiner, An Essay on Rights, p. 259. 
44 These are reviewed by Jones in Rights, pp. 32-6; and Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories of 
Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 9-12 
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policy decisions) with which we are concerned with. Moreover, this incompatibility 
has nothing essentially to do with the Non-Identity Problem, for Steiner's view also 
rules out future persons whose identities have already been fixed (such as Bella's 
child) from possessing rights. 
I do not think that that those sympathetic to right-based principles in general ought to 
be overly concerned about this, however. This is because there is another theory of 
rights which seems much more in tune with our considered convictions about the 
nature and scope of rights-discourse. As such, I think that we have reason to put the 
choice-theory to one side at this point in order to see the implications of holding the 
alternative interest-theory of rights in contexts where the conditions of the Non- 
Identity Problem obtain. 
According to the interest-theory, to say that an agent, X, has a right implies that `other 
things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty', 
45 and in contrast to the choice- 
theory, there is little in the formal nature of this account which, considerations of 
Non-Identity aside, appears to exclude the not yet born from possessing rights. This is 
because it can be assumed that there will be people who exist in the future, that these 
people will possess interests which will be vulnerable to harm, and that the actions of 
existing persons - particularly those affecting the integrity of the natural environment 
- will have profound effects on these interests (as is suggested in Chapter 1's review 
of the likely long-term impacts of climate change) 46 
45 Joseph Raz, `Right-Based Moralities', in Waldron, ed., Theories of Rights, p. 183; see also 
Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 166ff. 
46 For a defence of the view that future persons have rights according to the interest-theory, 
see Joel Feinberg, `The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations', in his Rights, Justice 
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However, there are some serious substantive objections to the idea that future persons 
may possess rights even on the interest-theory, and the most problematic of these 
flow from considerations of Non-Identity. Consider, for example, the following line 
of argument. 
Persons whose rights are in danger of being violated in cases of Non-Identity, such as 
the child in the Anna case, can exist only in the state in which their rights are violated. 
It follows that the only way in which these persons' rights could have been fulfilled 
would have been for them never to have been born, or, as McMahan argues, for the 
rights to have been `deprived of their bearers. '47 To ascribe rights to such persons, 
then, would be to ascribe rights which could not possibly be enforced to persons who 
owe their existence to these rights being violated. But if one cannot, even in principle, 
honour or respect any of the rights a person allegedly possesses, so the argument 
goes, that person cannot actually possess any such rights. 
One response to this line of thought might be found in the idea that, in certain 
situations, respecting a right might require that we act so as to ensure that no one 
comes to possess that right - whether they be either an existing or future person. Take 
the cases of Non-Identity introduced above. The idea here is that Anna should choose 
the `treatment strategy', and the policy-makers ought to choose the Conservation 
Policy, because not doing so would violate the principle that people should not be 
and The Bounds of Liberty, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 180ff; and Ernest 
Partridge, `On the Rights of Future Generations', in Donald Scherer, ed., 
Upstream/Downstream: Issues in Environmental Ethics, Philadelphia, Temple University 
Press, 1990. 
47See Jefferson McMahan, `Problems with Population Policy', Ethics, 92, October 1981, 
pp. 124ff.; and Doran Smolkin, `The Non-Identity Problem and the Appeal to Future People's 
Rights', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 32,1994, pp. 316ff. 
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brought into existence bearing rights that could not possibly be fulfilled - such as the 
right not to be brought into existence when one will not be able to enjoy access to a 
life-preserving natural resource, such as clean air or water. 
48 Let us call this the 
Inevitable Rights Violations Principle. 
4.2 The Retroactive Right-waiving Objection 
The Inevitable Rights Violations Principle seems at face value to defeat the argument 
against future persons possessing rights mentioned above. It enables us to grant the 
claim that it is a necessary condition of a right being violated that a recipient of that 
right actually exists (obligations cannot be owed to possible people on this view - no 
one has a right to be born, for example). On closer inspection, however, this principle 
is subject to at least one serious objection. Consider the case of Anna. Since we have 
assumed that Anna's child will be born handicapped if Anna chooses not to seek 
treatment, and since we have supposed that any child Anna has will lead a life which 
is at least worth living, we might assume that the child, once it came into existence, 
would wish to waive its right not to be brought into existence in a state where its 
49 
rights would necessarily be violated. 
48 This principle is endorsed by both Parfit and Woodward (although, unlike Woodward, 
Parfit thinks that it has a quite limited application). According to Parfit's version, 'it is 
wrong to cause someone to exist if we know that this person will have a right that cannot be 
fulfilled' (Reasons and Persons, p. 364). According to Woodward's version, acts or social 
policies are wrong if they `involve the creation of rights and obligations that would probably 
or inevitably be violated' ('The Non-Identity Problem', p. 821). I assume in the text that 
these two slightly different articulations of the principle are interchangeable. 
49 This problem was apparently first raised by McMahan, `Problems of Population Policy', 
p. 127. However, it is expressed in greater detail by Parfit Reasons and Persons, p. 365. See 
also Woodward, `The Non-Identity Problem', pp. 822-25. 
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The idea is that, although Anna's child may think that it would have been wonderful 
to have been born without her handicap, she might well come to feel glad to be alive, 
and in fact view her mother's decision not to seek treatment as one which actually 
furthered, rather than set back, her interests taken as a whole. As we have seen, the 
decision certainly did not render the child worse off in one prominent sense of the 
term, according to which to be made worse off a person's interests must be damaged 
all things considered. Perhaps, then, we can assume that the putative right-bearers in 
other cases of Non-Identity - such as the Conservation-Depletion case - will similarly 
waive their rights not to be born with rights which could not possibly be fulfilled, so 
long as their lives are on balance worth living. 
Of course, if it could be predicted that the future persons we are thinking about would 
lead lives which were not worth living, then the right-waiving objection would seem 
rather implausible. Here, one might think that it would be much worse for someone to 
exist who suffers from some incurable and debilitating disease than for them not to 
exist at all (although some have denied even this quite intuitive claim). 50 Consider the 
non-hypothetical case, discussed by Glover, of a young girl born with a congenital 
50 David Heyd, for example, thinks that no comparisons can be made between the condition 
of an existing person, and the 'condition' of that person's non-existence as such. As a result 
he denies that it can be worse for a person to exist than for them never have been born, no 
matter how miserable their life is in actuality. In fact, Heyd thinks that people who feel so 
miserable that they express regret that they were born are making a sort of logical mistake, 
as are those contented persons who express gratitude for being born (see Heyd, Genethics, 
pp. 122-2). Heyd, therefore, dismisses the idea that one can allocate non-existence a sort of 
notional zero-value in order to facilitate an identity-dependent explanation of how it could be 
wrong to bring a miserable person (one whose life does not appear to be worth living) into 
the world. In contrast, Heyd argues that the incommensurability between the subjective 
values of existence and non-existence cannot be overcome by comparing the zero value of 
non-existing persons with 'either the positive or the negative net value of the lives of actual 
people' (Heyd, Genethics, p. 113). For a critical evaluation of Heyd's view, see Ingmar 
Persson, 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and The Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics, 9,1, 
November 1995, pp. 28-9. 
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disease called Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa, which is incurable, terribly painful, 
and would cause the child to die at the age of just twelve weeks. The parents of this 
child expressed the following view in a letter to The Guardian: 
we had to watch our first child die slowly and painfully and we 
could not contemplate having another child if there was a risk that it 
too would have to die in the same ways' 
Surely it is inconceivable that, if she possessed the ability, this child would waive her 
rights not to be brought into existence suffering such misery - assuming, that is, one 
may possess a right not to be brought into existence if that entails enormous 
suffering. 52 
However, to the extent to which many persons belonging to future generations will 
lead lives which are well worth living, it could be predicted that at least some of these 
persons would in actuality wish to waive their rights not to be born with rights and 
interests which could not be fulfilled. Parfit, for example, defends his version of this 
claim by appealing to the apparently factual case of `The Man Who Wrote To The 
Times. ' 53 Here, a man who was the beneficiary of a fairly poor start to life as a result 
51 Jonathan Glover, 'Future People, Disability and Screening' in Peter Laslett and James 
Fishkin, eds., Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, pp. 129-30. 
52 Interestingly, Heyd's view denies precisely this thought. Heyd thinks that it would not be 
wrong to have another child just like this one even if its parents had full knowledge that their 
child would be born with the disease, nor would it be coherent to argue on this child's behalf 
that the life it was born into would be worse than no life at all. But this seems wildly 
counter-intuitive. Cases such as this provide the strongest intuitive grounds for thinking that 
a person's life can be not worth living, be of negative subjective value, and, consequently, 
that it would have been better for them that they had never been born. As we have seen, 
Parfit's view is consistent with the thought that it is wrong to bring such persons into the 
world, but he thinks that the wrong done here is explained not by the harm done to the young 
girl herself, but by the extra benefit that would have accrued from a different, non- 
handicapped, child being created. 
53 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 364. 
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of being born to a very young woman, argued forcefully that he did not regret being 
born, and, as such, his mother had not acted wrongly in giving birth to him at such a 
young age, even though it had been predicted that she would fail to care for him 
adequately during the early years of his life. In reflecting on this case, Parfit remarks: 
Suppose that I have a right to privacy. I ask you to marry me. If you 
accept, you are not acting wrongly, by violating my right to privacy. 
Since I am glad that you act as you do, with respect to you I waive 
this right. A similar claim applies to the writer of the angry letter to 
The Times. On the suggestion made above, this man has a right to 
be born by a mature woman, who would give him a good start in 
life. This man's mother acted wrongly because she caused him to 
exist with a right that cannot be fulfilled. But this man's letter 
shows that he was glad to be alive. He denies that his mother acted 
wrongly because of what she did to him. If we had claimed that her 
act was wrong, because he has a right that cannot be fulfilled, he 
could have said, `I waive this right. ' This would have undermined 
our objection to his mother's act 54 
Parfit goes on to claim that a similar line of thought can be exported to the 
Conservation-Depletion case. That is, on the supposition that the Depletion People 
lead lives which are worth living, Parfit thinks that the adoption of the Depletion 
Policy cannot be objectionable in virtue of violating the Depletion People's rights, for 
if these people were in possession of the facts, they would not regret, and could be 
54 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 364 - original emphasis 
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expected to waive their rights against, the Depletion Policy being adopted. 
55 How can 
we harm anyone by performing an act, Parfit asks rhetorically, `when we know both 
that if the people harmed knew about our act, they would not regret this act, and that 
our act will not be worse for these people than anything else that we could have 
done? ' 56 
Parfit's point, of course, is not that the policy-makers do no wrong if they choose the 
Depletion Policy, or that Anna does no wrong in choosing the `no treatment strategy. ' 
Rather, his point is that the right-waiving considerations outlined above demonstrates 
that the explanation of these wrongs can only be found in terms of identity- 
independent principles, such as the Same Number Quality Claim (or Q). Thus, 
according to his analysis of the case of the `Man Who Wrote to The Times': 
it would have been better if this man's mother had waited. But this 
is not because of what she did to her actual child. It is because of 
what she could have done for any child that she could have had 
when she was mature. The objection must be that, if she had waited, 
she could have given to some other child a better start in life. s' 
Parfit's line of thought, here, which I will call the Retroactive Right-Waiving 
Objection, seems to undermine the possibility of an identity-dependent solution to the 
Non-Identity Problem, so long as this solution is proposed in terms of the claims or 
interests of future individuals, and so long as we endorse a Parfitian view of harm 
55 See Parf it, Reasons and Persons, p. 365. 
56 parf it, Reasons and Persons, p. 373. 
57 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 364-5. 
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according to which people are not harmed by an act if they are not rendered worse of 
by it all things considered. 
4.3 Specific Interests, Specific Rights, and the Non-Identity Problem 
One way of retaining some of the force of a right-based objection to Anna's decision 
not to seek treatment, or the policy-makers' adoption of the Depletion Policy, would 
be to claim that a certain variety of interests or rights violations are consistent with 
the rejection of the Parfitian (all things considered) understanding of harm. Consider 
the distinction to be made between rights which are grounded in considerations of 
overall well-being and rights which are grounded in more specific human interests. 
Let us call these general and specific rights respectively. Regarding the latter, 
Woodward argues that 
people have relatively specific interests (e. g., in having promises 
kept, in avoiding bodily injury, in getting their fair share) that are 
not simply reducible to some general interest in maintaining a high 
overall level of well-being and that many moral requirements 
function so as to protect against violations of such specific interests. 
That an action will cause an increase in someone's overall level of 
well-being is not always an adequate response to the claim that such 
a specific interest has been violated. 58 
The Retroactive Right-Waiving Objection appears to deal a mortal blow to the idea 
that the general rights of the Depletion People, or Anna's handicapped child, can 
58 Woodward, `The Non-Identity Problem', p. 809. 
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provide the basis for an objection to either the Depletion Policy's adoption or Anna's 
conception of the handicapped child. This leaves us, however, with its implication for 
the notion of specific-rights, such as the right not to be born into a situation where 
one's interest in leading a dignified or autonomous life could not possibly be fulfilled. 
There are essentially two reasons for thinking that the notion of the specific rights of 
future persons might not fall victim to the retroactive right-waiving objection. First, at 
least some specific rights might be viewed as inalienable in the sense that they cannot 
simply be waived when their possession (or rather their non-violation) is not 
conducive to the maximisation of their possessor's welfare. Second, there are 
considerations which suggest that future persons, while they could waive their 
specific rights if they so wished, have some reason not to waive the rights which are 
grounded in their specific interests, even if these rights violations are remote, but 
necessary, conditions of their coming into existence and leading lives which are on 
balance worth living. Let us put the idea that specific rights are inalienable to one side 
for the moment in order to concentrate on the second of these claims in more detail. 59 
I start with the thought that there are certain advantages in maintaining the distinction 
between specific and general rights even in rather mundane, same person, contexts. 
Recall that, according to the interest-theory of rights, a person has a right only if an 
aspect of his well-being is a sufficient reason for holding some other person to be 
under a duty to him (as Raz puts it, `rights are always to what is in the interest of the 
59 1 focus here on the issues raised in the exchange between Woodward and Parfit in the 
Journal Ethics, as well as those raised by Parfit's discussion of these issues in Reasons and 
Persons. See Woodward, `The Non-Identity Problem', pp. 810ff; Woodward, 'Reply to 
Parfit', Ethics, 97,1987, p. 802; Parfit, `Comments', Ethics, 96,1986, pp. 854-862; Parfit, 
Reasons and Persons, pp. 364-66. 
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right-holder'). 60 The merit of making space in such a theory for specific rights and 
interests is that this appears to solve the otherwise puzzling phenomenon that the 
possession of certain rights appear to be in one's interests in some respects (possibly, 
all things considered) but not in others. 
Take a revealing example discussed by Raz. In certain contexts, a person might enjoy 
a right against others correlative to the important interest tied to some piece of 
property that they have acquired. On the other hand, that this person has exclusive 
rights over the disposal of this property might render them the target of theft, fraud, or 
of temptation. In fact, if certain conditions hold (say, that the temptation and malice 
of some band of criminals passes a certain threshold) it could be the case that the right 
holder's interests taken as a whole may cease to be served by his possessing his right 
of property (it may put him in danger of being attacked, for example). If rights merely 
served to protect their holders' all things considered interest, then this would seem to 
imply that being the subject of malicious criminals could result in one ceasing to 
possess the right to dispose of one's property as one sees fit - an implication which 
seems absurd. Raz points out a more attractive view is that, to the extent to which 
possessing the property is at least in its owner's interest in at least one respect, then 
this is sufficient to justify that person possessing a right to it 61 
Raz's intra-temporal, same person, example suggests that we ought to abandon the 
view that all rights function so as to protect a single general interest in their holders' 
well-being. As such, it also seem to provide some reason to embrace the view that 
actions can, contra Parfit's analysis, harm (and therefore wrong) a person even if they 
60 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford, Clarendon, 1994, p. 46. 61 Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, p. 46. 
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do not render that person worse off than they would otherwise have been. 62 This is 
because such actions might violate a person's specific interests and rights without 
endangering that person's overall well-being. Consider 
The Case of the Alcoholic Mother. In a recent television drama 
called Mothertime, a group of children help to save their mother 
from alcoholism by devising a radical plan. After returning home 
drunk on Christmas Eve, and generally behaving badly, the mother 
loses consciousness only to find the next day that her children have 
locked her in their basement sauna. The children proceed to keep 
her locked up in the sauna so that she can dry out, making certain 
that she has enough food and water to meet her basic physical 
needs. After initial bouts of rage, and desperate pleas to be let out of 
captivity, the mother dries out, and the end result is that she and her 
children enjoy a much higher quality of life than they did before the 
63 episode with the sauna began. 
Few will seriously doubt that to be locked in a sauna for several days in this manner 
constitutes a violation of one's rights. Suppose, however, that the success of the 
children's radical project could have been predicted in advance. The act of locking 
their mother up to dry out would be both a predictable cause of both their mother's 
well-being being improved substantially, and the violation of their mother's right not 
to be imprisoned against her will and without due representation. The idea here is that 
62 Woodward, `Reply to Parfit', p. 802. 
63 The drama was screened on BBC2 in the evening of 28 December 1997, and was based 
on a novel by Gillian White. 
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the mother has had one of her specific rights violated (say, her right not to be 
imprisoned), despite the fact that the act which violated her rights served her interests 
all things considered. 
It is important to note that embracing the notion of specific rights and interests need 
not entail abandoning the identity-dependent framework because the exact nature of 
this framework is open to interpretation. It might, for example, rest on the view that 
`an act cannot be wrong in any respect if it is not worse for people than any 
alternative in any respect' or that `an act cannot be wrong in any respect if it is not 
worse for people than any alternative all things considered. '64 The appeal to specific 
rights holds that a right-based objection to certain acts in Non-Identity cases can 
survive an endorsement of the former, but not the latter, interpretation - and that the 
latter implausibly assumes that all ethical requirements pick out, or only serve to 
protect, the all things considered interest of their owners. 
Moving to the inter-temporal application of this line of thought, consider the case of 
Grant, who is a member of a distant future generation in the possible future world 
where the Depletion Policy has been adopted by some predecessor generation, and 
who has difficulty in breathing clean air due to air pollution caused in part by climatic 
change 65 
According to the appeal to specific rights and interests, Grant's prima facie specific 
right of access to an important life-sustaining resource (i. e. clean air) appears to have 
been violated as a result of the GHG emissions of previous generations. 
64 As suggested by Temkin, `Harmful Goods, Harmless Bads', pp. 295-98. 
65 For the IPCC's research on the connection between climate change and air pollution, see 
McMichael et al, Human Health and Climate Change, pp. 43-70. 
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Suppose that had these previous generations adopted more conservationist policies on 
GHG emissions, Grant's difficulties in this regard would have been avoided. Applied 
to this case, the appeal to specific rights suggests that Grant's prima facie right to 
breathe clean air has been violated by the negligent actions of his ancestors, despite 
the fact that the actions which led to this right being violated rendered Grant, on 
balance, no worse off. If conservationist policies had been adopted, for example, 
Grant and his contemporaries would not have born with specific rights to resources 
which could never have been fulfilled and thus, in this limited sense, Grant and his 
contemporaries would have been better off not being born: if they had never been 
born, they would not have been in the possession of interests which would necessarily 
be thwarted or violated. 
Unfortunately, even if we follow Woodward and Raz in holding that people possess 
fairly specific interests which ought to be respected by others, and which it is possible 
to violate without rendering them worse off on balance, this does not seem to provide 
a full response to the Retroactive Right Waiving Objection. Suppose we adopt the 
perspective of the potential recipient of some specific right. Parfit suggests that the 
main defect in a rights-based objection to Depletion would be that we could expect 
the Depletion People to be grateful that they had been born and that as a result they 
would waive any rights that would be violated by this policy. 66 But why, it might be 
asked, should this objection not also be directed towards the notion of specific-rights? 
So long as the Depletion People lead lives which are worth living, and they do not 
regret their existence, we might assume that they would waive any rights which they 
66See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 364; and Glover, `Future People, Disability and 
Screening', pp. 129-31. 
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might possess which require us not to choose the Depletion Policy on their behalf. 
That is, even if we suppose that people possess interests and rights which are not 
reducible to their broader, all things considered, interests one might expect any future 
person to waive any specific-rights they possess whose fulfilment is not consistent 
with their ever being born. 
4.4 Responses to the Retroactive Right-Waiving Objection 
The question arises: are there any considerations which cast some doubt on whether 
the Depletion People would, in actuality, wish to waive either their specific or general 
rights not to have been born with interests which could not possibly be fulfilled? I 
think there are, and I consider some of these below. 
The Retroactive Right-Waiving Objection rests on an analogy between the way in 
which agents typically waive certain rights which they do not regret being violated in 
intragenerational contexts, and the way in which future agents could be expected to 
waive certain rights that they do not regret being violated by their ancestors. Parfit's 
example of the former sort of case is that of the person who wishes to marry and who 
does not regret his future wife violating his rights of privacy. 67 It might be argued, 
however, that there is a crucial difference between the cases of right-waiving which 
he takes to be analogous. This is that the person who gets married consents to their 
subsequent loss of privacy quite explicitly, and in advance of the marriage ceremony - 
or, more accurately, the start of the relationship - whereas there is no such explicit 
consent from the Depletion People available at the time of the policy choice. One 
67 Parf it, Reasons and Persons, p. 364. 
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aspect of this disanalogy is that, as Parfit concedes, we cannot be certain that future 
persons who are brought into the world with rights that are necessarily violated will 
waive these rights in actuality. However, the disanalogy also renders problematic the 
whole notion of retroactive right-waiving when the putative right-waiver does not yet 
exist. 
There are, for example, formidable problems associated with the idea of retroactive 
right-waiving in cases where future persons lead lives of very poor quality, but where 
it is uncertain whether they lead lives which are on the whole worth living or not. The 
examples offered by Parfit are perhaps clear cut in this regard - he stipulates that the 
characters in his examples are not so miserable that they would ever consider their 
lives not to be worth living. However, in reality there will be many cases in which 
people are born with medical conditions which make their lives doubtfully, if not 
certainly not, worth living - and it is likely that global environmental problems such 
as climate change will bring about an increase in the numbers of such cases (for 
example, through the impacts of global warming on pre-natal malarial infection, poor 
air quality and so forth). The question raised by all this, then, is `how might we 
establish whether the people who will belong to future generations blighted by 
climate change would in fact wish waive either their specific or general rights? ' 
I have argued above that there are problems raised for Parfit's analysis by the fact that 
retrospective consent is much more uncertain than actual consent. Consider once 
more the case of Grant. Suppose it was suggested that it does not matter whether or 
not Grant (and his contemporaries) would in practice wish to waive their rights, but 
rather that it be unreasonable or irrational of them not to do so. Is it really the case, 
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though, that it is unreasonable, or irrational, for the Depletion People to regret the 
adoption of the Depletion Policy? There seem to be at least three ways in which we 
might defend the view that it is not. 
Firstly, as Woodward claims, it seems at least reasonable for a person to argue that it 
would have been better if he had not existed, if (i) they fall short of some standard of 
perfection and (ii) they believe strongly that it is a terrible thing to live and fall short 
of this standard. 68 It might be the case, for example, that Grant comes to regret 
bitterly the fact that his reduced physical capabilities prevent him from perfecting his 
pursuit of some physical activity (such as running or walking) even though he accepts 
that his life is well worth living on the whole. 
Secondly, Parfit assumes that if it is known with some degree of certainty that a 
person will not regret, and will offer their retrospective consent to, an act's 
performance then this act does not violate any of this person's rights. However, this 
claim seems questionable to say the least. Thus, many people would think it wrong to 
enslave or to torture another person even if this person gave their consent in advance 
of the enslavement, and subsequently argued that he did not regret giving his consent 
in the first place. 
Woodward, for example, observes that we commonly make a distinction between 
reasonable and unreasonable grounds on which a person might waive his rights, or 
express a lack of regret about his circumstances, and that we do not commonly think 
that an expression of consent which is based on faulty premises alters the way in 
which an act or state of affairs is evaluated from the ethical point of view. Consider 
68 Woodward, `The Non-Identity Problem', p. 823. 
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Woodward's example of `lower caste members of a caste society [who] do not object 
to or regret being desperately poor or exploited because they are persuaded that this is 
required by the natural order of things. '69 It seems implausible to suggest that the 
presence of consent in such circumstances entails that no injustice has been 
perpetrated on the members of the lower caste in this society. In a similar way, one 
might argue that it is implausible to suggest that the lack of regret that the Depletion 
People express towards the adoption of the Depletion Policy renders this policy 
ethically unobjectionable. 
Thirdly, and most speculatively, Grant might argue that he regrets the adoption of the 
Depletion Policy because its adoption harms him in a way which does not reduce his 
well-being at all. The idea here is that there might be victim-involving acts which are 
not in fact well-being diminishing, but nevertheless interest-violating. 
Consider the case of Jim, who entertains certain esoteric, and deeply held, religious 
beliefs which lead him to believe that if a photographer from a news agency takes his 
photo, then this will surely result in his soul being jeopardised. Some will think that 
the taking of Jim's photograph violates an ethically weighty interest of Jim's - and 
will thus harm or disadvantage him - even if Jim's life would not go worse if his 
photograph is taken. The harm we do to him by taking his photograph might, for 
example, be explained in terms of the fact that we rob him of his dignity by taking his 
photograph against his wishes, even though the act which does this does not reduce 
his well-being as such (it simply being untrue that a person's well-being can be 
reduced by their photograph being taken in the manner suggested). These people will 
69 Woodward, `The Non-Identity Problem', p. 823. 
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claim that Jim has an interest in his image not being produced in ways in which Jim 
believes will cause himself profound damage. 70 
Consider, once more, the case of Grant. Perhaps being brought into the climate 
change affected world - as in the case of the photographed Jim - also harms Grant in a 
way that does not reduce his well-being. Because the presence of these harms are 
unconnected to Grant's overall well-being, they are not undermined by the presence 
of Non-Identity. Grant is harmed, here, even if his well-being is not reduced, on 
balance, by his coming into existence. It is this distinctive sort of harm which 
provides the basis for his regretting his existence, in the same way that Jim might 
regret his photograph being taken: he has been robbed of his dignity by the adoption 
of the Depletion Policy (he is forced to engange in a scramble for supplies of fresh air 
which should have been his birth-right), even though his well-being has not been 
diminished by this policy. 
5 Conclusions: The Limitations of the Appeal to Specific Rights 
Suppose we think that the Retroactive Right-Waiving Objection is at the very least 
not decisive, and that we grant that certain rights protect certain specific interests the 
fulfilment of which are not necessarily in their holders' overall interests. Serious 
limitations with this account remain. One of these relates to the fact that many of the 
goods which we are concerned to preserve for the sake of future persons are public 
goods. 
70 The case of Jim was suggested to me in a different context by Andrew Williams. The 
context was a discussion of the possibility that people might be harmed posthumously both in 
a way that does, and in a way which does not, diminish their well-being. 
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Public goods, such as clean air, are goods whose benefits are distributed throughout a 
society such that they are `not subject to voluntary control by anyone other than each 
potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefits. '7' However, on the interest- 
theory of rights, and it is worth remembering that the notion of specific-rights 
depends upon this theory, it is not readily apparent why individuals possess rights to 
public goods such as clean air. This is because the interest-theory does not generate 
rights to all interests which individuals possess, but rather only those which are 
sufficiently important to hold others under a duty to protect those interests. But in the 
case of public goods it seems unlikely that the interest of a single individual in having 
access to these goods is important, or weighty, enough to entail that all other persons 
lie under a duty to respect these interests. 
Raz, for example, is sceptical about the idea of an individual possessing a right to a 
public good, and suggests that separate individuals' interests in such goods are best 
thought of as grounding collective rights. 72 So it seems that the idea of the specific 
rights (or interests) of individuals will need to be supplemented by some appeal to the 
specific rights (or interests) of collectivities if we are to make sense of the idea of 
rights to environmental public goods such as clean air - and I think that this alone 
suggests that the appeal to specific rights cannot provide a fill solution to the Non- 
Identity Problem (though it might play a part in one). I turn to the notion of collective, 
or group, rights in the next chapter. 
71 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 198. 
72 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, pp. 186-90. For discussion, see Denise Reaume 
`Individuals, Groups and Rights to Public Goods', University of Toronto Law Journal, 38, 
1988, pp. 2ff. 
Chapter 6: Group Rights and The Non-Identity Problem 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that familiar identity-dependent theories of 
ethics are prone to peculiarly troubling problems of Non-Identity, and that one 
ingenious attempt to solve these problems is flawed. In this chapter, I will be 
examining the possibility of developing a revised identity-dependent objection to 
depletionist environmental policies in terms of the rights, interests, or ethical value of 
certain human groups. As a new piece of terminology, I distinguish between two quite 
different articulations of identity-dependence, namely, the narrow and the wide. 
Narrow identity-dependent (or person-affecting) views identify particular persons as 
being the only genuine bearers of ethical value, while wide identity-dependent (or 
group-centred) views identify both individual and collective entities as bearers of 
ethical status or value. 
The main advantage of a group-centred approach, it will be argued, is that by virtue of 
the fact that the coming into existence of many human groups is less dependent on 
events and actions which pre-date their origin, this approach will not be as prone to 
considerations of Non-Identity in social policy instances of the Non-Identity as its 
person-affecting rival. If we hold that groups can be the bona fide possessors of 
rights, interests or ultimate value, it seems that we do not need to abandon the terrain 
of identity-dependent ethics in order to provide some objection to choosing depletion. 
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A crucial part of the spelling out of the notion of group-centredness will turn on a 
spelling out of the ideas of group-rights and group-value, and how a contemporary 
liberal theories - which are paradigmatic examples of identity-dependent theories - are 
compatible with these ideas. In explaining the idea of group-centredness, I attempt to 
draw parallels between the idea of grounding at least part of our theory of 
intergenerational ethics in the idea of group-interests and the expanding literature on 
liberalism, and the rights of minority cultures. While I offer a limited defence of the 
ideas of group-rights and group-value, and their partial solution of the Non-Identity 
Problem, I also note some formidable problems that face the group-centred view. 
The chapter proceeds with a discussion of three possible formulations of the group 
affecting view (two grounded in the idea of group-rights, and the other in group- 
value) and then go on to apply these views to a case of Non-Identity constructed in 
the light of recent work on climate change. 
2. Liberalism and Group-Rights 
Contemporary liberalism faces at least three important challenges which have only 
been recently expressed in any detail in philosophical circles. The first, the problem 
of intergenerational ethics, needs little introduction. The second, the claim that liberal 
theory, and in particular its overwhelming focus on the language of individual rights, 
reflects an impoverished view of the importance of group or cultural membership to 
the lives of individuals, has been discussed by a number of liberal and 
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`communitarian' writers. ' Communitarian writers, notably Charles Taylor, Michael 
Sandel, and Alisdair Maclntyre, argue that liberalism is not sufficiently sensitive to 
the way in which group membership is central to the shaping, and flourishing, of 
human lives; and indeed, that this is at least partly reflected by - as well as 
exacerbated by - liberalism's characteristic focus on the rights and interests of 
individual persons. The third, the claim that liberal theory cannot accommodate the 
demands of certain indigenous and other minority groups' for collective self- 
determination, has also a fairly recent history. 3 Here, various indigenous groups - and 
theorists who take up their case - have complained that liberalism, and the 
international conventions on individual human rights which are often regarded as its 
greatest triumph, cannot make sense of their collective claims for secession or self- 
determination. 
The criticism of liberalism which the second and third of these challenges raise has 
been summed up usefully by Buchanan as a challenge to the perceived liberal 
`preoccupation with individual rights and an assumption that the liberal framework of 
individual rights can accommodate the legitimate interests of all groups. '4 Buchanan 
goes on to argue that one reason for liberals to consider the notion of group-rights is 
I The communitarian challenge to liberalism is reviewed by Will Kymlicka in Liberalism, 
Community and Culture, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 47-99; and S. Muthall 
and A. Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992. 
2 See Taylor, Sources of the Self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Sandet, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982; and 
MacIntyre, After Virtue, London, Duckworth, 1981. 
3 See Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, pp. 135ff; and Multicultural 
Citizenship, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 49ff. See also Allen Buchanan, 
Secession, Oxford, Westview Press, 1991, pp. 4ff. 
4 Buchanan, `Liberalism and Group Rights', in J. L. Coleman and A. Buchanan, eds., In 
Harm's Way: Essays in Honour of Joel Feinberg, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1994, p. 1. 
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that they appear to offer a valuable tool with which to deal more adequately with 
these two challenges. 5 
In a similar vein, I want to argue in this chapter that the first of the problems I 
identified above, and with which this thesis is primarily concerned, might also be 
more soluble from a liberal (and identity-dependent) perspective if the notion of 
group-rights is taken seriously. In short, this is because they might provide the basis 
of a solution to the Non-Identity Problem in an important (if limited) range of cases. 
Perhaps the most obvious place to begin an analysis of recent work on group-rights is 
the debate concerning the rights of minority cultures. There are two mutually 
incompatible - and exhaustive - articulations of group-rights which are appealed to in 
this debate. Correspondingly, there are two ways in which liberalism might reconcile 
itself with the idea of group-rights. The first of these takes the rights of groups, such 
as minority cultures, to be merely the conglomeration of the rights of its members, for 
example to have adequate access to their native language in public affairs. Here the 
group itself has no moral or ethical status above and beyond that possessed by its 
members, and thus it has no rights itself beyond those shared by all of its members. In 
other words, the group's rights are merely the aggregated claims of its members 
possessed severally. I call this the individualist view of group-rights, the most 
distinguished exponents of which are Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka. 
The second articulation of group-rights regards the moral rights of groups in a similar 
way as the legal rights of certain corporations. These rights are not reducible to the 
rights shared by its members. The group is, rather, viewed as bearing moral or ethical 
5 See Allen Buchanan, `Liberalism and Group Rights', p. 2. See also Secession, pp. 74ff. 
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status, and thus as a bearer of rights and interests, quite independently of its 
individual members. I call this the collectivist view of group-rights, one proponent of 
which is Vernon Van Dyke. 
In the following, I briefly review Raz's, Kymlicka's and Van Dyke's views. The 
distinction between the two positions they represent is important, I will argue, 
because while the collectivist view appears more likely to be of useful application in 
cases of Non-Identity, such as Depletion-Conservation, the individualist view of 
group-rights is much less controversial and appears more readily reconcilable with 
liberal, and other identity-dependent, theories of ethics. 
3. Raz, Kymlicka, and the Individualist View 
Recall that according to Raz's general account of rights, a person, X, `has a right if 
and only if X can have rights, and, other things being equal, an aspect of X's well- 
being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under 
a duty. '6 The key idea here is the extent to which a group might be thought of as 
possessing some interest which is important - or significant - enough to create a duty 
on the part of another group or person. Raz requires three conditions to be met in 
order for this to happen, that is, a group will possess a right whenever some joint 
interest of its members satisfies the following conditions. First, it must be important 
6 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 166. Compare with Dworkin's view that `an individual 
has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in favour of a political 
decision that the decision is likely to advance or protect the state of affairs in which he 
enjoys the right, even when no other political aim is served and some political aim is 
disserved thereby, and counts against that decision that it will retard or endanger that state of 
affairs, even when some other political aim is thereby served' (Taking Rights Seriously, 
London, Duckworth, 1977, p. 91). 
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enough to justify the creation of duties upon others. Second, the interest must concern 
the members' interests in securing access to an inherent public good.? Third, that the 
interest of each of the group's members to this public good, taken one by one, is 
insufficiently strong for it to justify the creation of duties on the part of others. 8 
In Raz's view, it is not the way in which a group possesses the quality of being an 
independent, and ethically important, entity in its own right which gives rise to it 
being the recipient of rights but rather the feature that the individuals which comprise 
it possess interests which combine in order to be sufficiently weighty to ground duties 
on the part of others. For Raz, a group as thinly defined as a set of individuals with 
one common interest on a shared matter (e. g. the provision of public transport) can 
possess group-rights (e. g. to a minimum level of public transport) if their combined 
interests are weighty enough. Raz is clearly proposing an individualist view of group- 
rights in this sense. He argues that `collective or group-rights represent the cumulative 
interests of many individuals who are members of the relevant groups. It follows that 
there is nothing essentially non-aggregative about rights. '9 
Raz's account of group-rights has attracted a number of criticisms, most notably from 
Denise Reaume. 10 Reaume modifies Raz's view somewhat to take account of the 
existence of `participatory goods. ' These are goods which, in contrast to public goods, 
cannot be enjoyed individually. An example of a participatory good might be 
7 The distribution of benefits of inherent public goods are `not subject to voluntary control 
by anyone other than each potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefits' and this 
is the case irrespective of technological factors (see The Morality of Freedom, pp. 198-9). 
8 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 208. 
9 Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p. 187. 
10 Denise Reaume, `Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods', University of Toronto 
Law Review, 38,1988, pp. Iff. See also Jeremy Waldron, 'Can Communal Goods be Human 
Rights? ', Archive Europeennes De Sociologie, 27,1987, pp. 296ff. 
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friendship. Here, the good of friendship can neither be produced individually nor is it 
valuable outside of the context of the joint involvement of those who participate in it. 
As Reaume observes, `the publicity of production itself is part of what is valued - the 
good is the participation. ' II Reaume holds that living in a flourishing cultural 
environment is one of these goods, and it is the way in which this good is a 
participatory, rather than an inherent public, good which lies at the heart of why it 
can only give rise to a group rather than an individual right: for only groups can have 
rights to participatory goods, to what can only be enjoyed collectively. 
Although Reaume embraces many aspects of Raz's general theory of rights, the true 
extent of the difference between her view and Raz's on group-rights is unclear. 
Reaume appears to hold that rights to participatory goods are group-rights in a deeper 
sense than the group-rights to inherent public goods. One reason for thinking this lies 
in Reaume's claim that, in the case of participatory goods, `the individual has no 
interest as an individual in these goods' and further that a group's interest in securing 
a participatory good `cannot be reduced to a set of individualised interests. ' 12 
But does this imply that the individual participants in a practice which produces a 
participatory good - e. g. friends enjoying the fruits of friendship - do not stand to lose 
or gain, as individuals, if the friendship is marred or enhanced by some event or 
other? As Hartney argues, there might come a point where `it may cease to be in the 
interest of one of the [friends] to belong to it, while the interest of the others remains 
unaffected: in that sense, the interest of one member is detachable from that of the 
11 Reaume, 'Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods', p. 10. 12 Reaume, `Individuals, Groups, and Rights to Public Goods', pp. l In, 24 
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others. ' 13 This suggests that, at best, Reaume has offered a tweaking of Raz's theory 
of group-rights - for at the fundamental level, both appear to share a commitment to 
an individualist account according to which the interests of a group as such cannot be 
seen as existing independently of the interests of its members. 
14 
The core of Kymlicka's defence of group-rights has several steps. 
15 First is the idea 
that individuals must have access to some structure in order for them to be provided 
with the conditions necessary for autonomous choice among an adequate range of 
options, and the manner in which this is an important idea for liberals. Second is the 
idea that only membership of a flourishing and secure cultural group provides such a 
structure (Kymlicka develops this point by describing the cultural structure as being 
`the context of choice'). 16 Third, many cultural groups are vulnerable and as a result 
can only flourish if they are allocated certain group-rights which are not relevant in 
respect of other, more robust, groups; possessing these rights may in certain cases be 
a necessary condition of a group, or culture, preserving its distinctive culture and way 
13 See Hartney, 'Some Confusions Concerning Collective Rights', in Kymlicka, The Rights 
of Minority Cultures, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 209. 
14 Raz's view is discussed, and endorsed, by Hartney in `Some Confusions Concerning 
Collective Rights', pp. 208-9. 
15 Kymlicka's view has a number of close cousins, most prominent of which is the account 
defended by Allen Buchanan. See Buchanan, Secession, pp. 52ff and pp. 74ff; and 'Liberalism 
and Group Rights', pp. 7ff. 
16 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 166. Buchanan notes that group 
membership goes beyond just providing a context or structure in which its members may 
pursue goals which they identify with, it also provides a valuable role in determining the 
content of peoples' projects, plans and goals. He observes that, 
participation in community, for many people, at least, is a fundamental 
intrinsic good, not merely a structural condition for the successful pursuit 
of other goods or a means of acquiring them... Nothing in liberalism or 
its understanding of human good precludes it from acknowledging this 
basic truth (Secession, p. 54; see also Buchanan, `Assessing the 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', Ethics, 99,4, July 1989, 
pp. 867ff). 
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of life which its members identify with. 17 Fourth, and finally, any liberal theory which 
is worth its salt will accommodate certain group-rights (such as those considered 
above), at least with respect to those groups which have been especially vulnerable to 
historical injustices, in order to protect the context for autonomous choice. 
It is the second step in Kymlicka's argument which has received the most attention 
from critics and defenders alike, namely, that group-membership is valuable for 
individuals in virtue of the way that this provides individuals with a context in which 
to exercise their autonomy. The community itself, here, has no ultimate importance. 
Kymlicka observes argues that 
liberals should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures, not 
because they have some moral status of their own, but because it's 
only through having a rich and secure culture that people can 
become aware, in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and 
intelligently examine their value. 18 
That cultural or group membership provides an important context for human choice, 
on Kymlicka's view, does not in itself entail that the liberal ought to embrace group- 
rights in order to protect particular groups from disintegrating. One might think that 
as long as every person considered one by one has access to some cultural structure, 
the liberal need not be committed to protecting any particular community. As 
17 Buchanan adds the important point that, although the liberal will ground group-rights in 
the thought that their protection is valuable for individual human beings, this does not 
commit the liberal to the view that `a member of a cultural group or community values the 
culture chiefly or even in part as something that is instrumentally good for himself, nor that 
his interest in the goods of cultural membership is egoistic. ' A liberal position, he argues, is 
perfectly consistent with the thought that participation in a culture constitutes an intrinsically 
valuable good. See Buchanan, Secession, pp. 79ff. 
18 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 65. Kymlicka's argument is re-stated 
in Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 80ff. 
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Kymlicka sets up the problem, `why not let minority cultural communities 
disintegrate, and assist those who suffer that misfortune to assimilate to another 
culture? ' 19 Kymlicka's response to this question is to claim that the extent to which 
individuals (in particular, members of ethnic minorities) are essentially bound to their 
own cultures prevents this approach even being an option for the liberal 2° 
So cultural membership is not only a valuable source of options for members, but also 
the source of individuals' personal agency, integrity and development? ' It also 
provides the basis for individuals' self-respect. This, for Kymlicka, is essentially the 
good point of the largely wrong-headed communitarian challenge to liberalism 
mounted by Taylor and others, but it is disconnected from the claim that communities 
are valuable over and above the way in which they are valuable for their individual 
members. Thus Kymlicka attempts to introduce group-rights into a liberal position 
while rejecting the idea of, for want of a better phrase, value-collectivism. 
4. Van Dyke and Collectivist Rights 
If individualist group-rights are grounded in the claim that the objects of group-rights 
- e. g. national self-determination - are essential to the continued well-being of that 
group's individual members, collectivist rights are grounded in the notion of respect 
19 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 173. 
20 Kymlicka claims that, 
We can't just transplant people from one culture to another, even if we 
provide the opportunity to learn the other language and culture. 
Someone's upbringing isn't something that can just be erased; it is, and 
will remain, a constitutive part of who that person is. Cultural 
membership affects our very sense of personal identity and capacity 
(Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 175). 
21 Kym I icka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 176 
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for groups as entities `with a distinct identity and life of its own which others must 
recognise and respect. '22 Consider the paradigm of a group which bears rights in 
international law, namely the nation-state. Nation-states are often recognised as being 
singular ethical, as well as legal, entities - possessing a separate identity and rights of 
self-determination. It is this clear, or perhaps not so clear, identity which gives rise to 
the demands of many nations to be seen as moral entities in their own right, and 
decidedly not the idea that the members of these communities have interests which 
add up with sufficient weight to create a right of self-determination. 23 The idea behind 
the collectivist view is that this sort of reasoning can be extended to the case of sub- 
national groups as well. 
There are obviously several problems here worth discussing. One is the problem of 
vagueness of identity. The identities of statal or sub-statal groups do not appear to be 
as easily defined as those of their individual members. 4 This makes it difficult to 
establish the point of origin, as well as extinction, of any given nation (a point which 
will have important ramifications when we come to look at the Non-Identity 
Problem). It also suggests that one of the formal requirements of rights-allocation - 
that the bearer is identifiable or specifiable in some reasonably clear way, even if its 
22 See Jones, Rights, pp. 184-5. 
23Although this view is defended by Margalit and Raz, `National Self-Determination', in 
Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain, pp. 125ff. 
24 Unless we hold Parfit's `reductionist' view of personal identity, according to which the 
conditions of existence of particular persons are more or less as weak as those of nations. 
See Reasons and Persons, pp. 211 ff. Compare with Hume's observation that, 
I cannot compare the soul more properly than to anything than to a 
republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by 
the reciprocal ties of government and subordination, and give rise to other 
persons, who propagate the same republic in the incessant changes of its 
parts. (David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1968, Part IV, Section VI, p. 261). 
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edges are somewhat blurred - will not be met by the sorts of groups which the 
collectivist view of group-rights would be paradigmatically concerned with. A 
different problem associated with group-identity is that any right-bearing group ought 
perhaps be robust at least to the point where it is not better viewed as merely the part 
of a wider entity, or is merely an amalgam of smaller entities which are best viewed 
as wholes in their own right. 25 It seems that, as compared with the relatively straight- 
forward individualist theory, the collectivist theory is more prone to problems arising 
from the untidiness of group-identity and infra-group boundaries. 
Quite different problems concern the directionality of the rights that the collectivist 
view defines. Here the collectivist conception of group-rights is prone to the objection 
that the rights it defines will in some cases conflict with the rights of its individual 
members. Such group-individual conflicts are not possible under the individualist 
view as on this view a person simply ceases to be a member of a group if his interests 
conflict with it. This is because the group is merely an aggregation of individuals who 
share a similar interest in some public (or participatory) good. 
There are at least two ways in which the collectivist view might entail group- 
individual conflicts. First, in ascribing rights or ethical status to a certain national 
minority, we also deny any smaller groupings which exist within that minority a 
similar status. By ascribing the right of self-determination to the British, for example, 
it seems that we also deny a similar (or at least a similarly robust) right to the Welsh. 
This denial, quite understandably, is often equated (by the smaller grouping) to a 
diminishing of their moral or ethical status. Second, because collectivist group-rights 
25 See Jones, `Group Rights', p. 15. 
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are possessed by a nation or ethnic group itself, it appears that the group would in 
certain situations be justified in restricting the autonomy of its members (say by 
outlawing certain practices or by making others compulsory) if this were to 
strengthen the group's ability to guarantee that right's fulfilment in the face of either 
internal or external pressures. As an example of this development, one might think of 
the way in which certain cultures are resistant to changes in the way women are 
treated on the grounds that they, as they possess a right to self-determination, stand 
more chance of surviving if certain individual rights and freedoms are restricted. 
The idea that a group in certain cases will have rights which are held, not against 
other groups, but against its own members is usually referred to in the literature as the 
problem of `internally-directed rights' or `internal restrictions. ' 
26 The problem that 
internal restrictions pose for liberals is that they appear to endanger traditional liberal 
values of toleration and individual autonomy. Kymlicka, for example, adopting 
different terminology to that suggested here, distinguishes between `group-rights' 
(which correspond, to all intents and purposes, to the collectivist rights discussed 
above) and `special rights' (which are individualist group-rights). He then goes on to 
argue that only `special rights', which are by definition claimed only against others 
outside the group, are compatible with a commitment to liberalism, and that `group- 
26 See, for example, Waldron, `Can Communal Goods be Human Rights? ', pp. 317ff; 
Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 35ff; and Jones, Rights, pp. 186-7. Jones sums up the 
worry well when he writes, on page 186, that 
the stress upon the identity of a group as a bearer of rights may become 
so great that its individual members are effectively denied any separate 
identity or purpose. They may become like the `members' of a human 
body which can exist and function only as parts of a single organism; 
they may cease to have any claim to exist or to function independently of 
the group (see also Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, pp. 190T). 
Chapter 6: Group Rights and The Non-Identity Problem 240 
rights' generate at least some claims against their own members and are both illiberal 
and implausible?? 
There are at least two ways in which a proponent of the collectivist view might 
respond to Kymlicka's claims. One would be to deny that `internal restrictions' are 
incompatible with liberalism. I put this to one side. The second would be to deny that 
the collectivist view necessarily entails that the rights it ascribes to groups will be 
wielded against their members. 8 The basis for this denial would be the thought that 
the distinction between externally and internally directed rights cuts across the 
distinction between individualist and collectivist theories of group-rights. There 
appears, for example, no insoluble problem associated with arguing for a collectivist 
conception of group-rights which only sanctions groups having rights against the 
outside world (in particular, other groups). 
In the following, therefore, I assume that this view is the one which any plausible 
theory of intergenerational collectivist group-rights will endorse. It is `external 
protections' which are crucial in explaining objections to acts of intergenerational 
injustice, such as excessive GHG emissions. Here the relevant group (some future 
community blighted by global warming or sea-level rises) has a right against a former 
individual or group which did the damage - not its own contemporaneous members. 
In contrast to Kymlicka, Van Dyke argues that the tension between liberalism and the 
growing importance of collective entities to debates about multiculturalism and the 
politics of recognition can only be resolved by 
27 See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Chapter 3, pp. 34-48. 28 See Jones, `Group Rights', p. 19. 
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recognising that certain kinds of collective entities exist, just as 
individuals do - perhaps not tangibly but not transcendentally either; 
that these collective entities have moral rights that are distinct from 
the rights of individual members; and that the frequent cases of 
conflict between the rights of individuals and, the rights of 
collectivities, and between the rights of different collective entities, 
must be handled through a balancing process in which judgements 
are made about the relative urgency and importance of the various 
claims. 9 
Like Raz and Kymlicka, Van Dyke endorses an interest-based theory of rights 
according to which rights serve so as to protect particularly important human interests 
and needs. 30 However, unlike these writers he goes beyond the individualist view of 
group-rights, according to which group-rights are merely `a kind of shorthand way of 
referring to the rights of the members. s31 Rather, the conception he proposes is that of 
the group `as a collective entity, a unity, a whole, analogous to a corporation. 
32 
Van Dyke notes that in legal circles both of these conceptions - the individualist and 
the collectivist - are quite commonly invoked. His view is that, in the ethical realm, 
and in particular in the light of pressing issues of multiculturalism and discrimination, 
it is necessary to incorporate the view that certain national, sub-national, or ethnic 
29 Vernon Van Dyke, `Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal- 
Democratic Thought', The Journal of Politics, 44,1982, p. 22. 
30 Van Dyke, 'Collective Entities and Moral Rights', p. 23. 
31 Van Dyke, `Equal Treatment: the Individual and the Group', in his Human Rights, 
Ethnicity, and Discrimination, Westport: Connecticut, Greenwood, 1985, p. 15 
32 Van Dyke, `Equal Treatment: the Individual and the Group', p. 15. 
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groups are ethically important entities in their own right and possess collective rights 
above and beyond those possessed by their individual members. 
Van Dyke provides eight standards for differentiating entities which can be regarded 
as the genuine possessors of rights from those which cannot. Here the strength of any 
given group's rights-claims will vary in proportion to: (1) its desire to preserve itself; 
(2) the reasonableness of its chance to preserve itself; (3) the extent it possesses clear 
criteria of membership; (4) the significance it has to its members; (5) the importance 
of the rights it would be afforded; (6) its ability to act and assume responsibilities; (7) 
the extent to which it is already treated as a group; and (8) the extent to which the 
rights the group would wield are compatible with a commitment to an abstract 
understanding of equality, where those affected by the group wielding what rights it 
has are treated with equal concern and respect. 33 
Van Dyke claims that these eight standards are not to be seen as being a list of 
necessary, or jointly sufficient, conditions for a group to possess rights, but rather 
'permit varying degrees of decisiveness in judging whether a group is entitled to 
status and rights. '34 He notes that taken together they will `not suggest any great 
proliferation of the kinds of groups to be recognised', and more importantly that 
interest groups and social classes are particularly unlikely to qualify. The extent to 
which other groupings, such as generations, might meet these conditions is a further 
source of interest which is not addressed by Van Dyke. 
33 Van Dyke, `Collective Entities and Moral Rights', pp. 31-33. 34 Van Dyke, `Collective Entities and Moral Rights', p. 33. 
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The individualist and collectivist view having both been outlined, a diagrammatic 
representation of the essential differences between the individualist and collectivist 
understandings of groups is provided in the form of Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Individual-Rights and Group Rights 
Group Rights Individual Rights 
Ascribed to collections of individuals an d Ascribed to an individual person, 
can only be exercised collectively or at or other sentient being, who in 
least on behalf of the collective principle can exercise the right 
independently and on her own 
authority 
Collectivist View of Group Rights Individualist View of Group Right 
Protect (and are grounded in) the interests of Protect (and are grounded in) 
the group qua group, and independently of the shared interests of individual 
the interests of the members of the group members of the group. 
5. Taylor and the Value-Collectivist View 
The distinction between the collectivist and individualist view of group-rights cuts 
across the issue of whether we hold communities to possess value as such. One can, 
for example, be an individualist about group-rights (such as Kymlicka or Raz) and 
still hold that communities - in virtue of being the context for autonomous action - are 
intrinsically valuable. There are, in fact, several ways in which an entity might be 
valuable, a useful taxonomy being offered by Raz. 35 
35 See Raz, The Morality Of Freedom, pp. 177-8. 
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According to Raz, something is of ultimate value if its value does not derive from the 
way it contributes to something else; something is of instrumental value if it `derives 
its value from the value of the consequences it is likely to have, or from the value of 
the consequences it can be used to produce'; and something is intrinsically valuable if 
it is has value independent of its instrumental value to the extent this lies `in its being 
a constitutive part of a valuable form of life. 736 As such, that something is intrinsically 
valuable is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of that thing being of ultimate 
value. 7 Because there are at least these three senses of what it is to be valuable, the 
claim that (certain) groups are valuable is ambiguous and needs further elaboration. 
Kymlicka and Raz quite clearly hold that cultural groups possess intrinsic value in 
Raz's sense of the term. Individual human beings, on the other hand, are of ultimate 
value - indeed individuals are the only entities which `ultimately' valuable. In other 
words, everything else that has non-ultimate (i. e. intrinsic or instrumental value) must 
derive this from the way it relates, and contributes, to the well-being of individual 
human beings. 8 The value of cultural groups is intrinsic, rather than instrumental for 
Raz, because of the way in which membership provides one set of logically necessary 
36 Raz, The Morality Of Freedom, p. 178. 
37 Raz gives the following example to explain this thought (The Morality Of Freedom, 
pp. 177-8). Some people lead a richer and better life because they own, and have a deep 
attachment to, a family pet. The value of the relationship between the person and their pet, 
here, is apparently of intrinsic value: it possesses value in virtue of `its being a constitutive 
part of a valuable form of life', as Raz puts it. As a result, the existence of the pet itself is 
intrinsically valuable as well, for its existence is a necessary condition of the relationship. 
However, the existence of the pet cannot be ultimately valuable, for any value the pet has 
ultimately comes from the way in which it contributes to its owner's, or another person's, 
well-being. 
38 Raz calls this the `humanistic principle' (The Morality Of Freedom, p. 194). A similar 
view appears to be held by Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin endorses what he calls the `abstract 
theory of overall ethical value', according to which only individual persons - and the lives 
they lead - are of ultimate moral value. See Why We Are All Liberals, typescript, New York 
University School of Law, 1995, p. 29. 
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conditions for individuals to enjoy cultural attachments and the options they give rise 
to. Because both Kymlicka and Raz hold that groups are intrinsically, but not 
ultimately, valuable they also hold that groups as such cannot be the bearers of rights 
in an analogous way to individuals. Raz writes, `It seems plausible to suppose that.. . 
only those whose well-being is of ultimate value can have rights. '39 In this sense we 
might call Kymlicka and Raz value individualists, as they hold that collective entities 
derive their value from the way they contribute to the lives of individual persons. 
Taylor, however, proposes that certain cultural groups ought to be protected in virtue 
of the fact that they are ultimately valuable - and that it would be regrettable if they 
were not so protected. In this sense we might call Taylor and others who hold similar 
views about group-value, value-collectivists. According to value-collectivism, 
collective entities can possess ultimate value, namely, value which is independent of 
the way it contributes to the lives of individual persons. 
Taylor refrains from putting his augment in terms of the notion of group-rights at all, 
a notion which he appears to regard with suspicion. He holds (in contrast to the 
individualist view) that certain cultural groups are of ultimate importance in their own 
right and (in contrast to both the individualist and collectivist views) that the idea of 
group-rights is incapable of articulating this fully 
40 Figure 6 (on the next page) 
explores the relation between value individualist and value-collectivist views. 
39 Raz, The Morality Of Freedom, p. 178. 
40 It is worth comparing Taylor's claim with Dworkin's observation that `We think it a 
shame when any distinctive form of human culture, especially a complex and interesting 
one, dies or languishes... this cannot be fully explained merely in terms of the contribution 
that cultural variety makes to the excitement of our live' (Dworkin, Life's Dominion, 
London, HarperCollins, 1993, p. 72). 
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Figure 6: Value Collectivism and Value Individualism 
(Q1) Can a group entity have value independently of the way in which 
it contributes to the well-being of individual human beings? 
Yeses No 
Value Collectivism Value Individualism 
11 (Q2a) Does their moral importance entail (Q2b) Do groups possess intrinsic value: 
that these groups possess moral rights? Le. are they necesssary constitutive 
components of valuable forms of life? 
Yes No 
i. e. certain groups possess i. e. certain groups possess 
ultimate value, and this ultimate value, as such they 
means that they can be ought to be protected, but 
ascribed rights qua groups. they do not possess rights. No 
The Collectivist View The Value Collectivist View 
The Value Individualist 
of Group Rights 
View 
Yes 
The Weak Value Collectivist View 
6. Value-collectivism 
There are several considerations which appear to support the view that groups possess 
ultimate value. Some of the most interesting of these reflect the real life moral 
convictions and behaviour of people. Many people believe, for example, that the 
complete annihilation of cultures'is bad over and above' the fact that this destruction is 
often accompanied by the destruction of large numbers of its members taken one by 
one. Thus the destruction of entire peoples does not seem to be abhorrent only 
because this entails the murder of extremely large numbers of people. Rather people 
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often feel as bad about genocidcal acts directed towards relatively small groups (such 
as the East Timorese) as they do about much larger groups (such as the Tutsies, 
Hutus, or European Jewry). Finally, the scope of international conventions which 
outlaw genocide do not regard the size of a nation, or cultural group, as relevant to the 
issue of whether the destruction of these groups qua groups is impermissable. 
As Barry has argued, the idea behind the value-collectivist view is that 
the destruction of cultures is a bad over and above the physical 
destruction of its bearers... destroying a large population is more 
serious than killing the same number of random individuals. And 
this in turn is another reason why remote possibilities of 
catastrophic accidents (e. g., in nuclear reactors) should be treated as 
especially grave threats, and not simply balances against the number 
of deaths from bronchitis or lung cancer that can be associated with 
use of fossil fuel as an alternative 41 
Although Barry appears to be embracing value-collectivism here, one suspects he 
would fall short of proposing that the destruction of cultures is unjust in virtue of 
violating their rights qua cultures, as opposed to the view that this destruction is an 
impersonal bad (a kind of cosmic impertinence), but not one which is right-violating 
(or victim-creating) as such. 
Taylor, on the other hand, seems to defend the view that cultural groups ought to be 
protected as entities in their own right, rather than for the sake of the autonomy or, 
more broadly, the well-being of the individuals who belong to it. Many of his remarks 
41 Brian Barry, `The Ethics of Resource Depletion', p. 525. 
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concern the case of Quebec, and the debate concerning the measures necessary to 
protect and preserve the cultural traditions and structures of the Quebecois. It is worth 
quoting Taylor at length: 
It is axiomatic for Quebec governments that the survival and 
flourishing of French culture in Quebec is a good. .. One could 
consider the French language, for instance, as a collective resource 
that individuals might want to make use of, and act for its 
preservation, just as one does for clean air or green spaces. But this 
can't capture the full thrust of policies designed for cultural 
survival. It is not just a matter of having the French language 
available for those who might choose it... it also involves making 
sure that there is a community of people here in the future that will 
want to avail itself of the opportunity to use the French language. 
Policies aimed at survival seek to create members of the 
community, for instance, in their assuring that future generations 
continue to identify as French-Speakers. There is no way that these 
policies could be seen as just providing a facility to already existing 
people 42 
One problem for Taylor's value-collectivist view flows from doubts concerning 
whether it can be bad for cultures to die out as such if their death does not result in 
any particular person's interests being harmed - as in the case where this death 
42 Charles Taylor, `The Politics of Recognition', in Amy Guttman, ed., Multiculturalism: 
Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton: New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 
1994, pp. 58-9. 
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actually comes about as a result of the autonomous choices of the culture's individual 
members. Another comes from the doubt that seeking to impose a certain cultural 
environment on a later generation can be reconciled with the concern to maintain the 
conditions for autonomous choice for these later generations. Rather, as Appiah 
observes, liberals ought perhaps to foster cultural survival by creating cultural 
structures which their descendants will want to hold on to, rather than seeking to 
impose these structures on them 43 
In a similar vein, Habermas expresses scepticism about the idea of group-rights per 
se, in particular concerning the way in which they might be appealed to in order to 
justify the preservation of communities or groups across time. He remarks, 
even if such group-rights could be granted in the democratic 
constitutional state, they would be not only unnecessary but 
questionable from a normative point of view. For in the last analysis 
the protection of forms of life and traditions in which identities are 
formed is supposed to serve the recognition of their members; it 
does not represent a kind of preservation of species by 
administrative means. 44 
Habermas appears to be concerned, here, that the sort of arguments that are 
commonly used to justify protection of species of animals or plant life are unavailable 
as justifications for the protection of human communities, such as nations. 
Communities are worthy of their continued survival, Habermas thinks, only if they 
43 See K. A. Appiah, 'Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social 
Reproduction' in A. Guttman, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
pp. 157-9. 
44 Habermas, `Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State', p. 130. 
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appeal to a wide enough range of support within the culture; support which is 
determined by the autonomous and reflective choices of members of the community, 
rather than being required by group-rights or other norms. To guarantee cultural 
survival by enshrining group-rights in a community's constitution would, Habermas 
continues, 
necessarily rob the [group's] members of the very freedom to say 
yes or no that is necessary if they are to appropriate and preserve 
their cultural heritage... the only traditions and forms of life that 
can sustain themselves are those that bind their members while at 
the same time subjecting themselves to critical examination and 
leaving later generations the option of learning from other traditions 
or converting and setting out for other shores. 45 
As such, Habermas appears to hold that having recourse to group-rights in order to 
protect cultures could be both unwarranted and futile. This is not to say that 
Habermas (and Appiah) could not subscribe to the view that cultural groups possess 
intrinsic value in Raz's sense (a thesis figure 6 describes as weak value-collectivism), 
but they would surely disown both (1) the collectivist group-rights view and (2) the 
view that certain groups possess ultimate value. 46 
45 Habermas, 'Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State', p, 130. 46 Habermas, as far as I am aware, does not discuss the issues of Non-Identity, or problems 
of intergenerational ethics in more general terms, in any of his recent writings - certainly not 
in his latest work Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1996). It is worth noting, though, that the critical normative principle he defends in this 
work, the Discourse Principle, would appear to be as equally prone to considerations of 
Non-Identity if applied to issues of intergenerational distribution as Scanlon's test of 
reasonable rejection (indeed they are strikingly similar principles). The Discourse Principle 
reads as follows: `Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses' (Between Facts and Norms, p. 107). 
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6.1 Group-Value and Societal Culture 
Even if we put aside Habermas's quite radical challenge to value-collectivism, and 
accept in formal terms the view that human groups can be valuable to the point where 
their protection is ethically important in its own right, there still arises the question as 
to which human communities are deserving of concern and respect in their own right 
and which are not. We want to say that polices which lead to the destruction of certain 
cultural groups are impermissible (or at least ethically regrettable in at least this one 
respect) while policies which lead to the undermining of other communities, such as 
those built around pariah cultures, such as Nazism, are not. We also want to deny that 
such groups can be no more that interest groups, that is, a collection of disparate 
individuals who possess only a few interests in common. (Recall that one of the 
considerations in favour of the value-collectivist view is the conviction that it is more 
regrettable, in an ethically relevant sense, if an entire community is wiped out by 
some disease than if the same number of random individuals die from it - and this is 
despite the fact that the 1000 strangers constitute a group in the sense that they all 
share the feature of being disease stricken). 
Of course, we have Van Dyke's eight standards to consider in this regard. However, a 
better standard, I think, is offered by Kymlicka in the course of his defence of 
individualist group-rights - but one which needs to be restricted in a special way. The 
standard is the notion of societal culture. Societal cultures are cultures which provide 
their members `with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, 
including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
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both public and private spheres. '47 Adopting the view that societal cultures can be the 
only group-entities which can possess ultimate value explains why the destruction of 
random groups of individuals, interest-groups, or collections of individuals who share 
certain physical characteristics, is only regrettable because of the harm this 
destruction does to individuals. These groups cannot provide for most of the physical 
and emotional needs of their members, nor are they the vehicles for shared ways of 
life built upon the social institutions and linguistic practices held in common by a 
population. 48 
The restriction, in contrast, is that the basic structure of the societal culture, namely, 
its social institutions and government organs, must be consistent with an abstract 
principle of equality according to which `it is objectively and equally important that 
each and every human life go well. '49 This principle is a restriction upon which 
societal cultures are of ultimate value, rather than a condition on which cultures are 
societal cultures, because it appears that a culture can provide for many of the needs 
of it members in a way that demonstrates, as Dworkin puts it, `a shared vocabulary of 
tradition and convention'S0 without treating all of its members with equal concern and 
respectst 
47 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76. 
48 In contrast with the application of the idea of societal culture suggested here, Kymlicka 
takes societal cultures to be valuable in relation to the way in which they provide individuals 
with a `context of choice. ' Societal cultures are not valuable for Kymlicka independently of 
their contribution to their members' well-being or capacity for autonomous choice. See 
Multicultural Citizenship, Chapter 5, especially pp. 82ff; see also Dworkin, A Matter of 
Principle, pp. 230ff. 
49 Dworkin, `Why We Are All Liberals', p. 29. 
50 Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, p. 231; quoted and discussed by Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship, pp. 76, and 83-4. 
51 In Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka notes that individuating societal cultures is in 
practice a messy business. This is important for the present discussion as the proponent of 
the value-collectivist view must, if his view is to have any genuine practical application to 
Chapter 6: Group Rights and The Non-Identity Problem 253 
7. Obligations to Future Collectivities 
In what remains of this chapter I want to defend the view that a limited appeal to the 
interests, rights, or ethical value, of certain human (or possibly non-human animal) 
collectivities can solve the Non-Identity Problem in a limited, though important, 
range of cases; and as a result that this appeal can explain, from an identity-dependent 
point of view, what is wrong with implementing depletionist policies which will have 
adverse long-term effects. I call views of intergenerational ethics grounded in this 
appeal to human communities group-centred views. Group-centred views are special 
instances of identity-dependent views, such as Barry's or Scanlon's, which have been 
broadened to include human (or animal) groups as being the subjects of ethical 
consideration, and the way in which these different views relate to each other is 
explored in Figure 7 on the following page. 
7.1 Climate Change and the Claims of Future Collectivities 
Climate change is expected to have a range of effects, both positive and negative, on 
the cultural and social fabric of many nations. There is possibly no better example of 
this than the way in which these changes are expected to cause significant sea-level 
rises in the coming decades and centuries. In its latest assessment, the IPCC 
concluded that there will be an increase in global mean sea-levels of between 20cm 
and 86cm (with a `best estimate' of 49cm) on 1990 levels by the year 2100.52 
applied ethical problems, be able to explain not just why certain groups (because they meet 
certain conditions) possess ultimate value, but in addition how we might go about 
determining which groups meet these conditions in the real world. 52 See R. A. Warrick et at, `Changes in Sea-level', in J. Houghton et al, eds., Climate Change 
1995: The Science of Climate Change, p. 3 8 5. 
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Figure 7: Identity-Dependent and Identity-Independent Theories 
(Q1) Can an act be wrong if it does 
not affect any particular value bearing 
individual for the worse? 
No es 
The Identity-Dependent View The Identity-Independent View 
(Q2) Can an act be wrong if it affects a particular human 
or animal community (rather than any particular human or 
non-human animal) for the worse? 
Nom Yes 
The Narrow Identity-Dependent The Wide Identity-Dependent 
(or Person-Affecting) View (or Group-Centred) View 
Moreover, it also predicts that this will have serious consequences for many nations 
in the future, but in particular for developing countries which are entirely, or have 
regions which are, low-lying. For example, these sea-level rises are expected to 
damage coastal cropland, and displace millions of persons from low-lying and coastal 
communities. Just some of the low-lying nations that the IPCC thinks are in most 
danger are the north-east coastal nations of Latin America, Bangladesh, Egypt and 
Holland. 53 
53 See L. Bijisma et al, `Coastal Zones and Small Islands', in R. T. Watson et at, eds., 
Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change, 289-324. 
The authors project that sea-level rise will have `negative effects on a number of sectors, 
including tourism, freshwater supply and quality, fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture, 
human settlements, financial services, and human health' (p. 292). 
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Perhaps the most disconcerting examples of nations vulnerable to sea-level rises, 
however, are the small island states of the South Pacific. The IPCC singles out these 
nations for special attention because of the especially adverse effects of sea-level rises 
on these states, including, in the worst case scenario, the possibility of complete 
disappearance. The combined effect of global warming and sea-level rises on such 
states is expected to result in reduced soil fertility, reduced availability of agricultural 
land, and higher levels of soil erosion. It will be massively expensive to undertake 
even moderate adaptive responses for all of these effects, and even if the resources 
could be found (from international humanitarian assistance, for example) the costs to 
various communities in terms of maintaining access to traditional ways of life, and 
adapting to new ways of living, would be huge. These are all projections which the 
IPCC make with some confidence. 54 
Suppose the IPCC's fears about the `best estimate' figure of global sea-level rise of a 
half a metre by the year 2100 are proved accurate. Consider 
The Case of the Displaced Islanders. Towards the end of the 21st 
century, the elders of a Pacific Island state have assembled to assess 
the damage which climate change has caused their small 
community. In line with the IPCC's projections, their island has 
been partially submerged by the Pacific Ocean, and their 
agricultural industry partially destroyed by a combination of soil 
erosion and soil infertility. Because of the lack of employment 
54 See Bijlsma et al, `Coastal Zones and Small Islands', pp. 296-98. See also E. Charles et 
al, A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, London, Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 1997, pp. 67ff. 
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prospects and general social upheaval, moreover, the indigenous 
population has been cut to a small percentage of its twentieth 
century level, although the existence of alternative sources of 
employment and sustenance outside the Island have meant that no 
particular Islander has failed to lead a life which was at least worth 
living. Finally, because of the combined impact of population 
displacement and other impacts, many cultural practices - practices 
which had been handed down through the generations - have been 
abandoned. The community, the elders agreed, was on the verge of 
collapse. 
Let us put aside the economic, social and health impacts of climate change on existing 
islanders, and in particular the important issues of international justice which this 
case raises . 
55 Has the island community itself been harmed by - has it a complaint 
against - the failure of previous generations to 
implement GHG limiting policies 
which may have prevented the unsavoury effects of climate change? 
On any version of the value-collectivist view there is at least a suspicion that it has. 
Here, despite the fact that no particular individual will exist in the future where 
Depletion is adopted who would have existed had it not been, various groups and 
associations will, and are thus at least candidates for complaint-bearing status. Indeed, 
even if the island community ceased to exist following a catastrophic increase in sea 
levels, this would not mean that we could simply assume that it had never existed. 
55 These issues are discussed by T. Banuri et al, in IPCC, 1996c, pp. 112-18; and Henry 
Shue, `Environmental Change and the Varieties of Justice', in F. O. Hampson and J. Reppy, 
eds., Earthly Goods: Environmental Change and Social Justice, London, Cornell University 
Press, 1996, pp. 9ff. 
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Rather, it would be because the nation had been destroyed primarily as a result, we 
are supposing, of the impact of climate change on its viability. The idea, then, is that 
the interests of the groups which constitute the Island - including, but not merely, the 
state itself - generate certain requirements which we can say were violated as a 
consequence of adopting the Depletion Policy. 
Suppose that the community was, prior to the sea-level rise, a traditional community 
dedicated to preserving a rich cultural and linguistic heritage. 
56 As the warming, and 
consequent sea level rises, would result in the impoverishment of the Islanders' 
linguistic and cultural heritage (most of the population bar the Elders, let us suppose, 
have fled to the mainland and now need to speak a different language in order to get 
by) the interests of the Islanders as a collectivity might be thought to have been 
harmed by this. Obviously there are a great many simplifying assumptions being 
made here. But the central claim - that climate change will in certain instances 
jeopardise the survival of certain communities and traditional patterns of life quite 
apart from the effects it will have on the members of these cultures taken one by one - 
appears to be a plausible one. 57 
It is worth locating the view proposed here within the context of some of the 
contributions to the issue of the rights or claims of minority cultures discussed earlier. 
Recall that it has recently been argued by Kymlicka that the adoption of certain acts 
56 We need not assume that the preservation of the native language is a necessary condition 
of the survival of the island's cultural life as such, as there may well be other distinctive and 
well-rooted cultural traditions enjoyed by the islanders which can be continued and 
preserved for the sake of posterity, without their being pursued in a particular language (just 
as the Welsh can play rugby without discussing tactics in Welsh). 
57 The IPCC certainly think so, for they expect that `adaptation to sea-level-rise and climate 
change will involve important trade-offs, which could include environmental, social, cultural 
values' (see See Bijisma et al, 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', p. 292). 
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or social policies can be wrong by virtue of undermining the needs which particular 
individuals have to access a flourishing cultural or communal context within which to 
pursue their personal life-plans or conceptions of the good. In his treatment of the 
issue of the claims of minority communities, Kymlicka claims that `membership in a 
cultural structure is what enables individual freedom, what enables meaningful 
choices about how to lead one's life', 58 and he goes on to suggest that the ethical 
importance of individual freedom is such that persons belonging to disadvantaged 
minority cultures should be afforded additional rights and resources to compensate for 
the disadvantages they face as a result of membership in a minority culture. But, as 
we have seen, while these rights are collective, in the sense that they are exercised 
collectively rather than individually, they are nonetheless individual rights in the 
sense that they are grounded in the interests of particular persons. 
59 
By contrast, according to the view proposed above, the communities which future 
people will belong to are deserving of concern and respect in their own right; and if 
present actions have the result either that these communities die out altogether, or are 
damaged in the sense that various communal practices are undermined, they are 
ethically objectionable at least in this one important respect. 
0 In this regard, this 
58 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, p. 208; and Multicultural Citizenship, 
pp"80ff. 
59 See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 34ff. 
60 The idea of group-centred requirements of intergenerational justice might also be 
contrasted with the more obviously 'communitarian' idea that present persons should protect 
the conditions of communal flourishing because the communities which they belong to are in 
fact essential components of their identity as persons. Consider, for example, the 
communitarian theory of intergenerational justice defended in Avner de Shalit's Why 
Posterity Matters, especially Chapter 1, pp. 13-50. The idea is also to be contrasted with 
recent contributions to the 'deep ecology' mode of environmental thought, according to 
which duties of environmental conservation flow from the fact that human identity is not 
merely moulded by membership in human communities, but in addition by its connection to 
natural processes and the biosphere itself. See, for example, Warwick Fox, Toward a 
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group-centred view shares much in common with Taylor's and Van Dyke's work on 
multiculturalism and the politics of recognition, and in particular on the issue of the 
value of communities. 
Taylor, for example, denies that the worth of communities is derived from the value it 
has in securing the `cultural needs' of individuals, such as their seeking to give 
meaning to their lives. He gives two reasons for this. First, Kymlicka's individualistic 
view neglects the moral importance of various communities qua communities. The 
idea here is that communities are often not merely associations of value-bearing 
individuals, but rather moral entities in their own right. Secondly, the individualistic 
view cannot make space for the way in which many persons have the intense desire 
that the community, or communities, they belong to continue to survive and flourish 
for reasons unrelated to the positive impact that this will have on their own well- 
being, or on the well-being of their compatriots taken as individuals. 
1 As such, 
Taylor argues that Kymlicka's individualistic view might be valid perhaps 
for existing people who find themselves trapped within a culture 
under pressure, and can flourish within it or not at all. But it doesn't 
justify measures designed to entire survival through indefinite 
future generations. For the populations concerned, however, that is 
what is at stake. 62 
Transpersonal Ecology, Boston, Shambala, 1990. By contrast, the key to the group-centred 
view is the idea that adopting social policies which undermine the integrity or viability of 
certain human, or non-human animal, communities is morally regrettable because this fails 
to afford these communities the respect that they deserve as moral entities, not that they are 
regrettable in virtue of undermining the motivations of self-transcendence entertained by 
existing human beings. 
61 Taylor, `The Politics of Recognition', pp. 40-41. 
62 Taylor, `The Politics of Recognition', p. 41. 
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According to the terminology introduced earlier, and developed in Figure 7, it appears 
that Taylor is advocating a widely identity-dependent (or group-centred) view to 
Kymlicka's narrowly identity-dependent (or individualistic) view. 
The group-centred view might also be developed more obviously in terms of group- 
rights, if the recent work of Brown-Weiss can be defended. According to Brown- 
Weiss, a basic requirement of intergenerational distributive ethics is that each 
generation respect the rights of successor generations to inherit an equal share of 
natural resources; and that these planetary or generational rights 
may be regarded as group-rights, as distinct from individual rights, 
in the sense that generations hold these rights as groups in relation 
to other generations - past, present and future. They exist regardless 
of the number and identity of individuals making up each 
generation. 63 
Weiss goes on to claim that the notion of planetary rights, qua rights of non- 
individual entities, escape considerations of Non-Identity, which only call into 
question `the traditional conceptual framework of rights as rights of individuals. ' 64 
Planetary rights, on the contrary, `are not rights possessed by individuals' but are 
rather possessed `by generations themselves against other generations. ' 
65 
63 Edith Brown-Weiss, 'Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the 
Environment', The American Journal of International Law, 84,1990, p. 203. See also Weiss, 
In Fairness to Future Generations: International Law, Common Patrimony, Tokyo, United 
Nations University, 1989, pp. 114-15. 
64 Weiss, `Our Rights and Obligations for the Environment', p. 205. 
65 Weiss, `Our Rights and Obligations for the Environment', p. 205. 
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Here we come to the crucial advantage of appeals to the rights, interests or value of 
groups as opposed to the rights, interests, or value of individuals in the 
intergenerational context. Appeals to group-rights, or group-value, seem to avoid 
problems of Non-Identity by virtue of the fact that the conditions of existence of 
groups are much more robust than that of their individual members: they typically 
endure for a much longer time-span, for example, and crucially their formation does 
not depend upon the coming together of two singular cells. 
According to group-centred views, then, it is simply irrelevant that no particular 
future islander in the above case will be harmed by the Depletion Policy's adoption 
(recall that they all lead lives which are at least worth living and owe their existence 
to it), for it may still remain the case that the islanders as a group are harmed. Here 
there is a direct link between the fact that the identities of groups are not as precarious 
as those of individuals, and the possibility that the interests of groups qua groups may 
be disadvantaged by the social policies adopted at earlier moments in time (possibly, 
before these groups even existed). 
It seems, then, that the group-centred view, whether developed in terms of group- 
value or group-rights, solves the Non-Identity Problem where certain conditions arise. 
For illustration, recall the four beliefs which seem to be inconsistent in circumstances 
of Non-Identity. The response to this inconsistency is to retain unaltered beliefs A, C 
and D- and to revise belief C to incorporate groups as being fully-fledged ethical 
entities. This response is consistent with the identity-dependent view of ethics, 
because it is particular, or individual, groups here which possess an interest in (and 
thus rights to) the maintenance of an undamaged heritage of cultural goods, such as 
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viable linguistic structures. The value of cultural preservation, on this view, is not 
owed `to the world' abstracted from the way it connects to the flourishing, and 
continued survival, of certain human communities. Indeed, both individual and group- 
rights share at least this one feature, namely, that they can be held only by particular, 
unified, entities. 
Because it retains an identity-dependent structure, one merit associated with 
embracing the group-centred view is that it appears readily reconcilable with the 
views of both Barry and Scanlon. Recall that, for Scanlon, an act is wrong only if its 
performance `would be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation 
of behaviour which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced 
general agreement. 66 It was argued above that contractualism, and the Unanswerable 
Complaints Principle this view endorses, seems problematic in the context of Non- 
Identity cases such as the Depletion-Conservation choice, as the Depletion People, 
taken one by one, do not appear to have a legitimate complaint against the Depletion 
Policy's adoption. 
However, contractualists need not commit themselves necessarily to the view that the 
complaints that they view as unanswerable must be restricted to those arising from 
harms, or wrongs, done to particular persons. This is demonstrated by Scanlon's 
understanding of the scope of contractualism, according to which ethically 
considerable entities must (1) possess a good in the sense that `there be a clear sense 
in which things can be said to go better or worse for that being', and (2) `constitute a 
point of view; that is there be such a thing as what it is like to be that being. '67 These 
66 Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. 67 Scanlon, `Contractualism and Utilitarianism', pp. 113-14. 
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two conditions must hold, Scanlon thinks, for us to be able to hold that the notion of 
justification can be applied to an entity. But while there are certainly differences 
between the `points of view' of particular human beings on the one side, and 
particular groups of human beings on the other, there seems to be no insurmountable 
barrier in the way of those who wish to argue that there can be such a thing as a group 
point of view, or perspective on things, or that things can go better or worse for at 
least some groups. 
While I have not the space here to construct a more positive defence for this line of 
thought, it is worth mentioning again the fact that many people's ethical convictions 
certainly point in this direction. Consider, once more, the widespread conviction that 
the deaths of large numbers of persons from small indigenous communities (which 
result in the deaths of these communities) are more regrettable from the ethical point 
of view than equivalent numbers of deaths of unrelated individuals. In any case, the 
suggestion is that we ought to think seriously about revising Scanlon's account of 
moral reasoning to read that `an act is wrong only if it affects some particular 
individual or group in a way that cannot be justified. ' 
8. The Group-Centred View: Some Problems 
I have space to mention two problems with the group-centred solution to the Non- 
Identity Problem. First, suppose that a course of action which we think will harm a 
certain future group's interests would also be a necessary condition of that group 
coming into existence in the first place. In such cases, it might be that the approach 
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will be plagued by a new group-centred version of the Non-Identity Problem, which 
we might call the Extended Non-Identity Problem. 
Fishkin discusses an interesting historical example of how the Extended Non-Identity 
Problem might arise, grounded in the experience of the descendants of the many West 
Africans who were transported to North America to live as slaves in previous 
centuries. 68 Here, we are invited to consider the position of a present-day African 
American individual who suggests that he himself had been harmed, and deserves 
compensation, in virtue of being born into a community which had been created by 
the enslavement of his ancestors, and which is still endeavouring to cast off the 
stigma associated with being the victim of such gross injustices. The Non-Identity 
Problem suggests that this person could not possibly have been harmed by the 
slavers' activities, as he owed his existence, in part, to their actions (as almost all 
existing persons do, I suspect, for the `knock-on' effects of the slavers' actions have 
been immense). 
Suppose next that the complaint had been made on behalf of the present-day African 
American community, rather than on behalf of a present-day African American 
individual. The enslavement seems to have been a necessary condition of the 
existence of the present-day African American community. Let me explain. If this 
grave injustice - or series of injustices - had never occurred, there would be no 
African American community in quite the same sense as there is today. There would 
no doubt be some Africans who had emigrated to the United States, for example, but 
it is unlikely that there would be the rich diversity of African American linguistic and 
68 James S. Fishkin `Justice Between Generations', Nomos XXXIII. " Compensatory Justice, 
John Chapman, ed., New York, New York University Press, 1991, pp. 91 ff. 
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cultural heritage that there is today. As a result, according to the new - extended - 
version of the Non-Identity Problem the representative of this present-day community 
could not even argue that his present-day community had been harmed by the original 
enslavements 69 If a similar line of thinking could be exported to other cases of Non- 
Identity, such as the Conservation-Depletion case, then various group-centred 
objections to the adoption of policies which seem to be intuitively impermissible in 
these cases would seem to fall away. 
At this point, it is worth noting that conditions of Non-Identity will obtain much less 
regularly in the case of groups than in the case of individual persons. This is because, 
as noted above, the identities of groups are more robust than those of individuals. As 
a result, the Extended Non-Identity Problem only partly rebuts, that is it reduces the 
scope of, group-centred principles such as the Wide Unanswerable Complaints 
Requirement. 
Second, putting aside the Extended Non-Identity Problem, while the Wide 
Unanswerable Complaints Requirement appears to narrow the range of problematic 
Non-Identity cases, it leaves a number of such cases untouched. Recall the case 
discussed earlier, where a young woman, Anna, decided to conceive a handicapped 
child despite the fact that she could have delayed her pregnancy in order to receive 
some inexpensive, and safe, treatment. The Wide Unanswerable Complaints 
Requirement appears to be of little use in the context of this case: it cannot explain 
our conviction that Anna acts wrongly by failing to seek treatment for her ailment. As 
69 I put to one side, here, the injustices which the original enslavement perpetrated on the 
African slaves and the communities to which they belonged to at the time of this 
enslavement. 
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a result, even if we endorse this contentious principle we are still left with a gap 
between the way in which our considered convictions lead us to think that Anna acted 
wrongly and the limits of identity-dependent ethics. 
Group-centred principles are particularly ill suited to single-person Parfitian cases, 
such as the case of Anna - which do not concern actions which will have profound 
consequences for the health, or continued flourishing, of entire communities. Perhaps 
the Wide Unanswerable Complaints Requirement could be extended to cover classes 
of future persons (such as denoted by the expression `Anna's First Child') which do 
not make reference to a particular future person, but I am sceptical about this. The 
class of any woman's potential children, for example, is not a group in the same sense 
that a culture or nation is - it cannot provide for the needs of its members, or make a 
claim to be of ultimate value. One cannot harm a class of any given woman's possible 
children. 
It is worth noting that, in Chapter 5, I argued that Anna-type cases can be solved by 
what were called Number-Sensitive Comparative Principles, such as Parfit's Same- 
Number Quality Claim, so one might think that the inability of group-centred 
theorising to solve such cases does not pose such a tremendous worry. This is 
particularly the case, it might be argued, as one of the recurring themes of the 
discussion in previous chapters has been that intergenerational ethics is pluralistic in 
the sense that there are a plurality of grounds for our concerns about the well-being of 
members of future generations. The fact that the group-centred view cannot 
apparently underpin all of our ethical convictions in the light of Non-Identity Problem 
cases, then, should not detract from the fact that these principles offer at least some 
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defence of an identity-dependent environmental and intergenerational ethic. On the 
other hand, this limitation does at least suggest that, if we are ever to achieve a match 
between our considered convictions and our normative theorising in such cases, 
Number Insensitive Comparative Principles will play some role in our account. 
Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Although a broad consensus exists that climate change raises questions of 
intergenerational distribution of enormous significance, this view had until recently 
attracted relatively little philosophical attention. In this thesis, I have sought to clarify 
and taxonomise a series of issues which I take to be crucial for the evaluation of this 
view. In the course of the discussion, I have not attempted to defend a more or less 
complete theory of intergenerational distribution. Rather, I have discussed some of 
the most interesting problems which face those who wish to appeal to some familiar 
principles of distribution within generations in order to approach certain issues of 
distribution between generations. In what follows, I provide a chapter by chapter 
summary of the thesis and its principal findings, and a brief sketch of two applications 
of these findings for the issue of climate change policy. 
1. Summary of Argument 
In recent years, much time and energy has been devoted to the exploration of the 
scientific basis of global climate change. The main results of this research have been 
two-fold. First, it has brought about an unprecedented convergence in the world's 
climatological community on the view that the balance of evidence, to quote the 
IPCC, 'suggests discernible human influence on climate change. ' I Second, it has 
brought about a convergence on the view that climate change will alter the 
distribution of benefits and burdens both within and between the generations to come. 
I IPCC, 1996a, p. 5. 
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In Chapter 1, I summarised much of the salient recent evidence for the view that 
climate change, if unchecked, will have peculiarly grave consequences for the 
integrity of the biosphere, and for the well-being of the earth's future human 
inhabitants. It was argued that climate change will have a predominantly, if not 
uniformly, adverse impact on future human health, as well as on the cultural and 
socio-economic structures handed down to future generations. It was also argued that 
climate change would have more adverse effects for certain vulnerable populations, 
such as those residing in coastal areas of developing nations, and for small island 
communities. 
Also in Chapter 1, I observed that I found it surprising that, despite the burgeoning 
interest in climate change issues, there have been few attempts to test the robustness 
of the claim that the sorts of impacts the IPCC predict raise questions of significance 
for a range of pre-eminent theories of distributive ethics. The possibility that such 
theories might not be suitable for extension to the intergenerational context, for 
example, had rarely been discussed. 
In order to plug this hole in the literature, I embarked, in Chapter 2, on an extended 
discussion of a variety of theories of the ethics of distribution, and explored the 
question of whether the IPCC's findings raised issues which these theories viewed as 
significant. I found that the IPCC's predictions concerning the long-term impacts of 
climate change did indeed raise genuine problems for theories of distributive equality, 
priority and sufficiency on the one hand, and theories of resourcism, welfarism, and 
basic-capabilities on the other - although I also found that the intergenerational 
extension of welfarist theories was on balance more problematic than was the case for 
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other theories. I went on to argue that climate change impacts would appear to raise 
questions for libertarian and communitarian theories as well. The first principal 
finding of the thesis, then, was that intergenerational distributive ethics is indeed a 
genuine, if somewhat under-developed, subject of concern: familiar theories of 
distribution could indeed serve as a framework for investigating issues of distribution 
between generations, just as they do in the context of distribution within generations. 
In the core part of the thesis, encompassing Chapters 3 through 6, I went on to discuss 
in detail two particularly interesting problems which plague the intergenerational 
extension of some familiar principles, and theories, of distribution. According to the 
first problem, it is alleged that the lack of reciprocity evident in dealings between 
persons belonging to different generations undermines the claims of future persons to 
resources currently at the disposal of existing persons. I called this the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem. In the first few sections of Chapter 3, I discussed the Non- 
Reciprocity Problem in some detail and suggested that it undermined the 
intergenerational extension of a cluster of theories which assume that the scope of 
distributive ethics is determined by the notion of reciprocal benefit (I called these 
reciprocity-based theories). 
In later sections of Chapter 3, and the whole of Chapter 4, I went on to suggest that, 
even if we assume that there exists a tight connection between the notion of 
reciprocity and the scope of distributive ethics, there are reasons to think that enough 
reciprocity exists in dealings between generations to ground quite far-reaching duties 
of intergenerational ethics. In sections 5 and 6 of Chapter 3, for example, I examined 
Barry's suggestion that there are at least two ways in which we might reconcile 
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reciprocity-based theories with quite stringent norms of intergenerational ethics. This, 
I argued, is because there is a distinctive, if indirect, form of reciprocity which exists 
in dealings between persons belonging to non-proximate generations. 
I went on to discuss the idea of indirect reciprocity in terms of two accounts of 
intergenerational obligation, namely, the Chain of Concern and the Trusteeship 
models. I found that, although there are problems with these two views, the duties 
they define seem defensible when the correct pre-conditions obtain. In fact, the partial 
ability of these models to explain and give unity to widely held convictions about 
intergenerational responsibility, I ventured, lends some credence to the view that the 
ethics of intergenerational distribution is complex and not admitting of tidy solution. 
That is, it appears that there are multiple sources of our obligations to future 
generations, just as it seems that there are multiple sources of our obligations to 
contemporaries. This was my second principal conclusion. 
In Chapter 4, I went on to discuss the possibility that reciprocity-based conceptions of 
intergenerational distribution might be premised on the idea that, while present 
persons can either enhance or diminish the well-being of future persons through 
standard causal pathways, future persons may at the very least be in a position to 
diminish the well-being of present persons non-causally through the avenue of 
posthumous harm. Although the notion of posthumous harm is contentious, I argued 
that a number of objections to it which have been raised in the philosophical literature 
were flawed, and that two pre-eminent theories of well-being seem consistent with the 
notion. Consequently, it seemed that if it could be proved that there exists no 
reciprocity between members of different generations, this would not be because 
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persons cannot be harmed after their death. One note of caution which I endorsed, 
however, lay in the thought that the measure of reciprocity which the existence of 
posthumous harms brings to intergenerational dealings is somewhat limited and 
therefore could only provide a limited basis for a defence of intergenerational 
applications of reciprocity-based distributive ethics. This was my third principal 
conclusion. 
At the start of Chapter 5, I observed that, even if we rejected the claim that the scope 
of distributive ethics is determined by considerations of reciprocal benefit, there are 
still some formidable objections to the idea that familiar distributive theories - such as 
theories of equality, priority and sufficiency - can be extended intergenerationally. 
According to the second `problem of extension' I discussed, the conviction that 
activities which contribute to global climate change are impermissible because they 
harm future persons is indefensible because the very acts or social policies which 
contribute to climate change turn out to be necessary conditions of the vast majority 
of future persons coming into existence. This raises what has been called the Non- 
Identity Problem. 
In Chapter 5, I outlined the way in which the Non-Identity Problem arises in the case 
of individual procreative decisions which determine the existence and quality of life 
of a single person, as well as for social policy decisions which determine the 
existence and quality of life of many people. It was argued that this problem calls into 
question the intergenerational extension of a wide range of ethical principles which 
pre-suppose that actions or policies can be wrong only if they harm or render worse 
off particular people (I called these identity-dependent accounts). As such, 
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considerations of Non-Identity seem to undermine the claim that present persons or 
institutions owe any ethical duties at all to the vast majority of members of future 
generations so long as we appeal only to identity-dependent ethical principles. 
This finding, I argued, has important implications for climate change ethics, for if we 
assume that ethics has an identity-dependent structure we must abandon the thought 
that global environmental problems such as climate change, which may well lower 
the quality of life for future generations, are ethically regrettable in virtue of the 
effects they have on posterity (although they may be ethically regrettabte in virtue of 
effects on existing people). I went on to suggest that, despite the apparently counter- 
intuitive implications of exclusive appeals to identity-dependent principles, there were 
at least three reasons why it would be worth investigating identity-dependent 
responses to the Non-Identity Problem, rather than abandoning the approach in favour 
of some version of the rival identity-independent view. These included the 
consideration that much contemporary thinking about ethics, both at the theoretical 
and the intuitive levels, remains stubbornly committed to an identity-dependent 
framework. 
In the later sections of Chapter 5, and the whole of Chapter 6, I outlined two identity- 
dependent lines of thought which appear to solve the Non-Identity Problem in an 
important, if limited, range of cases. According to the first line of thought, discussed 
in section 4 of Chapter 5, many of the obligations which we violate by despoiling the 
environment are grounded in the specific (rather than the general) rights possessed by 
future individuals. I found that, despite the fact that there seems some mileage in the 
appeal to specific-rights in this context, theories that appeal solely to the way in 
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which the behaviour of existing people violates the interests of future individuals 
seem unlikely to capture more than a very small part of intergenerational ethics. This 
was my fourth principal conclusion. 
According to the second identity-dependent line of thought, discussed in Chapter 6, 
many of the obligations we violate by damaging the environment are grounded in the 
collective interests of particular future communities or groups. I noted that the idea of 
group-rights has been interpreted in several conflicting ways, and that the whole 
notion of rights which protect the interests of collective units cries out for 
clarification. Much of the discussion of Chapter 6 attempted to clarify and taxonomise 
various understandings of group-rights and their potential application to cases of Non- 
Identity. It was suggested that, as in the case of the appeal to specific-rights, the 
appeal to group-rights appeared to provide some basis for duties of intergenerational 
distributive ethics, even where considerations of Non-Identity obtained. However, I 
also found that a new version of the Non-Identity Problem plagued such appeals, 
because in certain cases future groups will owe their very existence to the 
environmentally profligate acts performed by previous generations. 
Because the appeals to specific-rights and group-rights could not explain many 
peoples' convictions about the wrongness of adopting policies which neither violate 
the specific interests of future individuals nor the collective interests of future groups 
but which nevertheless lower the quality of life enjoyed by future generations, it 
seemed that any attempt to explain such convictions would have to appeal, in part, to 
identity-independent principles. Identity-independent principles, to recall, are 
compatible with the view that acts or social policies can be wrong even if they fail to 
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harm or render worse off particular entities. This was my fifth and final principal 
conclusion. 
2. Applications 
I mentioned below just two applications of my discussion for recent moves towards 
translating concerns about the impacts of climate change into stringent international, 
legally binding, agreements on the reduction of GHG emissions - in particular those 
culminating in the recent negotiations at the Kyoto climate change summit. 
First, I take it that nothing in what I have found justifies the profound scepticism of 
the global energy lobby, or the position of the oil producing states, towards these 
negotiations. Climate change sceptics such as Patrick Michaels may object to the 
research techniques adopted by, and thus the scientific findings of, the IPCC in order 
to defend the view that large sums of money should not be invested in policies 
designed to reduce GHG emissions, but they have no grounds on which to appeal to 
ethical considerations in order to justify such a stance. 
Second, from the ethical point of view it looks suspiciously as if the measures agreed 
at Kyoto as they stand will be insufficient to prevent members of the present 
generation from violating various duties to their descendants. Part of the reason for 
this speculation is that the cuts in emissions which the Kyoto protocol requires do not 
apply to developing countries. This is a problem because many developing countries, 
such as China, have rapidly expanding outputs of GHGs. As a result, it seems likely 
that even if the GHG reductions required by the Kyoto Protocol were adhered to by 
the developing nations party to it, global GHG emissions would, on balance, continue 
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to rise well into the next century. This, I venture, would not be a development which 
is consistent with the fulfilment of the duties we have to future generations, whether 
they take an identity-dependent or identity-independent form. 
Another problem is that, even if developing nations agree to be bound by the Kyoto 
protocol at some later date, the net global reductions in GHG emissions which would 
result would still not be sufficient to prevent many of the adverse impacts which were 
discussed in Chapter 1. This is because the average cut in emissions required by the 
protocol (a modest 5.2% on 1990 levels by 2012) is far below the level at which many 
leading IPCC climatologists claim will be necessary to keep changes in climatic 
variables to a level that most ecological systems can tolerate (one estimate has this at 
a global 60% cut on 1990 levels in the same time-frame). 
Bringing these two points together, I agree with the view expressed by a Friends of 
the Earth spokesperson, who has claimed in regard to the Kyoto summit that 
Governments have delivered a deal but at present this is a fatally 
compromised and riddled with loopholes. Millions of people world- 
wide will remain at risk from the social and economic upheaval that 
will accompany progressive global warming. There must be an 
urgent evaluation of what has been achieved here and early efforts 
to improve this weak agreement 3 
If, as I have argued above, there are several sources of intergenerational obligation 
(including, but not merely, certain obligations correlative to the rights of various 
2 See, for example, `Industrial Countries Agree to Cut Emissions', The Times, Thursday 
December 11 1997. 
3 Tony Juniper, `Kyoto Deal Will Not Stop Global Warming', p. 1. 
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future individuals' specific-interests and various future collectivities' group- 
interests), Kyoto will do relatively little to prevent our generation violating these 
rights. 
It would be convenient, of course, if members of existing generations could argue that 
their temporal remoteness, as well as their relative lack of power, meant that we could 
ignore the interests, needs, or rights of future persons in our decisions about how to 
treat the environment. In recent years, apparently serious philosophers have argued 
that because of the problems of Non-Identity 4 or Non-Reciprocirys we can effectively 
disregard the long-term effects of our actions, even if it can be predicted that they will 
have grave consequences for the well-being of our distant successors. I hope to have 
shown in this thesis that this view is unfounded: that, although the problems raised by 
these philosophers are of genuine concern, they complicate rather than undermine the 
obligations we have to protect the climate system for the sake of future generations. 
4 See Martin Schwartz, `Obligations to Posterity', in R. I. Sikora and Brian Barry, eds., 
Obligations to Future Generations, p. 3 if. 
5 See Martin Golding, `Obligations to Future Generations', The Monist, 56,1, January 1972, 
pp. 86ff. 
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